State v. Breed, 5D04-282.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 5D04-282.,5D04-282. |
| Citation | 917 So.2d 206 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John W. BREED and Olivia Breed, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Judy Taylor Rush, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Ronald E. Fox of Ronald E. Fox, P.A., Umatilla, for Appellees.
The State of Florida ("State") appeals an order granting John W. and Olivia Breed's motion to suppress evidence obtained subsequent to a traffic stop. The State contends that the trial judge erred when it granted the motion to suppress. We agree and reverse.
After the traffic stop, the Breeds consented to a search of their motor home. The seized evidence led to charges of possession of a controlled substance, possession of cannabis over 20 grams, and possession of paraphernalia. Thereafter, the Breeds filed a motion to suppress the evidence and statements made pursuant to the search.
At the suppression hearing, Department of Transportation Officer Charles Hunter testified that he stopped the Breeds after observing their motor home had a cracked windshield. Hunter asked Mr. Breed for his driver's license and registration. Mrs. Breed advised the officer that the registration for the vehicle in tow was in the motor home. Hunter then asked the Breeds to step outside the vehicle. As they exited their vehicle, Hunter asked the Breeds if they had "any contraband, any knives, guns, grenades, narcotics, large sums of cash, alcohol in the vehicle, [among] the contents of the vehicle." The Breeds replied no, but they had kitchen knives in the motor home. At that point, Hunter asked for, and received, consent from the Breeds to search their persons and the motor home. The consent occurred within five minutes of the stop. Officer Pelton searched the motor home and, after a two to three hour search, found marijuana.
In its oral disposition, the trial court ruled that the Breeds' consent to search their vehicle was "for a cursory search of the vehicle to look for ... possible dangerous items to the officer or whatever, but certainly not a full-blown search that was going on here keeping these people detained for this length of time."
And so they're sitting on the side of the road because they consented to search the vehicle for now up to twenty-five minutes in the scheme of things, and the officer hasn't done one lick of work towards writing a citation. I find that personally outrageous in my opinion. I'd be dad-gum irritated if an officer kept me on the side of the road for twenty-five minutes writing a traffic citation when he knew my — without writing a traffic citation, and he was going through my vehicle because I consented.
I find — and only for the purposes of this case only that the consent that was given was consent to — for a cursory search of the vehicle to look for, you know, possible dangerous items to the officer or whatever but certainly not a full-blown search that was going on here keeping these people detained for this length of time.
In its written order, the trial court suppressed all physical evidence seized and all incriminating statements made by the Breeds and ruled:
1. The initial traffic stop by Officer Hunter to inspect the safety of a damage[d] windshield was authorized.
2. Officers searched the vehicle for an unreasonable amount of time without making any effort to write the correction notice ultimately issued for the damaged windshield.
3. By the time the contraband sought to be suppressed was discovered the Accused and their vehicle had been illegally detained for an unreasonable amount of time in violation of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Florida Constitution.
The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the Breeds' motion to suppress because they consented to a search of their motor home. We agree.
We begin our inquiry by determining the trial court's reasons for granting the motion to suppress. The trial court articulated two reasons: One, the officers took an unreasonable time to write the traffic citation after the stop. Two, the Breeds were detained an unreasonable time before the contraband was discovered. Thus, the unreasonable time violated the Breeds' protection against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution.
The trial court properly applied the law when it concluded that the initial stop for the cracked windshield was a valid stop. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the United States Supreme Court ruled that it is not a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a law enforcement officer to temporarily detain a motorist for a civil traffic infraction where the officer has probable cause to believe a violation occurred. The reasonableness of the traffic stop is based upon the validity of the basis asserted by the officer making the stop. Id. at 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
Numerous Florida cases have held that a traffic stop is valid and does not violate the Fourth Amendment if an officer stops a motor vehicle for the non criminal traffic infraction of driving with a cracked windshield. See Hilton v. State, 901 So.2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (en banc); K.G.M. v. State, 816 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Smith v. State, 735 So.2d 570, 571-572 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Thomas v. State, 644 So.2d 597 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Additionally, a police officer is permitted to order the vehicle's passengers to exit the vehicle, after the stop, pending the completion of the inspection. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Smith, 735 So.2d at 571-572.
However, the trial court misapplied the law when it determined that the length of time necessary to issue a traffic citation was too long. Specifically in this case, the officer did not detain the Breeds by delaying the issuance of a citation as a subterfuge; the Breeds gave consent to search their motor home within a short time of the stop. Where an officer stops a vehicle in order to issue a non criminal traffic citation, and there is no suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may not, without more information, detain the individual longer than is reasonably necessary to issue a citation. See Thomas v. State, 614 So.2d 468, 471 (Fla.1993); Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480, 481 (Fla.1990). Once the purpose of the initial stop and detention has been satisfied, the officer no longer has any legal ground to continue to detain a motorist absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion of illegal activity. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Diaz, 850 So.2d 435 (Fla.2003). The detention may, however, continue if the driver freely and voluntarily...
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