State v. Brouillard, 96-344-C.A.

• Decision Date: 04 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 96-344-C.A.,96-344-C.A.
• Citation: 745 A.2d 759
• Parties: STATE v. Joseph BROUILLARD.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

745 A.2d 759

STATE v. Joseph BROUILLARD.

No. 96-344-C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

February 4, 2000.

Present WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Virginia M. McGinn, Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for plaintiff.

James Moretti, Cranston, for defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

This appeal from a criminal conviction challenges the voluntariness of a defendant's courthouse confession to a series of robberies that occurred in the southeastern part of Rhode Island during 1992. It also questions the propriety of the defendant's absence from a pretrial chambers conference during which the trial justice granted the defendant's motion to sever his case at trial from that of a codefendant.

The defendant, Joseph Brouillard, was indicted, tried, and convicted for committing two counts of robbery in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-39-1; committing two counts of conspiracy in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-6; carrying a pistol without a license in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8; possessing a firearm after being convicted of a crime of violence in violation of § 11-47-5; and for being a habitual criminal in violation of G.L. 1956 § 12-19-21. The defendant's cousin, Kenneth J. Brouillard (cousin), was also indicted on similar charges arising from the same incidents. However, instead of proceeding to trial, the cousin eventually pled guilty and received a sentence of twenty-five years, with eight to serve, seventeen suspended with probation. During defendant's trial, just prior to closing arguments,defendant fled the jurisdiction. The police, however, eventually apprehended him, after which the court sentenced him in 1995 to fifty years imprisonment with twenty years to serve.¹

The defendant contends on appeal that (1) his confession to the police should have been suppressed, and (2) he should receive a new trial because he was not present at a pretrial chambers conference during which the trial justice granted defendant's motion to sever his trial from that of his cousin. The defendant argues that this conference, conducted in his absence, violated his right to be present at every stage of his trial as guaranteed to him by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and by art. 1, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, as well as by Rule 43 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons expounded below, we deny defendant's appeal and affirm the judgment of conviction.

Analysis

A. Voluntariness of Defendant's Confession

The defendant claimed that he was undergoing symptoms of alcohol withdrawal when he confessed to his crimes during a pre-arraignment courthouse meeting with the police on March 31, 1992 — a meeting that defendant had requested his wife to arrange. He averred that he had been in the habit of drinking a quart of vodka and several beers per day before his March 28 arrest. The defendant further suggested that, under the conditions of withdrawal imposed upon him during his post-arrest stay in the prison hospital ward, his mental state had deteriorated so drastically that his later confession during his March 31 courthouse meeting with the police should be considered involuntary. Although defendant did not give a statement to the police on the night of his arrest, he claimed that his"deteriorated mental state caused by his alcohol withdrawal was no resistance against the coercive police conduct during his interrogation." While he was recuperating in the prison hospital ward at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), defendant contended that "the [police] threats and promises [during his initial interrogation] kept amplifying in the defendant's mind." He further asserts on appeal that the record contains sufficient facts for this Court to conclude that his courthouse confession to the police several days after his arrest was not a product of his free and rational thought and that therefore it should have been suppressed.

1. Standard of Review

In reviewing a trial justice's motion to suppress a confession, "we accord deference to the trial court's factual findings concerning the historical events pertaining to the confession by using a `clearly erroneous' standard of review." State v. Carter, 744 A.2d 839, 845 (R.I. 2000). With respect to the voluntariness of a confession, however, this Court undertakes a de novo review of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact because constitutional rights are implicated in these determinations. Id. (citing State v. Nardolillo, 698 A.2d 195 (R.I.1997)). A defendant's confession is admissible if the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights, including his right to remain silent and to obtain legal representation. See id.

2. Initiation of Contact with Police and Defendant's Waiver of his Rights

In determining the admissibility of a confession by a defendant who initially has invoked one or more of his or her Miranda² rights, two factors must be considered: (1) whether the defendant "initiated conversation" with the authorities; and (2) whether, considering the totality of the circumstances,defendant waived his or her "right to counsel and to remain silent." State v. Lionberg, 533 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.1987). In this case defendant not only initiated contact with police, but he also expressly waived his constitutional right to counsel and to remain silent immediately before he confessed to the crimes in question.

The evidence offered at the suppression hearing in this case amply supports the conclusion that defendant initiated the meeting with the police during which he confessed to the crimes in question. Even though a defendant initially invokes his or her constitutional rights, this circumstance does not preclude the defendant from subsequently changing his or her mind and offering to speak with the police, in which event any resulting statement may be considered voluntary. See id. Such an initiation of contact with the authorities must indicate "a willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about" the crimes at issue. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 412 (1983)). In Lionberg, the defendant was arrested in Kansas and initially invoked his right to counsel after being informed of his Miranda rights, at which point the police officers ceased further questioning. Id. at 1176. The police thereafter placed the defendant in a cell, and some time later he asked one of the officers when he was going to be extradited to Rhode Island. Id. When the officer responded that he was not sure the defendant would be extradited because he did not know why the defendant was wanted in Rhode Island, the defendant responded, "[T]hey want me because I killed that old lady and stole her car. That's murder one and grand theft auto." Id. This Court held that although a criminal suspect initially may invoke his or her rights and then terminate police questioning, such an event does not preclude the trial court from admitting into evidence the suspect's later confession after the suspect has changed his or her mind, has initiated police contact, and has engaged in conduct that effectively waives his or her rights to obtain legal counsel and remain silent. Id.

The only witnesses who testified at the suppression hearing in the present case were Officer Philip Martin (Officer Martin) and Detective George Arruda (Det. Arruda). Their uncontradicted testimony was that defendant, through his wife, initiated contact with them while defendant was being detained at the ACI. Detective Arruda had initially advised defendant of his rights in the early morning hours of March 28, 1992, several hours after defendant's arrest. At that time, defendant did not wish to give the police a statement. However, when testifying about the courthouse meeting with defendant on March 31, Det. Arruda described the post-arrest events that indicated that defendant had changed his mind:

"Q And who initiated the meeting between you and this Defendant on the 31st?

"A His [defendant's] wife.

"Q And you were not prepared to take a statement that morning, is that correct?

"A Not at all, sir. I never expected to speak to that gentleman.

"Q And only because of his wife having contacted the Little Compton Police did you go and meet with him, is that correct?

"A That's correct, sir."

Likewise, Officer Martin testified that a member of his department received a phone call on March 29, 1992, from defendant's wife, Gail Brouillard. Officer Martin further testified that as a result of Gail Brouillard's call, he and Det. Arruda met with defendant because "[defendant] wanted to speak with us concerning the robberies that had occurred." Such an invitation from defendant's wife certainly indicated to the police that defendant possessed a "willingness to discuss" the crimes in question. Lionberg, 533 A.2d at 1177.

Furthermore, defendant admits that he instructed his wife to call the police while he was incarcerated at the ACI because he wanted to talk with them. Once defendant initiated this contact, the police responded appropriately by meeting again with defendant and taking his statement. See State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1151 (R.I.1980)

(holding that a defendant who initially requested anattorney and later waived his rights by informing police he wanted to give a statement "knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right[s]"). In this case, without any police prompting or encouragement, much less coercion, defendant simply changed his mind after initially invoking his Miranda rights.

Nevertheless, defendant contends that his waiver of rights was involuntary because of his medical condition at the time he met with police at the Newport courthouse. He claims that he was suffering from alcohol withdrawal symptoms that impaired his capacity for...