State v. Brown
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21CA3758 |
| Citation | 2022 Ohio 4197 |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMARR E. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Jamarr E. Brown, Appellant, Pro Se.
Jeffrey C. Marks, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela C. Wells, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellee.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
{¶1} This is an appeal by appellant Jamarr E. Brown ("Brown) of his criminal conviction in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee, the state of Ohio ("state") has filed a brief in opposition.
{¶2} Brown asserts four assignments of error: (1) "It was prejudicial error in violation of the defendant-appellant's Absolute right to procedural due process of law as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I Section 16, Ohio Constitution for the trial court to dismiss the application to withdraw without the court making and filing written findings of facts and conclusions of law relative its decision to overrule the motion to withdraw plea which effectively a warranted the appellee a summary judgment[,]" (2) "It was prejudicial error in violation of the appellant's absolute right to procedural Due process of law for the trial court to sua sponte grant the State of Ohio the equivalent of a summary judgment even though the State never appeared in the case in violation of the appellant right as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Under Article I, Section 16 Ohio Constitution[,]" (3)"The trial court erred and abused its discretion and violated the appellant's absolute right to procedural due process of law where the court failed to give the motion to withdraw plea its due consideration in violation of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution [,]" and (4)"It was plain and prejudicial error for the trial court below not to Grant the appellant relief in the case where the record is clear that the appellant arrest and prosecution was illegally obtained and contrary to clearly established federal constitutional law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court and the result of defense counsel's ineffectiveness."
{¶3} In response, the state asserts: (1) the trial court is not required to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law when addressing post-sentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas according to Crim.R. 32.1, (2) when the defendant files a motion to withdraw a plea post-sentencing, the state is not required to respond and contest it - it is the defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice has occurred, (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered a ruling without a hearing on this post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, and (4) Brown's motion to withdraw guilty plea is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and he did not establish a manifest injustice occurred in his trial proceedings.
{¶4} After our review of the party's arguments, the record, and the applicable law, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown's motion to withdraw his plea. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶5} On July 12, 2019, the state charged Brown with eight criminal counts that included (1) two counts of having a weapon while under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, third-degree felonies; (2) one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a first-degree felony; (3) two counts of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of 2925.11, third and fifth-degree felonies; (4) one count of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a first-degree felony; and (5) two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03, third and fifth-degree felonies.
{¶6} On February 6, 2020, the trial court held a plea hearing during which the court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 colloquy with Brown advising him of the constitutional rights he was waiving in pleading guilty to all eight counts, and confirmed that his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Brown signed a plea agreement acknowledging the same. At sentencing the court merged: (1) counts three and six (possession of heroin and trafficking in heroin), (2) counts four and seven (aggravated possession of drugs and aggravated trafficking in drugs), (3) counts five and eight (aggravated possession of drugs and aggravated trafficking in drugs). The court then sentenced Brown as follows: Counts One and Two, 36 months; Count Three, mandatory four years; Count Four, twelve months; and Count Five, 36 months. Counts One, Two and Five were to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to Counts Three and Four.
{¶7} On June 28, 2021, Brown filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea purporting that his plea was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent because his counsel did not did not file a motion to suppress and should have requested "summary dismissal based on the insufficiency of evidence[.]" On September 27, 2021, the trial court issued an entry denying Brown's motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. It is this judgment that Brown appeals.
I. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ARTICLE I SECTION 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE APPLICATION TO WITHDRAW WITHOUT THE COURT MAKING AND FILING WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RELATIVE ITS DECISION TO OVERRULE THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA WHICH EFFECTIVELY A WARRANTED THE APPELLEE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO SUA SPONTE GRANT THE STATE OF OHIO THE EQUIVALENT OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVEN THOUGH THE STATE NEVER APPEARED IN THE CASE IN VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT RIGHT AS GUARANTEED BY THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHERE THE COURT FAILED TO GIVE THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA ITS DUE CONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ARTICLE I, SECTION 16, OHIO CONSTITUTION
IV. IT WAS PLAIN AND PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT BELOW NOT TO GRANT THE APPELLANT RELIEF IN THE CASE WHERE THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT THE APPELLANT ARREST AND PROSECUTION WAS ILLEGALLY OBTAINED AND CONTRARY TO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS DETERMINED BY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE RESULT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS.
{¶8} "An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶ 32, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus (deciding a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the trial court's discretion); State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715, (1992), paragraph two of the syllabus (deciding a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the trial court's discretion). The Supreme Court has defined" 'abuse of discretion' as an 'unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or as a view or action that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.'" State v. Kirkland, 140 Ohio St.3d 73, 2014-Ohio-1966, 15 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 67, quoting State v. Brady, 119 Ohio St.3d 375, 2008-Ohio-4493, 894 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 23." 'Abuse of discretion' has been described as including a ruling that lacks a 'sound reasoning process.'" State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶9} Crim R. 32.1 distinguishes between a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed prior to sentencing, and one filed after sentencing.
{¶10} "' "[A] presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted." '" State v. Lester, 4th Dist. Vinton No. 12CA689, 2013-Ohio-2485, quoting State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 57, quoting Xie at 527. When presented with a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the "trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea." State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 05CA9, 2005-Ohio-5015, ¶ 9, citing Xie at 527.
{¶11} However, a "defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice." State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 2019-Ohio-5206 147 N.E.3d 623, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261,361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Smith, 4th Dist. Ross No. 21CA3739, 2021-Ohio-4028, ¶ 16. "A 'manifest injustice' is defined as a clear or openly unjust act. Straley at ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d 203, 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 (1998). It "relates to a fundamental flaw in the plea proceedings resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Id., citing State v. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936 N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.), citing Kreiner at 208, 699 N.E.2d 83 and Smith at 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324. While manifest injustice...
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