State v. Brown

Decision Date17 January 2019
Docket NumberNo. 35304-4-III,35304-4-III
Citation432 P.3d 1241,7 Wash.App.2d 121
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. David Joseph BROWN, Petitioner.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

PUBLISHED OPINION

Fearing, J.¶ 1 RCW 46.61.305(2) declares that a driver must, "when required," continuously signal an intention to turn or cross lanes during at least the last one hundred feet traveled before turning or moving lanes. This appeal asks if this statute compels a driver, who moved left from a middle lane to a dedicated left turn lane while signaling his intention to change lanes, to reactivate his turn signal before turning left from the reserved turn lane. We hold that the statute only requires use of a signal in circumstances that implicate public safety. Because the circumstances surrounding David Brown’s left-hand turn from a left-turn-only lane did not jeopardize public safety, we hold that Trooper Mason Acheson lacked grounds to stop David Brown’s vehicle. We affirm the district court’s ruling that suppressed evidence resulting from the stop of Brown and reverse the superior court’s reversal of the district court’s decision. In doing so, we educate ourselves in turn signal technology.

FACTS

¶ 2 We borrow most facts from the district court’s findings of fact. On the evening of March 22, 2015, Trooper Mason Acheson patrolled the streets of Kennewick. At 10:15 p.m., while traveling eastbound on Clearwater Avenue, Trooper Acheson saw appellant, David Brown, driving a Toyota Tundra, turn right from Huntington Street onto Clearwater Avenue, a four-lane arterial. During the turn, the left side tires of the Tundra, a large pickup, crossed the white dashed divider line between the two eastbound lanes by one tire width for a brief moment, after which the vehicle fully returned to its lane of travel. Brown’s diversion across the dividing line did not endanger any travel. Acheson observed Brown’s tires cross the white dashed divider line, and he continued to view Brown’s driving thereafter.

¶ 3 Shortly after entering Clearwater Avenue, David Brown signaled his intent to change lanes, and to move to the left or inner eastbound lane, by activating his left turn signal that blinked numerous times. Brown entered the inner lane of the two lanes.

¶ 4 Soon David Brown approached the intersection of Clearwater Avenue and Highway 395, where the eastbound lanes widen to three lanes. The innermost of the three lanes becomes a designated left turn only lane. Brown again wished to change lanes so he could turn left. Brown signaled his intent to move left into the dedicated turn lane. Brown maneuvered his vehicle into the dedicated turn lane, at which point the left turn signal cycled-off.

¶ 5 The parties employ and the district court incorporated the term "cycle off," a term with which we were not familiar, before this appeal, in the context of vehicle signal lights. The turn signal for most cars includes a self-cancelling feature that returns the horizontal signal lever to the neutral, or no signal, position as the steering wheel approaches the straight forward position after completion of a turn. We assume "cycle off" refers to the activation of the self-cancelling feature. Most cars now incorporate the additional turn signal feature of a spring-loaded momentary signal position activated when the driver partially depresses or raises the horizontal stalk. The signal then operates however long the driver holds the lever partway toward the left or right turn signal detent. A driver typically lowers or raises the spring-loaded momentary signal feature when changing lanes as opposed to executing a turn from one street to another. The parties’ nomenclature and the district court’s findings of fact suggest David Brown did not employ the momentary signal when changing lanes on the second occasion while traveling east on Clearwater Avenue.

¶ 6 David Brown stopped his vehicle in the dedicated left turn lane while awaiting the light to turn green. He did not reactivate his turn signal. Trooper Mason Acheson pulled behind Brown. No other traffic was present on eastbound Clearwater Avenue. When the light turned green, Brown turned left onto northbound Highway 395. Trooper Mason Acheson then actuated his patrol vehicle’s emergency light and stopped Brown.

¶ 7 Trooper Mason Acheson stopped David Brown based on Brown’s crossing the eastbound lanes’ divider line during his turn from Huntington Street onto Clearwater Avenue. He did not stop Brown based on Brown’s failure to signal his left turn onto Highway 395. After stopping Brown, Trooper Acheson investigated Brown for suspicion of driving under the influence of intoxicants. Acheson arrested Brown for driving under the influence.

PROCEEDINGS

¶ 8 The State of Washington charged David Brown with driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Brown filed a motion to suppress evidence garnered from the stop of his car by Trooper Mason Acheson. He argued that the state trooper lacked cause to stop his vehicle. During the suppression hearing, the district court entertained testimony from Mason Acheson.

¶ 9 The State principally contended, before the district court, that State Trooper Mason Acheson possessed probable cause to stop David Brown because of Brown’s crossing of the dashed dividing line between the two eastbound lanes on Clearwater Avenue when turning right from Huntington Street. The district court concluded that, because Brown, as reasonably as practical, kept his vehicle within his lane when turning right onto Clearwater Avenue, the crossing of the dividing line on the avenue did not violate the traffic code. Therefore, Trooper Acheson lacked probable cause to stop Brown for crossing the line.

¶ 10 The State of Washington moved for reconsideration and added, based on the suppression hearing testimony of Trooper Mason Acheson, that Acheson had additional reason to stop David Brown since Brown violated RCW 46.61.305 when turning left onto Highway 395. The statute references use, for a continuous one hundred feet, of a turn signal before turning left or right.

¶ 11 With the motion for reconsideration, the district court needed to determine if David Brown’s failure to activate his turn signal before turning left onto the highway afforded probable cause. The district court reasoned:

3. Based upon the evidence presented, there was insufficient time and distance for the Defendant to comply with the signal statute while executing the lane change to enter the dedicated left turn lane at the intersection of Clearwater Ave. and SR 395. The Defendant complied with the signal statute as best he could and due to the impossibility to comply with the signal statutes requirement of signaling for 100 feet prior to making a lane change the Defendant cannot be in violation of said provision when it was impossible to comply with such.
4. The intent of turn signals is to notify other drive[r]s where the Defendant was intending to travel. Trooper Acheson’s testimony confirmed that not only did he kn[o]w where the Defendant intended to travel but in fact the Defendant did travel in the direction Trooper Acheson suspected he would go and[,] therefore, [t]he Defendant wasn’t required to re-indicate the direction he was turning from the dedicated left turn lane at the intersection of east bound Clearwater Ave. and north bound SR 395 as the Defendant had already signaled his intent to enter that lane prior to entering it.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 13. The district court concluded that, because Brown violated no traffic law, Trooper Acheson lacked probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. The district court suppressed all evidence gained from the stop and thereafter dismissed the prosecution.

¶ 12 The State of Washington appealed the dismissal to the superior court. The superior court adopted the district court’s findings of fact. Nevertheless, the superior court held that the district court erred when suppressing the evidence of intoxication gathered after the traffic stop. According to the superior court, David Brown violated RCW 46.61.305(2), which requires a continuous signal of one’s intent to turn during the last one hundred feet before turning left. Because Trooper Mason Acheson observed Brown’s failure to continuously signal before turning left onto the highway, Acheson gained reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction. The superior court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

¶ 13 David Brown sought discretionary review, before this court, of the superior court’s decision. Our court commissioner granted review. Comm’r’s Ruling, State v. Brown, No. 35304-4-III (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2017).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

¶ 14 In response to David Brown’s appeal, the State does not argue that Trooper Mason Acheson held probable cause to stop Brown based on his clumsy right turn onto Clearwater Avenue from Huntington Street. Therefore, this appeal addresses only whether Acheson possessed probable cause to stop Brown because of Brown’s failure to signal his left turn onto Highway 395.

¶ 15 We previously outlined the facts based on the district court’s findings of fact as adopted by the superior court. Neither party challenges the findings of fact before this court. Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. State v. Luther, 157 Wash.2d 63, 78, 134 P.3d 205 (2006).

¶ 16 A law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless traffic stop under article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution as an investigative stop if based on at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of either criminal activity or a traffic infraction. State v. Arreola, 176 Wash.2d 284, 292-93, 290 P.3d 983 (2012). We must determine whether David Brown’s conduct provided reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.

¶ 17 The primary issue on appeal is whether, under RCW 46.61.305, a driver must reinitiate his turn signal after he signals to enter a left-turn-only lane, enters the lane, and the turn signal cancels...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • State v. Meyers
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 31, 2020
    ...as an exception to a state rule of procedure that prohibited admission of evidence obtained unconstitutionally); State v. Brown , 7 Wash.App.2d 121, 432 P.3d 1241, 1249 (predicting that the Washington Supreme Court would not allow a mistake of law to supply reasonable suspicion because that......
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 26, 2019
    ...Because Brown was in a turn-only lane that did not jeopardize public safety, no signal was required. State v. Brown , 7 Wash. App. 2d 121, 123, 135-36, 432 P.3d 1241 (2019). Chief Judge Lawrence-Berrey dissented, reasoning that a signal must be continuous under the plain language of RCW 46.......
  • Asotin Cnty. v. Eggleston, 35720-1-III
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • January 17, 2019
    ... ... " State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (quoting Dept of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002) ). In ... ...

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT