State v. Bryant

• Decision Date: 22 July 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. Wal–12–522.
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Luke A. BRYANT.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

97 A.3d 595

2014 ME 94

STATE of Maine

v.Luke A. BRYANT.

Docket No. Wal–12–522.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: April 7, 2014.

Decided: July 22, 2014.

Steven C. Peterson, Esq., West Rockport, orally and on the briefs, for appellant Luke A. Bryant.

Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Lauren F. LaRochelle, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of Attorney General, Augusta, on the briefs, for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

SILVER, J.

[¶ 1] Luke A. Bryant appeals from a judgment of conviction of manslaughter (Class A), 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A) (2013), entered in the trial court ( R. Murray, J.) following a jury trial. Bryant contends that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with police following a shooting at his residence. We affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] “We view the record in a light most favorable to support the court's order on the motion to suppress, and find that the record supports the following facts.” State v. Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 3, 41 A.3d 535. On the evening of February 19, 2011, Detective Jason Bosco of the Waldo County Sheriff's Department responded to reports of a shooting at Bryant's residence. Bosco arrived at the scene and soon learned that an individual had been killed by what appeared to be an accidental discharge of a shotgun. Bosco asked Bryant if he would be willing to speak with him about what had happened. Bryant agreed. They then engaged in a fifteen-minute-long, audio-recorded interview in a bedroom in Bryant's apartment. Bosco testified that the focus of the interview was to investigate what he believed to be an accidental shooting, and that he had no probable cause to arrest Bryant at that time. Bosco was not in uniform, did not physically restrain Bryant, was non-confrontational, and did not inform Bryant that he was under arrest or that he was not free to leave. Bryant remained calm throughout the interview.

[¶ 3] Later that evening, Detective Jason Andrews of the Maine State Police arrived at the residence in plain clothes, met Bryant, and observed that Bryant was visibly upset. After obtaining Bryant's consent to search the apartment, Andrews asked Bryant if he would speak with him further. Andrews repeatedly informed Bryant that he was not under arrest, was not required to speak with Andrews, and was free to leave at any time. Bryant acknowledged that he understood and agreed to speak with Andrews. After Bryant expressed a desire to leave the apartment, Andrews suggested that they continue the interview in Andrews's unmarked police cruiser. Bryant agreed. Bosco was also present for much of the interview in the cruiser, which lasted approximately two hours, was audio-recorded, and was non-confrontational. At no point during the interview did Bryant or the detectives raise their voices. Bryant remained calm and provided responsive and focused statements. A number of times throughout the interview, Andrews told Bryant that he was free to leave at any time.

[¶ 4] During the interview in the cruiser, the detectives repeatedly asked Bryant to return to the apartment to participate in a reenactment of the shooting. Bryant was initially unwilling to go back inside, but after the detectives informed him that the victim's body had been removed from the apartment, he agreed to go inside. The detectives and Bryant returned to the scene of the shooting and conducted a walk-through that lasted approximately twenty-five minutes and was video-recorded.

[¶ 5] At the conclusion of the interview, Bryant left the residence with friends. At no time during the various interviews did any police officer provide Bryant with Miranda warnings.

[¶ 6] On May 20, 2011, the Waldo County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Bryant with manslaughter in violation of 17–A M.R.S. § 203(1)(A). Bryant pleaded not guilty at arraignment. He later moved to suppress the statements he had made to Bosco and Andrews on February 19, 2011.¹ Bryant argued that his statements were made in the course of custodial interrogation without having received Miranda warnings, and that his emotional state rendered his statements involuntary.² The court held an evidentiary hearing on Bryant's motion. The State presented the detectives' testimony and introduced audio and video recordings of the interviews. Following the hearing, the court entered an order denying Bryant's motion to suppress, concluding that Bryant was not in custody and that his statements were voluntarily given.

[¶ 7] At trial, the State introduced the audio and video recordings of the interviews. After a three-day trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Bryant guilty of manslaughter. The court sentenced Bryant to fifteen years in prison, with all but nine years suspended, and four years of probation. Bryant timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 8] Bryant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress for two reasons: first, because he was subjected to custodial interrogation but did not receive Miranda warnings, and second, because he was in a state of shock and emotional distress that rendered his statements involuntary. We review the trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error, and its ultimate determination regarding suppression de novo. State v. Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 8, 48 A.3d 769. Because Bryant does not challenge the court's factual findings, we need only review the court's ultimate legal conclusions that Bryant was not in custody and that he made his statements voluntarily. See State v. Lowe, 2013 ME 92, ¶¶ 13–14, 81 A.3d 360; Bailey, 2012 ME 55, ¶ 12, 41 A.3d 535.

A. Whether Bryant's Statements Were Made in the Course of Custodial Interrogation

[¶ 9] “A person who is in custody and subject to interrogation must be advised of the rights referred to in Miranda v. Arizona in order for statements made during the interrogation to be admissible against [him] as part of the State's direct case at trial.” State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 23, 829 A.2d 247; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The State does not dispute that Bryant was “interrogated”for purposes of Miranda. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (defining “interrogation,” for purposes of Miranda, as “express questioning or its functional equivalent”). Rather, the issue is whether Bryant was in custody when he made his statements to the police.

[¶ 10] A subject is “in custody” if he is subjected to either (1) a formal arrest (which the parties agree was not the case here), or (2) “a restraint on freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222 (quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). To determine whether Bryant was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest, we ask “whether a reasonable person, standing in the defendant's shoes, would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Bragg, 2012 ME 102, ¶ 8, 48 A.3d 769 (quotation marks omitted). In making this objective determination, we consider various factors, viewing them in their totality:

(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;

(2) the party who initiated the contact;

(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);

(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;

(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;

(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);

(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;

(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;

(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and

(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.

Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222; see also State v. Jones, 2012 ME 126, ¶ 22, 55 A.3d 432 (“We consider these factors in their totality, not in isolation.” (quotation marks omitted)).

[¶ 11] The totality of the factors establishes that Bryant was not in custody at any point during the interview conducted in the bedroom by Bosco, the interview conducted in the cruiser by Bosco and Andrews, or the walk-through reenactment in the apartment. Throughout the interviews, the detectives repeatedly asked Bryant's permission to speak with him, and Bryant repeatedly consented. See State v. Nightingale, 2012 ME 132, ¶ 17, 58 A.3d 1057 (suspect was not in custody where he voluntarily participated in an interview with police), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 2798, 186 L.Ed.2d 864 (2013); State v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 55, 1 A.3d 445 (suspect was not in custody in his dorm room where he consented to the police's request to enter his room). The detectives did not physically restrain Bryant, see State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d 1349, 1358–59 (Me.1981) (lack of restraint on defendant at the time of questioning is relevant to custody determination), and they repeatedly told Bryant that he was not under arrest and was free to terminate the conversation and leave at any time; in fact, Bryant did leave at the end of the interviews, see Nightingale, 2012 ME 132, ¶¶ 17–18, 58 A.3d 1057 (suspect was not in custody where the police informed him that he could terminate the interview at any time, and where the suspect did terminate the interview). Both the detectives and Bryant remained calm and non-confrontational throughout the entire encounter. See Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶ 55, 1 A.3d 445 (suspect...