State v. Michaud

• Decision Date: 25 November 1998
• Citation: 1998 ME 251,724 A.2d 1222
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Dean MICHAUD.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

724 A.2d 1222

1998 ME 251

STATE of Maine v. Dean MICHAUD.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued October 6, 1998.

Decided November 25, 1998.

Andrew Ketterer, Attorney General, Donald W. Macomber (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Fernand R. LaRochelle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for State.

E. Allen Hunter (orally), Solman & Hunter, P.A., Caribou, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, SAUFLEY, and ALEXANDER, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Dean Michaud ("Michaud") appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (Aroostook County, Calkins, J.) in a jury-waived trial finding him guilty of reckless manslaughter in violation of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A) (1983 & Supp.1998),¹ and from the sentence imposed. Michaud contends that: (1) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was not sufficient to either (a) establish the corpus delicti for homicide, (b) establish recklessness, (c) establish causation, or (d) disprove his self-defense claim; (3) the court erred in denying his request for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) the court erred in sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm both the judgment and the sentence.

[¶ 2] The State presented evidence at trial that would permit the following factual findings: On September 11, 1996, Michaud caused the death of Thomas Maki ("Maki") by drowning him in the St. John River in Frenchville, Maine. Prior to the incident, Maki had recently begun courting Michaud's former girlfriend, Barbie Ouellette ("Ouellette"). After an "on again, off again" romantic relationship that lasted approximately fourteen months, Michaud broke up with Ouellette for the third and final time on September 3, 1996. Maki met Ouellette during the same week and began spending time with her, much to Michaud's chagrin. Michaud became jealous because Ouellette showed a growing interest in Maki. After many unsuccessful attempts to salvage his relationship with Ouellette, Michaud asked Maki to accompany him to the St. John River to talk on September 11, 1996. An altercation broke out between Michaud and Maki in the shallow water near the rocky shore of the river. During the struggle, Michaud pushed or struck Maki and caused him to fall on his back and hit his head on the rocks. While grappling in the shallow water with Michaud on top of him, Maki inhaled water while his head was below the surface. At the time of the drowning, Michaud was an eighteen-year-old student at the University of Maine at Fort Kent ("UMFK") and a citizen of New Brunswick, Canada. Maki was a twenty-year-old UMFK student. Michaud was approximately 6'4" tall and weighed around 180 to 200 pounds. Maki was 5'10" tall and weighed 150 pounds. An autopsy examination revealed numerous injuries to Maki's head, throat, neck, and back. Michaud had no injuries except for one or two small red spots on his face.

I.

[¶ 3] Michaud first asserts that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to the police on September 11 and 12, 1996, because he was "in custody" and did not receive Miranda² warnings. The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona held that, in order to safeguard an uncounseled criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, law enforcement officers may not begin a custodial interrogation before warning the suspect "that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The United States Supreme Court has defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995) (quotations omitted). Therefore, a Miranda warning is necessary only if a defendant is: (1) "in custody"; and (2) "subject to interrogation." State v. Swett, 1998 ME 76, ¶ 4, 709 A.2d 729, 730.

[¶ 4] A defendant is "in custody" if subject to either: (a) a formal arrest; or (b) a "restraint on freedom of movement [to] the degree associated with a formal arrest." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (quotations omitted). To determine whether a defendant was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest, a court must ascertain "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed he was in police custody and constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest." In making this "reasonable person" analysis of whether a defendant is "in custody," a court may examine a number of objective factors, including:

(1) the locale where the defendant made the statements;

(2) the party who initiated the contact;

(3) the existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extend communicated to the defendant);

(4) subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant, to the extend they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;

(5) subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;

(6) the focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);

(7) whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;

(8) the number of law enforcement officers present;

(9) the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect; and

(10) the duration and character of the interrogation.

See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 509 A.2d 1160, 1163 n. 3 (Me.1986)

; State v. Thibodeau, 496 A.2d 635, 639 (Me.1985); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). We will not reverse a trial court's custodial determination unless the record fails to rationally support the finding. See Swett, 1998 ME 76, ¶ 4,

709 A.2d at 730.

[¶ 5] After examining the above factors in light of the September 11, 1996 hospital interview, the court concluded that, "under the totality of the circumstances, ... a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed he was in police custody and constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest." After analyzing the facts surrounding the September 12, 1996 interview at the crime scene, the court also found "little merit to the suggestion that the interviews ... were custodial." Based on the above custodial interrogation factors, the record contains evidence that rationally supports the conclusion that Michaud was not "in custody" when he spoke with the police at the hospital. See State v. Carr, 1997 ME 221, ¶ 11, 704 A.2d 353, 356-57

. Therefore, the court did not err in denying Michaud's motion to suppress the statements he made during either the hospital interview or the crime scene interview.

II.

A.

[¶ 6] Michaud challenges the trial court's corpus delicti³ ruling. In a homicide case, the corpus delicti rule requires the State to establish both that: (1) the victim died; and (2) a criminal agency was responsible for the death.⁴ See State v. Buzzell, 617 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1992)

. The State's burden of proving the corpus delicti (i.e., that the victim died as the result of a criminal agency) has two prongs. See State v. Chad B., 1998 ME 150, ¶ 5, 715 A.2d 144, 146. First, the State must produce sufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti under a "substantial belief" standard, without relying on any of the defendant's post-crime admissions. See id. Second, after including the defendant's post-crime admissions, the entire record must contain sufficient evidence to prove the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.

[¶ 7] Under the first prong of the State's burden of proof, we review the trial court's factual findings only for clear error. See Chad B., 1998 ME 150, ¶ 8, 715 A.2d at 146-47. However, whether the court's factual findings were sufficient to establish a substantial belief that the victim died as the result of a criminal agency is a question of law that we review de novo. See id.

[¶ 8] Pursuant to the corpus delicti rule, a court may not allow a defendant's admission in evidence⁵ until the State has met its burden of proving the corpus delicti to a "substantial belief" standard, under the first prong.⁶ See State v. Reed, 676 A.2d 479, 481 (Me.1996)

. The substantial belief standard is an objective standard that requires neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt nor proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. See Chad B.,

1998 ME 150, ¶ 6,

715 A.2d at 146. Rather, the substantial belief standard "resembles the probable cause standard." Id. (quotations omitted). "In the context of the corpus delicti rule, `[p]robable cause exists where facts and circumstances within the [factfinder's] knowledge . . . would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe' that someone committed the crime." Id. (quotations omitted).

[¶ 9] When viewed objectively, the facts as the court found them were "sufficient to establish a substantial belief that [Maki] died as the result of a criminal agency," independent of Michaud's post-conviction admissions. Id. In light of Maki's injuries and Dr. Ryan's testimony, the evidence "would warrant a prudent and cautious person to believe" that Maki died as a result of criminal means, rather than by natural causes, accident, or suicide. Id. Nor would the existence of other explanations for the circumstances surrounding Maki's death preclude such a finding.⁷ See State v. Reed, 676 A.2d 479, 482 (Me.1996)

. The State satisfied its burden of introducing sufficient evidence independent of Michaud's statements to warrant a "substantial belief" of criminal agency. See Chad B.,

1998 ME 150, ¶ 6,

715 A.2d at 146. Therefore, the court did not err in determining that the State met its...