State v. Bunting
| Decision Date | 17 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 31655.,31655. |
| Citation | 142 Idaho 908,136 P.3d 379 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Bran L. BUNTING, Defendant-Appellant. |
William M. Appleton, Coeur d'Alene, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.
Bran L. Bunting appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing. Bunting specifically challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence. Because we conclude that Bunting's motion to suppress should have been granted, we vacate Bunting's judgment of conviction.
In September 2003, there was an explosion and ensuing fire in Bunting's garage. Bunting and his neighbor, Gerald Blake, put out the fire. Neither Bunting nor Blake phoned for emergency services, but neighbors across the street did so. The police were the first to arrive at the scene. Bunting was outside and one of the officers asked Bunting if there was anyone else inside the house. Bunting responded he did not know. The officer asked if he could check the house and the garage, and Bunting consented. Three officers went into the home. In the garage, one of the officers reported that there was intense heat and acrid fumes, but no flames. The officer saw a scorched table in the garage with several items on or near it, including a butane torch, a burner, a small propane tank, a roll of aluminum foil, a broken glass jar, and an empty pill bottle underneath the table. The officers all exited the home after being satisfied that no one else was in the building.
After leaving the house, one officer questioned Bunting regarding what had happened. Bunting responded that he had been asleep and heard the explosion. When asked, Bunting admitted that the house was his, that Blake had been in the garage cleaning car parts and that it was not uncommon for people to be in his home without his knowledge. Another officer went next door and contacted Blake. Blake had a large, fresh burn wound on his nose. Blake claimed he had been cleaning car parts with kerosene and lit a cigarette, which ignited the kerosene and caused the explosion and fire.
Firefighters arrived and entered the garage. The officer who had questioned Blake then went back into the garage. The officer noticed a closed blue cooler under the scorched table. The officer asked the firefighters if they had checked the cooler. In response, the firefighters dragged the cooler out and the lid, which was broken, came ajar. The officer saw the contents of the cooler, specifically jars, tubing and funnels and suspected these items were used for methamphetamine production. The officers regrouped and contacted a drug task force officer, who arrived at the scene shortly thereafter.
The drug task force officer went into Bunting's garage and discovered further evidence consistent with methamphetamine production. The drug task force officer then sought and received a search warrant for both Bunting's and Blake's homes. The warrant was served the following day and methamphetamine, as well as additional methamphetamine-making supplies, were discovered in and around Bunting's house. The state charged Bunting with possession of methamphetamine, I.C. § 37-2731(c)(1), and trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing, I.C. §§ 37-2732B(a)(3), 37-2732B(a)(3), and 18-204.
Bunting moved to suppress the evidence seized from his house, which the district court denied. A jury found Bunting guilty of both charges. The district court sentenced Bunting to concurrent unified terms of seven years, with a minimum period of confinement of two years, for possession of methamphetamine and twelve and one-half years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years, for trafficking in methamphetamine by manufacturing. Bunting appeals.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct.App.1999).
Although it did not base its ultimate ruling to deny Bunting's motion to suppress on the issue, the district court determined that there were probably exigent circumstances justifying police reentry into the house after their initial sweep. The district court reasoned that, so long as the police did not go beyond the area of the firefighters' operation, there was enough overlap between the police and firefighters' investigation to allow the police to follow the firefighters back into the house. Bunting argues that the police reentry did not meet all the requirements of the following-in-the-footsteps of emergency personnel exception to the warrant requirement.
Whether a search complies with the Fourth Amendment is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct.App.1998). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution prohibit the government from engaging in warrantless searches and seizures. Therefore, a police officer's or other state agent's warrantless entry into a home is presumed to be unlawful unless it falls within a well-recognized exception. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991, 114 L.Ed.2d 619, 634 (1991); State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04, 975 P.2d 789, 791-92 (1999); State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847, 849, 41 P.3d 275, 277 (Ct.App.2001). Under the exigent circumstances exception, agents of the state may engage in warrantless searches when there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486, 498 (1978); Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho at 849, 41 P.3d at 277. However, a warrantless search under this exception must be strictly circumscribed by the nature of the exigency that justifies the intrusion. State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 99, 57 P.3d 807, 810 (Ct.App.2002). The test for application of this warrant exception is whether the facts as known to the agent at the time of entry, together with reasonable inferences, would warrant a reasonable belief that an exigency justified the intrusion. State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 217 (Ct.App.2003). The burden is on the state to show the applicability of this exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218-19, 984 P.2d 703, 706-07 (1999).
The traditional exigencies that justify a warrantless entry by law enforcement officers are the pursuit of a fleeing felon, imminent risk of destruction of evidence, preventing a suspect from escaping, or danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1689-90, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 95-96 (1990). A structural fire is also an exigent circumstance where no warrant is required for firefighters to enter a building to fight a fire and stay a reasonable length of time to determine the cause of the fire. Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 1950-51, 56 L.Ed.2d at 499-500. Medical emergencies also qualify as exigencies and emergency personal may enter a building without a warrant to perform emergency medicine or rescue. See State v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 557, 21 P.3d 491, 494 (Ct.App.2001). This Court has previously held that a police officer may follow emergency personnel into a premises without a search warrant under certain, narrowly-defined circumstances, stating:
[A]n officer may follow in the footsteps of firefighters or other emergency response personnel who, while lawfully present in response to an exigent circumstance, have discovered contraband or other evidence of criminal activity in plain view, and have thereupon requested police assistance. In such a circumstance, the defendant's privacy interest has already been compromised to the extent of the emergency personnel's intrusion. So long as the emergency personnel are still lawfully on the premises at the time of the police officer's arrival, and the officer's intrusion does not exceed that of the emergency personnel, either temporally or spatially, the defendant suffers no additional injury to his privacy interest by the officer's entry for purposes of seizing the already-discovered contraband.
Bower, 135 Idaho at 560, 21 P.3d at 497.
In Bower, paramedics entered a motel room to treat a man who had collapsed in the bathroom. One paramedic noticed what appeared to be drug paraphernalia in plain view. The paramedics summoned the police. Upon arrival, the police entered the motel without a warrant to investigate the evidence of a potential crime reported by the paramedics. We determined that the exigency created by the injured defendant in his motel room allowed the paramedics to enter without a warrant. After the paramedics noticed the drug paraphernalia and summoned the police, the police could follow in the footsteps of the emergency personal without a warrant. Bower, 135 Idaho at 560, 21 P.3d at 497.
In Buterbaugh, a police officer conducted a warrantless search of a basement after the fire chief requested police assistance because he had discovered a marijuana-growing apparatus while investigating the cause of a fire in the...
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