State v. Butcher

• Decision Date: 26 November 1986
• Docket Number: No. 86-182,86-182
• Citation: 27 Ohio St.3d 28,27 OBR 445,500 N.E.2d 1368
• Parties: , 27 O.B.R. 445 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BUTCHER, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 28

27 Ohio St.3d 28

500 N.E.2d 1368, 27 O.B.R. 445

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BUTCHER, Appellee.

No. 86-182.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Nov. 26, 1986.

Appellee, Michael Butcher, was arrested on May 8, 1984 and charged in the Cleveland Municipal Court with having committed the offense of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02. He was placed in jail on the day of his arrest, where he remained until May 29, 1984, when he was released on bond. On June 13, 1984, appellee was indicted for the robbery offense, as well as an aggravating specification alleging that he had previously been convicted of armed robbery in 1971.

An arraignment was conducted on June 29, 1984, resulting in an increase in appellee's bail from $5,000 to $20,000. Since appellee was unable to secure a bond for that amount, he was again placed in jail until his case proceeded to trial on January 22, 1985. Four days prior to trial, counsel for appellee filed a motion seeking dismissal of the charges on the basis that appellee was denied his right to a speedy trial within the parameters of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. ¹ The trial court conducted an oral hearing on the motion immediately prior to the commencement of the trial, at which time the motion was overruled. A trial to the court ensued, and appellee was found guilty as charged in the indictment. He was then sentenced to a term of thirteen to fifteen years of imprisonment at the Chillicothe Correctional Institute.

On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that since appellee had presented a prima facie case for discharge when he was not brought to trial by August 27, 1984, ² a burden of production rested with the state to demonstrate that appellee was not entitled to the triple-count provision prescribed in R.C. 2945.71(E). Because the record was devoid of evidence demonstrating the nonapplicability of the triple-count provision, the court concluded that the charges against appellee should have been dismissed for lack of a speedy trial.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of the state's motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and John P. Tremsyn, Cleveland, for appellant.

Paul Mancino, Jr., Cleveland, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Without citation to any legal authority whatsoever, the state maintains that when a criminal defendant is being held in jail as a result of having been charged with the commission of separate and distinct felonies, the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(E) is not applicable. Presumably, the state seeks to invoke the rule contained in State v. Ladd (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 197, 383 N.E.2d 579 , syllabus, and State v. MacDonald (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 357 N.E.2d 40 , paragraph one of the syllabus, that "R.C. 2945.71(D) is applicable only to those defendants held in jail in lieu of bail solely on the pending charge." ³ Although we continue to adhere to the principles espoused in Ladd and MacDonald, these cases are inapposite to the subject cause.

In his January 18, 1985 motion for discharge, appellee alleged that he was not afforded a speedy trial under R.C. 2945.71(E), and that he remained in jail since the date of his arraignment "solely on this pending cause." At the oral hearing on the motion, the state argued appellee was not being held in jail solely for the charge contained in the indictment, but rather, that he was also being held for "numerous" other charges stemming from a variety of felonies which he allegedly committed. Continuing, the state suggested that, as a result of those other charges, appellee was not entitled to the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(E), thereby allowing the trial to commence within two hundred seventy days of his arrest.

We agree with the court of appeals that the state failed to document its position at the oral hearing by way of records ⁴ demonstrating the existence of other pending charges sufficient to invoke the rule of Ladd and MacDonald. In fact, a review of the record reveals an absence of any documents establishing that appellee's confinement was related to charges other than the pending charge. When appellee alleged in his motion that he was incarcerated "solely on this pending charge" and then demonstrated he was not brought to trial within the limits imposed by the triple-count provision, he presented a prima facie case for discharge. At that point a burden of production arose whereby the state became obligated to produce evidence demonstrating appellee was not entitled to be brought to trial within the limits of R.C. 2945.71(E). Having failed to produce any such evidence, the court of appeals correctly held that the state did not meet its burden of establishing that appellee was not entitled to the triple-count provision under the statute.

We have repeatedly stated that as valid legislative enactments, R.C. 2945.71 and 2945.73 are mandatory and must be strictly adhered to by the state. State v. Cross (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 270, 271 N.E.2d 264 , paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Gray (1964), 1 Ohio St.2d 21, 203 N.E.2d 319 , paragraph one of the syllabus. In the present case the record unequivocally demonstrates the...