State v. Butler
| Decision Date | 30 May 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. CV–12–0402–PR.,CV–12–0402–PR. |
| Citation | 302 P.3d 609,661 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33,232 Ariz. 84 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Petitioner, v. Hon. Jane A. BUTLER, Judge Pro Tempore of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pima, Respondent Judge, Tyler B., Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Barbara Lawall, Pima County Attorney by Nicolette Kneup, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for State of Arizona.
Hernandez & Robles PC by Joshua F. Hamilton, Tucson, Attorneys for Tyler B.
Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice by David J. Euchner, Chandler, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice.
Nesci & St Louis PLLC by James Nesci, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae National College of DUI Defense, Inc.
ACLU Foundation of Arizona by Daniel Pochoda, Kelly J. Flood, Phoenix, and Perkins Coie LLP by Jean–Jacques Cabou, Thomas D. Ryerson, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Arizona.
Juvenile Law Center by Lourdes M. Rosado, Philadelphia, PA, and Nuccio & Shirly by Jeanne Shirly, Tucson, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center, Center on Children and Families, Central Juvenile Defender Center, Children and Family Justice Center, The Children's Law Center Inc., Children & Youth Law Clinic, Civitas ChildLaw Center, Juvenile & Special Education Law Clinic/University of the District of Columbia, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Justice Policy Institute, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, National Center for Youth Law, National Juvenile Defender Center, National Juvenile Justice Network, Northeast Juvenile Defender Center, Pacific Juvenile Defender Center, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Rutgers School of Law Camden Children's Justice Clinic, Rutgers Urban Legal Clinic, San Francisco Office of the Public Defenders, University of Michigan Juvenile Justice Clinic, Neelum Arya, Tamara Birckhead, Susan L. Brooks, Michele Deitch, Jeffrey Fagan, Barbara Fedders, Barry Feld, Frank Furstenberg, Theresa Glennon, Martin Guggenheim, Kristin Henning, Randy Hertz, Paul Holland, Julie E. McConnell, James R. Merikangas, Wallace Mlyniec, Catherine J. Ross, Elizabeth Scott, Abbe Smith, and Barbara Bennett Woodhouse.
[232 Ariz. 86]¶ 1 Arizona's implied consent statute, A.R.S. § 28–1321, outlines how law enforcement officers can obtain consent to blood and breath tests from persons arrested for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and provides consequences for arrestees who refuse to submit to a test. Against this backdrop, we address whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a juvenile arrestee's consent be voluntary to allow a warrantless blood draw. We hold that it does and that the juvenile court properly ruled that evidence of a blood draw was inadmissible because the juvenile did not voluntarily consent.
¶ 2 On February 17, 2012, Tyler B., a sixteen-year-old high school student, and two friends arrived late to school. A school monitor smelled marijuana on the boys and also saw drug paraphernalia in Tyler's car. School officials detained the boys in separate rooms and contacted the sheriff's office.
¶ 3 A deputy sheriff soon arrived and read Miranda warnings to Tyler. In the presence of several school officials, Tyler admitted that he had driven his car to school after smoking marijuana and that he owned some of the drug paraphernalia in the car. The deputy informed Tyler that he was under arrest for DUI and other offenses. Tyler became agitated and the deputy placed him in handcuffs. The deputy left Tyler with the assistant principal for about ten minutes while retrieving a phlebotomy kit to do a blood draw.
¶ 4 When the deputy returned to the room, he saw that Tyler had calmed down, so he removed the handcuffs from the youth. He read Tyler an “implied consent admonition” twice, first verbatim and then in “plain English.” The admonition provided in relevant part:
Arizona law requires you to submit to and successfully complete tests of breath, blood or other bodily substance as chosen by the law enforcement officer to determine alcohol concentration or drug content. The law enforcement officer may require you to submit to two or more tests. You are required to successfully complete each of the tests.
If the test results are not available ... or indicate any drug defined in ARS 13–3401 or its metabolite, without a valid prescription, your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended for not less than 90 consecutive days.
If you refuse to submit or do not successfully complete the specified tests, your Arizona driving privilege will be suspended for 12 months, or for two years if there is a prior implied consent refusal, within the last 84 months, on your record. You are, therefore, required to submit to the specified tests.
Tyler agreed verbally and in writing to have his blood drawn, and the deputy drew two vials of Tyler's blood.
¶ 5 The State charged Tyler with DUI. Tyler moved to suppress evidence of the blood draw, arguing that his consent had not been voluntary and that, as a minor, he lacked the legal capacity to consent. The juvenile court granted the motion, finding that the blood draw violated Arizona's Parents' Bill of Rights (“PBR”), A.R.S. § 1–602, and, notwithstanding the PBR, that Tyler's consent had been involuntary under the totality of the circumstances. The court relied in part on In re Andre M., in which this Court recognized the “increased susceptibility and vulnerability of juveniles” in assessing whether a juvenile's confession was voluntary under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 207 Ariz. 482, 485 ¶ 9, 88 P.3d 552, 555 (2004).
¶ 6 On the State's petition for special action relief, the court of appeals reversed the juvenile court's ruling. State v. Butler, 231 Ariz. 42, 45 ¶ 11, 290 P.3d 435, 438 (App.2012). The court first held that the PBR did not apply because the deputy was acting within the scope of his official duties. Id. at 44 ¶ 6, 290 P.3d at 437. It then held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply because the blood was not testimonial evidence. Id. at 45 ¶ 10, 290 P.3d at 438. Stating that “the informed consent statute presents no Fourth Amendment issue,” the court of appeals held that the juvenile court abused its discretion in suppressing the blood draw evidence. Id. ¶ 10 n. 6.
¶ 7 We granted review because this case raises questions of first impression and statewide importance. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 5(3) of Arizona's Constitution and A.R.S. § 12–120.24.
¶ 8 The Fourth Amendment provides, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated....” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is properly suppressed. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Trial court rulings on motions to suppress are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60, 70 ¶ 23, 280 P.3d 604, 614 (2012). “We consider the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court's ruling.” Id.
¶ 9 Tyler argues that a blood draw is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment and, to be valid, requires either a warrant or an exception such as voluntary consent. The State responds that every Arizona motorist gives “implied consent” under § 28–1321 and that tests administered under the statute are not subject to a Fourth Amendment voluntariness analysis. The State further argues that “adult privileges carry adult responsibilities,” and thus juveniles should not be treated differently from adults in assessing the voluntariness of consent to a blood draw.
¶ 10 Contrary to the State's argument, a compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to § 28–1321, is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment's constraints. See Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1556, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (). “Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's ‘most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.’ ” Id. at 1558 (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985)).
¶ 11 McNeely also forecloses the State's arguments that requiring warrants for blood draws will unduly burden law enforcement officials or render Arizona's implied consent law meaningless. “In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.” Id. at 1561.
¶ 12 In general, under the Fourth Amendment, warrantless searches “are per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). One such exception is exigent circumstances, but the State has not argued that this exception authorized the blood draw here.
¶ 13 Consent can also allow a warrantless search, provided the consent is voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226–28, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Voluntariness is assessed from the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Relevant circumstances include the suspect's age and intelligence as well as the length of detention. See id. at 226–27, 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041.
¶ 14 We reject the State's contention that age should be disregarded in assessing a juvenile's consent to a blood draw. In various contexts, the law recognizes a juvenile's age as a relevant consideration. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, ––– U.S. ––––, 131...
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