State v. E.C.

Decision Date26 August 2022
Docket Number2021-179
PartiesState of Vermont v. E.C.
CourtVermont Supreme Court

On Appeal from Superior Court, Windham Unit & Windsor Unit Criminal Divisions

John R. Treadwell, J. (Windham); Elizabeth D. Mann, J. (Windsor)

Evan Meenan, Deputy State's Attorney, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cabot Teachout of DesMeules, Olmstead &Ostler, Norwich, for Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Cohen and Waples, JJ., and Mello, Supr. J., Specially Assigned

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1. In this consolidated appeal, petitioner E.C. challenges two trial court orders denying his requests to expunge his criminal-history records. We conclude that his petitions were properly denied under the governing law and therefore affirm but remand for the Windham criminal division to expunge any of petitioner's convictions eligible under 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 31.

¶ 2. Petitioner's criminal-history records include several felony and misdemeanor convictions, as well as several charges that were dismissed before trial. In 2020, petitioner filed petitions in the Windham and Windsor criminal divisions seeking to seal or expunge his records, asserting that relief could be granted under various statutory provisions.

¶ 3. As relevant to this appeal, petitioner sought expungement on two grounds in the Windham criminal division.[1] First, he argued that his dismissed charges should be expunged under 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(B), which directs a court to expunge a record "related to the citation or arrest of a person within 60 days after the final disposition of the case if . the charge is dismissed with prejudice," unless a party objects in the interests of justice. Petitioner explained that the three-year statute of limitations had expired for each of his dismissed charges, and that the dismissals therefore were with prejudice by operation of the statute and thus were eligible for expungement under § 7603(e)(1)(B).

¶ 4. Second, he argued that his convictions for offenses committed when he was seventeen years old, including misdemeanor possession of marijuana, should be expunged under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B), which permits a person to request expungement if they were "convicted of an offense for which the underlying conduct is no longer prohibited by law or designated as a criminal offense." Petitioner noted that the Legislature had amended the marijuana-possession laws to make possession a civil penalty if it involves less than one ounce of marijuana by a person between sixteen and twenty-one years old. See 18 V.S.A. § 4230b(a). He also noted that the Legislature amended the superior court's jurisdiction to provide that proceedings against persons under eighteen years of age must be filed as delinquent acts in the family division and are therefore no longer criminal offenses under the law. See 33 V.S.A. § 5203. Accordingly, he argued that these offenses are no longer designated as criminal and were therefore eligible for expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B). The State filed an objection to expungement.

¶ 5. The Windham criminal division rejected petitioner's claims for expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(B) because it concluded that provision did not operate retroactively to reach charges dismissed before it took effect. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that some of his convictions qualified for expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B), relying on State v. Turner, 2021 VT 30, ¶ 13, ____ Vt. ____, 254 A.3d 204. The court, however, granted petitioner's request for sealing in multiple dockets under 33 V.S.A. § 5119.

¶ 6. In the Windsor criminal division, petitioner only sought expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(B), again arguing that his charges dismissed without prejudice were eligible for expungement because the limitations period had expired. The State filed an objection. Unlike the Windham criminal division, the Windsor criminal division did not consider whether § 7603(e) applied retroactively. Instead, it reasoned that § 7603(e) did not apply because petitioner's charges were dismissed without prejudice. Even if the dismissals had been with prejudice, the court explained, the State's objection would have blocked expungement. Accordingly, the court rejected the petition.

¶ 7. Petitioner appealed both orders, and we granted the motion to consolidate the appeals for review. Petitioner also sought to seal the appellate record. The State did not object to petitioner's request. A single Justice held a hearing under Vermont Rule for Public Access to Court Records 9(a). The Court granted the request to seal the record temporarily, pending decision on the merits of the appeal.

¶ 8. On appeal, petitioner argues that his convictions are eligible for expungement under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B) notwithstanding our interpretation in Turner because, in his view, there is clear legislative intent in Title 33 to "treat the juvenile behavior of minors differently from the criminal acts of adults." He also argues that the courts misconstrued 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e), contending that: (1) the statute applies retroactively to reach his dismissals; (2) his dismissals operated as dismissals with prejudice as a matter of law because the statute of limitations for each charge has elapsed; and (3) the State cannot unilaterally block a petition for expungement by objecting.

¶ 9. This appeal raises questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Turner, 2021 VT 30, ¶ 5. In interpreting a statute, our goal is to "identify and implement the Legislature's intent." State v. Hinton, 2020 VT 68, ¶ 11, 213 Vt. 1, 239 A.3d 246. "We start with the plain language of the statute, and if the meaning is clear, we will enforce it according to its terms." State v. Richland, 2015 VT 126, ¶ 6, 200 Vt. 401, 132 A.3d 702. If the language is ambiguous, "we ascertain legislative intent through consideration of the entire statute, including its subject matter, effects and consequences, as well as the reason and spirit of the law." State v. Berard, 2019 VT 65, ¶ 12, 211 Vt. 39, 220 A.3d 759. We discuss each order in turn.

I. Windham Criminal Division Order
A. 13 V.S.A. § 7602

¶ 10. We first address petitioner's argument that his convictions are eligible for expungement under 13 V.S.A § 7602(a)(1)(B). Section 7602(a)(1)(B) permits a person to file a petition requesting expungement of a conviction if "the person was convicted of an offense for which the underlying conduct is no longer prohibited by law or designated as a criminal offense."

¶ 11. In Turner, this Court interpreted § 7602(a)(1)(B) to permit expungement of an offense where the underlying conduct has been both legalized and decriminalized. 2021 VT 30, ¶ 13. In so holding, we acknowledged that the statutory language was ambiguous because both the defendant and the State urged interpretations that rendered one of the clauses superfluous. Id. ¶ 9. Accordingly, we turned to the plain language of the statute and reasoned that while "or" commonly means "one thing or another," "it is also used after a negative verb to mean one thing and also not another." Id. ¶ 12 (quotation omitted). Because the ambiguous clauses in § 7602(a)(1)(B) followed the negative phrase "no longer," we concluded that the statute only permits expungement "when the underlying conduct is both no longer prohibited by law and no longer designated as a criminal offense." Id. ¶ 13.

¶ 12. Petitioner argues that when applied in the juvenile context, § 7602(a)(1)(B) is no longer ambiguous because the provisions of Title 33 governing juvenile proceedings unambiguously assert that the conduct of minors should not result in criminal records that carry into adulthood. See, e.g., 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(2) (providing that juvenile proceedings shall be construed in accordance with purpose of "remov[ing] from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior"); id. § 5101a(a) (finding and declaring as public policy that "an effective juvenile justice system . . . when appropriate, shields youths from the adverse impact of a criminal record"). He argues that the juvenile statutes have been amended to provide that an offense committed by a child between the ages of fourteen and seventeen is to be adjudicated by the family division as a delinquent act, id. § 5103(a), and any finding of delinquency "shall not . . . be deemed a conviction of a crime," id. § 5202(a)(1)(A). In essence, he argues that when the conduct underlying a criminal conviction involved the act of a minor, § 7602(a)(1)(B) must be construed in light of the juvenile provisions in Title 33.

¶ 13. Our holding in Turner forecloses this outcome. Although petitioner's conduct when he was a minor would now be considered a delinquent act and therefore no longer criminal, delinquent acts are still prohibited by law and are adjudicated by the family division. See 33 V.S.A. § 5102(9) (defining "delinquent act" as "an act designated a crime under the laws of this State, or of another state if the act occurred in another state, or under federal law); id. § 5103(a) (vesting jurisdiction over delinquent children to family division). Because delinquent acts are prohibited by law, petitioner's convictions are not eligible for expungement under § 7602(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 2021 VT 30, ¶ 13.

¶ 14. Nothing in § 7602(a)(1)(B) indicates that its terms apply differently in the context of a conviction for an offense committed when the person was a minor. Indeed, though the Legislature declared that an effective juvenile-justice system "shields youths from the adverse impact of a criminal record," it cabined that policy to "when appropriate." 33 V.S.A. § 5101a(a). Nor is there any specific...

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