State v. Cable

• Decision Date: 09 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. SC09-1684.,SC09-1684.
• Citation: 51 So.3d 434
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Kathy Jo CABLE, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

51 So.3d 434 STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Kathy Jo CABLE, Respondent. No. SC09-1684. Supreme Court of Florida. Dec. 9, 2010.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Bureau Chief, and Susan D. Dunlevy, AssistantAttorneys General, Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and John C. Fisher, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Cable v. State, 18 So.3d 37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), regarding a violation of Florida's knock-and-announce statute. In its decision the district court ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

IN VIEW OF THE ABROGATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE VIOLATIONS, SHOULD THE JUDICIAL REMEDY OF EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE BE APPLIED FOR VIOLATIONS OF FLORIDA'S STATUTORY KNOCK-AND-ANNOUNCE PROVISIONS.

Id. at 39-40. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

This certified question asks whether the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006), requires the Court to recede from its 1964 opinion in Benefield v. State, 160 So.2d 706 (Fla.1964), in which this Court held that a violation of Florida's knock-and-announce statute vitiated the ensuing arrest and required the suppression of the evidence obtained in connection with the arrest. We conclude that because the remedy of exclusion in Benefield was based on a violation of Florida's knock-and-announce statute, and not the Fourth Amendment, Hudson does not mandate that we recede from Benefield. Accordingly, we approve the decision of the Second District.

FACTS

On May 15, 2007, at 6:37 a.m., Polk County Sheriff's Office Deputy Richard Lawrence was checking vehicle license tags in the parking lot of the Lake Wales Inn. Deputy Lawrence was in uniform and was in a marked Sheriff's Office vehicle. Deputy Lawrence recognized a vehicle that he had seen at a drug house the day prior and ran the license tag number. He found that it was registered to respondent Kathy Jo Cable. Upon running a check on Cable, Deputy Lawrence discovered that Cable had an outstanding Polk County arrest warrant for failure to appear on a charge of possession of methamphetamine. Deputy Lawrence contacted the motel manager and learned that Cable and her husband were staying at the motel.

After returning to his vehicle, Deputy Lawrence observed R.E., later identified as Cable's sixteen-year-old son, exit the motel room. Deputy Lawrence initiated contact with R.E. and directed R.E. to go back to the motel room and "get his mother up" because Deputy Lawrence needed to speak with her. Deputy Lawrence did not inform R.E. about the outstanding warrant because he believed this information might prompt Cable to attempt a "back door" escape. After Deputy Lawrence waited approximately fifteen minutes, neither Cable nor R.E. came outside, so Deputy Lawrence knocked on the door of Cable's motel room. Since there was no answer, Deputy Lawrence knocked again and announced "Sheriff's Office" and "come to the door." Deputy Lawrence did not announce his purpose for being there—that he had a warrant for Cable's arrest.

Deputy Lawrence received no answer after announcing his authority and requestingthat the occupants come to the door. After waiting a few minutes with still no response, Deputy Lawrence opened the unlocked door and entered the motel room. Inside, he found Cable, who was unresponsive on the bed, her husband, R.E., and two other boys. Deputy Lawrence woke Cable, notified her that he had a warrant for her arrest, and placed her in custody. A search of Cable's person incident to the arrest revealed methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.

Cable was charged by information with trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence against her on the ground that the warrant for her arrest was illegally executed in violation of section 901.19, Florida Statutes (2005)—Florida's statute requiring police to announce their authority and purpose before entering a building to arrest an individual. Specifically, she argued that Deputy Lawrence knocked and announced his presence and authority, but failed to announce his purpose before entering the motel room in which she was staying—a fact conceded by the State in this case. The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The trial court concluded in pertinent part:

Defendant contends that the Deputy Sheriff failed to announce his purpose for being there when knocking on the door, and therefore, the entry and arrest were unlawful. The Court disagrees.

Pursuant to V.P.S. v. State, 816 So.2d 801 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), arrest warrants carry with them the limited authority to enter a dwelling when there is reason to believe that the person is within. Florida also recognizes a "substantial compliance" standard for arrest statutes. Conti v. State, 540 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In accordance with these standards, and in light of all of the attendant facts and circumstances, the Court holds that there was, at a minimum, substantial compliance on the part of the officer and lawful authority to enter the room to arrest the Defendant.

Furthermore, in Hudson v. Michigan , 126 S.Ct. 2159 (2006), a case in which it was undisputed that the knock and announce statute was violated, the United States Supreme Court held that, "exclusion [of the evidence] may not be premised on the mere fact that a constitutional violation was a 'but-for' cause of obtaining evidence."

Id. at 2164.

Subsequently, Cable entered into a negotiated nolo contendere plea to the trafficking charge in exchange for a mandatory minimum sentence of three years in prison, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. The State nolle prossed the paraphernalia charge. Cable was then sentenced pursuant to the plea agreement, and she appealed to the Second District.

The Second District reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in denying Cable's motion to suppress. Cable, 18 So.3d at 38-39. The district court reasoned that "by failing to announce his purpose before entering the motel room, the officer acted in violation of section 901.19(1)." Id. at 38. In reaching this conclusion, the Second District relied on Benefield but noted that the facts in Benefield regarding statutory violations by police were extreme. The district court then explained that it had considered less extreme circumstances in Urquhart v. State, 211 So.2d 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968):

Relying on Benefield, we held that an officer failed to comply with the provisions of the statute when he "did not announce his purpose and he did not wait until he was refused admittancebefore pushing open the door." Urquhart, 211 So.2d at 83. We also held that the officer's failure to announce his purpose made "the subsequent arrest and incidental search invalid and any evidence seized as a result thereof ... inadmissible." Id.

Cable, 18 So.3d at 38-39. The Second District found the facts in Cable to be indistinguishable from those in Urquhart. Id. at 39. The Second District also recognized that the "issue in the instant case, however, is not—as it was in Hudson—whether the evidence is subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the issue is whether suppression of the evidence is a remedy that must be applied for the violation of the statutory knock-and-announce provision." Id. The Second District recognized, however, that the reasoning of Hudson "calls into question the appropriateness of applying the exclusionary rule for violations of Florida's knock-and-announce statute." Id. Thus, it certified the question of great public importance as to whether the remedy of exclusion of evidence is required as a result of a violation of the knock-and-announce statute.

More recently, the Third District Court of Appeal relied on Hudson to conclude that the exclusionary rule does not apply to statutory knock-and-announce violations. See State v. Brown, 36 So.3d 770, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). In Brown, the defendant argued that section 901.19(1), the knock-and-announce statute, supported the trial court's suppression of inculpatory evidence against him. Id. at 771, 773. The Third District rejected the defendant's knock-and-announce argument, but noted:

[W]e believe that reversal is required even if we are wrong on the knock and announce point. This is so because of the holding of Hudson that even established violations of the principle do not implicate the exclusionary rule so as to suppress pertinent evidence. We follow Hudson both because we are persuaded by its reasoning on the point and because we are required to do so by Article 1, section 12, of the Florida Constitution.

Id. at 775 (footnotes omitted). The Third District noted that Cable was contrary to its reasoning. Id.

ANALYSIS

To answer the certified question, we first discuss Florida's knock-and-announce statute and the case law interpreting it. We then discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson and why it does not control. We next discuss whether we should recede from Benefield and conclude that we should not. Thus, we answer the certified question in the affirmative. Finally, we discuss the application of Benefield to the facts of this case.

Florida's Knock-and-Announce Statute and the Exclusionary Rule

Section 901.19(1), Florida Statutes (2005),¹ provides:

If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after she or he has announced her or his authority and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, the officer may use all necessary and reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably believed to

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