State v. Camacho, 13–0903.
| Decision Date | 17 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–0903.,13–0903. |
| Citation | 856 N.W.2d 381 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Pedro Olea CAMACHO, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Kent A. Simmons, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney General, Alan Ostergren, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., and TABOR and BOWER, JJ.
Pedro Oleo Camacho appeals his judgment and sentence for six counts of second-degree sexual abuse. He contends the district court should have suppressed statements he made to police following his arrest.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A teenager was admitted to a hospital after overdosing on sleeping pills. When asked why she took the pills, she said she was sexually assaulted as a young child. She identified the perpetrator as Camacho.
A sergeant with the Muscatine County Sheriff's office began an investigation which led to the filing of a complaint against Camacho and the entry of an attorney's appearance on his behalf. On discovering that Camacho did not live in Iowa, the sergeant asked the county attorney what to do. He advised her to continue investigating.
The investigation uncovered similar complaints by the teenager's older sister. Camacho was arrested and returned to Iowa.
On his arrival in Muscatine, Camacho was interrogated at the jail. The interrogation was audio-recorded. The sergeant conducted the interrogation entirely in English. Camacho's native language is Spanish.
After some preliminary questions, the sergeant read Camacho his Miranda1 rights in English. Camacho responded, The sergeant then said, There was no audible answer.
Camacho signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and the sergeant questioned him about the sex abuse allegations. During the questioning, the sergeant told Camacho they had DNA samples that implicated him. This statement was false. Camacho provided an explanation of how his semen might have been found on the children. His explanation did not include a confession to the crimes.
At this juncture, the sergeant asked Camacho to draft and sign an “apology” letter. Camacho responded that he could not write English. The sergeant suggested statements for inclusion in the letter, confirmed them with Camacho, and wrote them down. She then read the full statement to Camacho and had him sign it.
Camacho entered an initial appearance the following day. A subsequent order noted his retention of the same attorney who previously entered an appearance.
The State charged Camacho with six counts of second-degree sexual abuse. Camacho moved to suppress the recorded statement and the letter.2 He asserted the evidence was obtained in violation of his right against self-incrimination and right to counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well analogous rights under Article I, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Court denied the motion.
The letter and the recording were admitted during the State's case-in-chief. After the State presented its case, Camacho testified and essentially retracted the explanation he gave during the interrogation. A jury found Camacho guilty of all six counts of second-degree sexual abuse. The district court imposed sentence and this appeal followed.
I. Suppression Ruling
“The Miranda warnings protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination ‘ensuring that [ ] suspects know[ ] that [t]he[y] may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time.’ “ State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa 2009) (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ). Miranda requires “meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which [the suspect] can comprehend and on which [the suspect] can knowingly act.” State v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1981) (citing Coyote v. United States, 380 F .2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.1967) ). While no strict formulation is required, the “crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear understandable warning of all of his rights.” Id.
Given Camacho's conversance with the English language, the sergeant had no obligation to use the Spanish translation of the warnings she concededly had in her possession.
Camacho next points to the speed at which the warnings were read to him. We agree the sergeant proceeded through the warnings at a fast clip. But the warnings were clear and intelligible to someone who spoke and understood English and Camacho acknowledged he understood his rights.
We are left with Camacho's assertion that the sergeant should have clarified the scope of his right to counsel after he stated he had a lawyer but did not know when he was going to court. This statement, it is contended, raises doubts about whether Camacho understood he was entitled to the presence of a lawyer “at the jail for questioning.”
Absent an unequivocal assertion of a right to counsel, an officer does not have a Fifth Amendment obligation to stop interrogating a suspect. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) ).
[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel.... [The suspect] must articulate [a] desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) ] does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect.
Id.; see also State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2007) ; State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 608 (Iowa 1997) (). When a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, the Fifth Amendment does not require an officer to “ask clarifying questions,” although these types of questions “will often be good police practice.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
Appellate counsel concedes Camacho's statement “certainly did not express an unequivocal decision to have his attorney present at the jail.” In light of this concession, the sergeant had no Fifth Amendment obligation to stop questioning him or to ask clarifying questions before proceeding with questioning.
We turn to whether Camacho's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 252 ; State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 453–54 (Iowa 2006). To make this determination, “we must inquire if the suspect knew that he or she did not have to speak to the police without counsel and understood that statements provided to the police could be used against him or her.” Ortiz, 76 N.W.2d at 252.
Camacho came to the United States in the early 1980's and, as noted, was able to speak and understand English. He received accurate and intelligible Miranda warnings that he acknowledged he understood, and he signed a waiver of his Miranda rights. Although the officer used deceit, the deception occurred after Camacho waived his rights. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude Camacho's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Camacho next contends Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution requires “a meaningful conversation ... between the officer and detainee,” including an explanation that “the suspect has a right to have counsel present before and during police interrogation.” The Iowa Supreme Court addressed this issue in Morgan, as follows:
As a final challenge to the confession evidence, Morgan asks this court to impose, under the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution, a requirement that police must ask clarifying questions when faced with an equivocal request to consult with counsel and that suspect interrogations must, where feasible, be recorded. Requiring law enforcement personnel to record interrogations or to ask such clarifying questions are issues that may be argued both pro and con as matters of public policy. We are confident, however, that such procedures are in no way mandated by any provision in the Iowa Constitution. We reject Morgan's contention that they are.
Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at 609. Morgan is controlling.
Camacho acknowledges Morgan but cites a special concurrence in State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 897 (Iowa 2009), characterizing Morgan as “wobbly precedent that may not survive a direct attack.”
Effler does not overrule Morgan. Addressing a challenge to the district court's denial of a motion to suppress a confession, the opinion failed to garner a majority of votes. Because six justices were equally divided on the question of whether the defendant's request for counsel was equivocal and whether the officer needed to ask clarifying questions, the district court's ruling was affirmed by operation of law. While certain justices wrote separate opinions,...
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