State v. Camp

• Citation: 6 S.E.2d 299,189 Ga. 209
• Decision Date: 16 November 1939
• Docket Number: 13061.
• Parties: STATE v. CAMP et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

6 S.E.2d 299

189 Ga. 209

STATE v. CAMP et al.

No. 13061.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 16, 1939

Syllabus by the Court.

1. 'Where the language of a statute consists of common ordinary words, and there is nothing to show that any unusual meaning is to be attached to the terms employed, it would be going beyond the province of the court, and all recognized limitations upon it in the construction of statutes, to deny to the language employed in the act its ordinary, usual signification, and give it an unusual meaning and a forced or strained significance, even though such construction would avoid results which might be disastrous to valuable properties of the species * * * involved.' Standard Steel Works Co. v. Williams, 155 Ga 177(2), 181, 116 S.E. 636; Floyd County v. Salmon, 151 Ga. 313, 315, 106 S.E. 280; Neal v. Moultrie, 12 Ga. 104, 110; Standard Oil Co. v. State Revenue Com., 179 Ga. 371, 375, 176 S.E. 1, and cit. This is true irrespective of other and different rules of construction applied in cases where the language of the statute is ambiguous, such as that the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a statute may be considered, and that language will be adopted which has the more reasonable intent and effect, State Revenue Com. v. Edgar Bros. Co., 185 Ga. 216, 220, 194 S.E. 505, the 'statutes levying taxes should be construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the citizen' (Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23(6, 7); Standard Oil Co v. Swanson, 121 Ga. 412, 414, 49 S.E. 262; Case-Fowler Lumber Co. v. Winslett, 168 Ga. 808, 149 S.E. 211; McIntyre v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 65, 75, 157 S.E. 499; that the contemporaneous practical construction of ambiguous or doubtful provisions of an act by the department of the State empowered with its administration or supervision will be given great weight, and will not be distrubed except for weighty reasons. Blount v. Munroe, 60 Ga. 61; Howell v. State, 71 Ga. 224, 229, 51 Am.Rep. 259; Epping v. Columbus, 117 Ga. 263(7), 43 S.E. 803; Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 50 S.Ct. 115, 74 L.Ed. 457, and cit.

2. While it is true that the adoption by the General Assembly of the State of the Code of 1933 amounted to a re-enactment of each section thereof as contemporary statutes (Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831(2), 31 S.E. 531, 42 L.R.A. 518; Daniel v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 182 Ga. 384, 395, 185 S.E. 696; Davis v. Davison, 160 Ga. 545, 546, 128 S.E. 743; Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Averett, 159 Ga. 876, 880, 127 S.E. 217, 39 A.L.R. 1400; Ga.L.1933, p. 31; Ga.L.1935, p. 84), it is also true that in construing the meaning of an ambiguous Code section the original act will be looked to in order to determine the true interpretation of the section (Bacon & Sons v. Jones, 116 Ga. 136, 139, 42 S.E. 401); and it is the well-settled rule, in such an interpretation of an ambiguous Code section having the force of a statute, that, unless the contrary manifestly appears from the words employed, the language of such section should be construed as intending to state the previously existing law, and not to change it. Lamar v. McLaren, 107 Ga. 591, 34 S.E. 116. This rule obtains unless there has been a change so conspicuous as to demand an inference that it was noticed by the lawmaking body and by them understood to effect a modification of the pre-existing law. Atlanta Coach Co. v. Simmons, 184 Ga. 1, 5, 6, 190 S.E. 610; Clark v. Newsome, 180 Ga. 97, 102, 178 S.E. 386, and cit.; Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 10, 23 S.E. 107, 30 L.R.A. 143, 51 Am.St.Rep. 121. See Comer v. State, 103 Ga. 69(1), 29 S.E. 501; Turner v. Turner, 123 Ga. 5, 8, 9, 50 S.E. 969, 107 Am.St.Rep. 76; Mechanics' Bank v. Heard, 37 Ga. 401, 412; Mitchell v. Georgia & Ala. Ry. Co., 111 Ga. 760, 768-770, 36 S.E. 971, 51 L.R.A. 622; Rogers v. Carmichael, 184 Ga. 496, 504, 192 S.E. 39.

3. In accordance with the foregoing principles, and construing as we must the language in question of the Code, § 92-3401, as ambiguous; upon reference to the statute from which it was derived, and giving effect to the legal rules governing the construction of tax statutes, as set forth in the 1st preceding paragraph, the court did not err in its construction of the Code section involved. Under this construction it is unnecessary to pass upon the constitutional attacks made upon the acts of March 24, 1933, and February 14, 1935.

The executors of the will of a resident of Georgia filed a Federal estate tax return, and paid the Federal tax due under existing Federal law. The net estate amounting to $50,165.99, and the executors paying no State inheritance tax, the State revenue commissioner issued an execution for a small amount, which he claimed to be due to the State, under the Code, § 92-3401, and the Federal inheritance-tax acts of 1932 and 1934, as 80 per cent. of the Federal taxes thus imposed. The executors filed an affidavit of illegality, setting up that the language in the Code section, 'the act of Congress relating to the levy and collection of Federal estate taxes' referred only to the Federal inheritance tax act of 1926, and not to the Federal acts of 1932 and 1934, since the language of the Code section was codified from the Georgia inheritance-tax act of 1926, which had reference only to the Federal act of 1926; and that there was no liability for State inheritance taxes, since the Federal act of 1926 allowed an exemption of $100,000, notwithstanding the subsequent reduction of the exemption to $50,000 as to the increased taxes imposed by the Federal acts of 1932 and 1934. The State brought its bill of exceptions from the order of the superior court overruling a demurrer to the affidavit of illegality. To facilitate an understanding of the legal contentions of the parties, dealt with in the syllabus and the opinion, the pertinent legislation as to inheritance taxes is stated. In 1924 the Federal Government passed an inheritance tax law, fixing an exemption of $50,000, providing for a graduated scale of taxation on amounts in excess thereof, varying from 1 to 40 per cent. of the net estate, and allowing a credit on the Federal tax of any like 'taxes actually paid' to a State, not exceeding 25 per cent. of the Federal tax. Act of June 2, 1924, §§ 301, 303, 43 Stat. 303, 305, Historical Notes, U.S. Code Ann., title 26 (§§ 350-1149), p. 129 et seq., §§ 410, 412 notes. In 1925 the General Assembly of Georgia, apparently in order to take advantage of the Federal provision allowing a credit up to 25 per cent. for inheritance taxes paid to a State, passed an inheritance tax law, requiring that a deplicate return of Federal returns be filed with the State tax commissioner, and assessing 'Twenty-five per centum of the amount found to be due for Federal Estate Taxes,' computed on 'the amount that would be due upon said return as Federal Estate Taxes under the Act of Congress relating to the levy and collection of Federal Estate Taxes upon the property of said estate taxable in Georgia.' Ga.L.1925, p. 63. On February 26, 1926, the Federal Government passed a new inheritance tax law, repealing the law of 1924, and providing a graduated scale of taxation on the amounts of net estates ranging from 1 to 20 per cent., with an exemption of $100,000, and also allowing a credit on the Federal tax of any like 'taxes * * * actually paid,' to a State, not exceeding 80 per cent of the Federal tax. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, §§ 301, 302, 303, 44 Stat. 69, 70, 72, 125, U.S. Code Ann. title 26 (§§ 350-1149), secs. 410, 411, 412, 413(b), and notes. Immediately after this enactment the State General Assembly on March 31, 1926, Laws 1926, Ex.Sess., p. 15, passed an inheritance tax law, amending the State act of 1925, by providing a new 80 per cent. inheritance tax, apparently so as to take advantage of the increased 80 per cent. deduction for State inheritance tax payments allowed by the new Federal law, but otherwise only slightly changing the act of 1925, and requiring that a duplicate of Federal returns be filed with the State tax commissioner, and that he 'compute the amount that would be due upon said return as Federal estate taxes under the act of Congress relating to the levy and collection of Federal estate taxes upon the property of said estate taxable in Georgia, and assess against said estate as State inheritance taxes 80 per centum of the amount found to be due for Federal estate taxes.'

The apparent practical purpose and result of the State acts of 1925 and 1926, by conforming to the maximum credits allowed by the changing Federal laws for State inheritance tax payments, while thus benefiting the State, was not to impose on citizens of the State any total tax burden greater than would have existed without such legislation. In 1932 the Federal Government, while retaining as a 'basic estate tax' the provisions of its tax law of 1926, the scaled taxation there provided, the $100,000 exemption, and the 80 per cent. credit allowed for taxes paid to a State as to such 'basic' taxes, passed a new tax law imposing new and 'additional estate taxes,' which, as to such new and additional taxes, reduced the exemption to $50,000, eliminated the 80 per cent. credit for estate taxes paid to a State, and imposed added taxes on net estates, after deducting the 'basic tax,' ranging from 1 to 45 per cent. Act of June 6, 1932, 47 Stat. 243, U.S. Code Ann. title 26 (§§ 350-1149), §§ 410-413(b) pp. 128, 183, 202; § 535, p. 242, and historical notes. In 1934 the Federal Government, while retaining the act of 1926 as to 'basic taxes,' increased the new and additional taxes on net estates, computed as provided by the act of 1932, to amounts ranging from 1 to 60 per cent., but still leaving as to the new and additional taxes the reduced exemption of...