State v. Carpenter

• Decision Date: 14 January 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 13-18-16,13-18-16
• Citation: 2019 Ohio 58,128 N.E.3d 857
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyree L. CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

128 N.E.3d 857

2019 Ohio 58

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Tyree L. CARPENTER, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 13-18-16

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Third District, Seneca County.

Date of Decision: January 14, 2019

Robert A. Miller for Appellant.

Stephanie J. Kiser for Appellee.

ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Tyree L. Carpenter ("Carpenter"), appeals the April 27, 2018 judgment entry of sentence of the Seneca County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case stems from a series of drug-related events, including the overdose of Meredith Breech ("Breech") and overdose death of Steffen Yarris ("Yarris"), that took place between August 2015 and April 2016 in Fostoria, Ohio. The city of Fostoria is situated at the convergence of Hancock, Seneca, and Wood Counties. However, the events at issue in this case transpired in only Hancock and Seneca Counties.

{¶3} On August 8, 2016, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Carpenter on thirteen counts, including: Counts One and Three of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(a), both fifth-degree felonies; Count Two of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(4)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Counts Four and Six of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(6)(a), both fifth-degree felonies; Counts Five and Seven of corrupting another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), (C)(1)(a), both second-degree felonies; Count Eight of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(a), a fourth-degree felony; Count Nine of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Counts Ten and Thirteen of possessing criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), (C), both fifth-degree felonies; Count Eleven of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(6)(c), a third-degree felony; and Count Twelve of trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(4)(b), a fourth-degree felony. (Doc. No. 4). The indictment included forfeiture specifications as to Counts Three, Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Twelve and specifications that the offense was committed in the vicinity of a juvenile as to Counts Eleven and Twelve. (Id. ). On August 17, 2016, Carpenter appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 10).

{¶4} On August 30, 2016, under a superseding indictment, the Seneca County Grand Jury indicted Carpenter on three additional counts: Count Fourteen of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(a), a fourth-degree felony; Count Fifteen of corrupting another with drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3), (C)(1)(a), a second-degree felony; and Count Sixteen of involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), (C), a first-degree felony. (Doc. No. 15). The superseding indictment alleged that the offenses described in Counts Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen occurred in Hancock County, Ohio. (Id. ). The superseding indictment also included a forfeiture specification as to Count One in addition to all of the specifications contained in the original indictment. (Id. ). On September 8, 2016, Carpenter appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty to the new indictment. (Doc. No. 24).

{¶5} On September 22, 2016, Carpenter filed a "motion to separate trials and to dismiss indictments." (Doc. No. 26). The next day, Carpenter filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. (Doc. No. 27). Further, on September 26, 2016, Carpenter filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc. No. 28).

{¶6} The State filed its memorandums in opposition to Carpenter's motions to separate trials and to dismiss the indictment on November 21, 2016 and filed its memorandum opposing Carpenter's motion to suppress on December 2, 2016. (Doc. Nos. 37, 38, 42). Ultimately, the trial court denied all of Carpenter's motions. (Doc. No. 57).

{¶7} The case proceeded to a jury trial on April 23-26, 2018. (Doc. No. 147).¹ During the trial, the State filed a motion to dismiss Counts Six and Seven of the superseding indictment, which the trial court granted. (Doc. Nos. 145, 146).

{¶8} On April 26, 2017, the jury found Carpenter guilty of Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Sixteen but not guilty of Count Two of the superseding indictment. (Doc. Nos. 147, 148). Further, the jury found that the currency and property identified under the specifications in Counts One, Eight, Nine, and Eleven, were subject to forfeiture, that the property and some of the currency identified in Count Three were subject to forfeiture, and that the currency and some of the property identified in Count Twelve were subject to forfeiture. (Id. ); (Id. ). The jury also found Carpenter guilty of the specifications in Counts Eleven and Twelve alleging that Carpenter committed the offenses in the vicinity of a juvenile. (Id. ); (Id. ).

{¶9} On April 26, 2018, the trial court sentenced Carpenter to 12 months in prison on Counts One, Three, Nine, Ten, and Thirteen, respectively, 8 years in prison on Count Five, 18 months in prison on Counts Eight and Twelve, respectively, 36 months in prison on Count Eleven, and 11 years in prison on Count Sixteen. (Doc. No. 151). The prison terms imposed by the trial court were ordered to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 19 years and 132 months in prison. (Id. ).² The trial court filed its judgment entry of sentence on April 27, 2017. (Id. ).

{¶10} Carpenter filed his notice of appeal on May 14, 2018. (Doc. No. 156). He raises three assignments of error for our review. For ease of our discussion, we will review Carpenter's second and third assignments of error together, followed by his first assignment of error.

Assignment of Error No. II

Appellant's convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence.

Assignment of Error No. III

Appellant's convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶11} In his second and third assignments of error, Carpenter argues that his convictions are based on insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, in his second assignment of error, he argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that: (1) he possessed heroin, cocaine, or criminal tools; (2) he "knowingly prepared for shipment, shipped, transported, delivered, prepared for distribution, or distributed any illegal narcotics"; (3) Breech suffered serious physical harm; and (4) he was "an independently sufficient cause of Yarris'[s] death or serious physical harm." (Appellant's Brief at 26-28). In his third assignment of error, he specifically argues that the weight of the evidence shows that: (1) he did not possess heroin as alleged in Counts One and Three of the superseding indictment; (2) he did not knowingly prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute any illegal narcotics; (3) he did not provide Beech with a substance which caused her serious physical harm; and (4) the heroin that he allegedly provided Yarris "in-and-of-itself" did not cause Yarris's death or serious physical harm. (Appellant's Brief at 33).

Standard of Review

{¶12} Manifest "weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are clearly different legal concepts." State v. Thompkins , 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Thus, we address each legal concept individually.

{¶13} "An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks , 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds , State v. Smith , 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668 (1997). Accordingly, "[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. "In deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Jones , 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, 2013 WL 5864591, ¶ 33, citing State v. Williams , 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, 968 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.). See also State v. Berry , 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, 2013 WL 2638704, ¶ 19 ("Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight of the evidence."), citing Thompkins at 386, 678 N.E.2d 541.

{¶14} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, " ‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ " Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin , 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass , 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, "[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court's judgment." State v. Haller , 3d Dist. Allen, 2012-Ohio-5233, 982 N.E.2d 111, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter , 131 Ohio...