State v. Carter, 197--I
| Decision Date | 22 November 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 197--I,197--I |
| Citation | 5 Wn.App. 802,490 P.2d 1346 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Walter Reed CARTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Butler, Seattle, for appellant.
Christopher T. Bayley, King County Pros. Atty., Suzanne B. Amacher, Marco J. Magnano, Jr., Deputy Prosecuting Atty., Seattle, for respondent.
John M. Junker, Professor of Law, Harvey H. Chamberlin, Seattle, amicus curiae.
Walter Reed Carter was convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree following a jury trial. He appeals from that conviction. This matter is before the court upon the granting of appellant's petition for rehearing. We adhere to the result of the original decision reported in 4 Wash.App. 115, 479 P.2d 543 (1971). The facts are restated here for clarification.
In the early morning hours of May 27, 1969, Mr. Carter entered the apartment of a young woman through an open window. When he encountered the occupant of the apartment, he placed his hand over her mouth as she started to scream and pushed her to the floor. They then engaged in a 'conversation' for nearly an hour. When Mr. Carter left the apartment accompanied by the young woman, they met the apartment manager and the young woman requested assistance. Mr. Carter indicated that he wanted to fight the manager but thereafter entered into a conversation with him. He eventually left the building and was outside in his automobile when police officers arrived and arrested him. There is conflicting testimony as to statements made by Mr. Carter regarding his reasons for entering the apartment.
Mr. Carter relied upon a three-pronged defense at his trial: (1) he blundered into the wrong apartment and was there due to a mistake, (2) he was under the influence of liquor or narcotics, and (3) he had diminished capacity to form the specific intent to commit the crime. In finding him guilty, the jury rejected his first two defenses. The primary question on appeal is the refusal of the trial court to admit expert medical testimony regarding Mr. Carter's mental condition. The offered evidence would not support a finding of insanity as defined by RCW 10.76.010. The purpose in offering the evidence was to establish that Mr. Carter lacked the mental capacity to form the intent to commit the crime. The trial court, relying on State v. Cogswell, 54 Wash.2d 240, 339 P.2d 465 (1959), refused the evidence because it was not relevant to Mr. Carter's state of mind on the date and time of the alleged crime.
Mr. Carter argues that evidence of mental incapacity short of legal insanity is admissible on such issues as specific intent, premeditation and malice. He recognizes that the Washington court has not ruled on the question but relies on those jurisdictions that have approved of what is referred to as the doctrine of 'diminished capacity' or 'partial responsibility.'
In People v. Taylor, 220 Cal.App.2d 212, 33 Cal.Rptr. 654 (1963), a question very similar to the one considered here was before the California court. The appellant was charged and convicted of entering a building with intent to commit theft. The trial court sustained an objection to a question asked of the appellant regarding his previous psychiatric treatment. The appellate court stated 220 Cal.App.2d at 216, 33 Cal.Rptr. at 657:
In the case of a crime involving specific intent, the jury is called upon to determine the existence of such nonobjective fact, i.e., the specific intent or state of mind and must therefore be as completely informed as possible of all the circumstances connected with the offense which manifest such intention. (Citing case.) Hence under his plea of not guilty, the defendant may present any evidence, not amounting to proof of legal insanity, which tends to prove the specific intent or state of mind involved. (Citing cases.) This includes the testimony of a psychiatrist. (Citing cases.)
We think therefore that the trial court was in error in its apparent ruling that evidence of the psychiatric treatment of the defendant was not admissible except under a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 1
Here the information charged that Mr. Carter 'with intent to commit a crime therein, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did enter the dwelling of * * *' It is clear therefore that specific intent is an essential element of the crime and a material issue in the case. Any competent evidence which tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove a material issue is relevant and should be admitted unless it is specifically inadmissible by reason of some affirmative rule of law.
RCW 9.19.030 2 provides that one is presumed to enter a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein once it is established that he unlawfully entered the dwelling or building. However, this presumption is not conclusive, State v. Durning, 71 Wash.2d 675, 430 P.2d 546 (1967), State v. Anderson, 5 Wash. 350, 31 P. 969 (1892), and the statute specifically provides that it does not apply when such unlawful entry is explained to the satisfaction of the jury that it was made without criminal intent. If the jury entertains a reasonable doubt that the entry was made with the intent to commit a crime therein, there cannot be a conviction of burglary.
Mr. Carter sought to introduce the testimony of a psychiatrist based on a personal examination of him and a review of his history of psychiatric treatment over the past 12 years. The psychiatrist had formed an opinion of Mr. Carter's mental condition and Mr. Carter offered to prove that the condition the psychiatrist found in August of 1969 would also be the condition on May 26 and May 27, 1969.
It is argued that State v. Tyler, 77 Wash.2d 726, 466 P.2d 120 (1970) would preclude the testimony of the psychiatrist as offered here. In Tyler, the court precluded the opinion of the psychiatrist because it was based on the appellant's testimony as to the amount of drugs and alcohol that he had consumed, which testimony was so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that it provided no basis for a competent medical opinion. Here the evidence offered went to the capacity of the appellant to form an intent on the date in question. Language in State v. White, 60 Wash.2d 551, 588, 374 P.2d 942, 964 (1962), while not necessary to dispose of the issues there, indicates that upon a proper showing such evidence is admissible in this jurisdiction:
The presence of a mental disease or defect which falls short of criminal insanity may well be relevant to issues involving the elements or degrees of certain crimes, E.g., where malice, premeditation or...
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Washington's Diminished Capacity Defense Under Attack
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