People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 16 September 1963
• Docket Number: Cr. 4271
• Citation: 33 Cal.Rptr. 654,220 Cal.App.2d 212
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter Jerome TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 654

33 Cal.Rptr. 654

220 Cal.App.2d 212

PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Walter Jerome TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 4271.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 16, 1963.

Hearing Denied Nov. 13, 1963.

J. F. Thacher, San Francisco, for appellant (Under appointment of the District Court of Appeal).

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen. of the State of Cal., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Robert R. Granucci, Edward P O'Brien, Michael J. Phelan, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for respondent.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Defendant was charged in an information with a violation of section 459 of the Penal Code (burglary). The information also charged two prior felony convictions (auto theft and burglary). Defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, but withdrew the latter plea shortly before trial. He thereafter admitted each of the two prior convictions charged in the information. A jury found defendant guilty of burglary of the first degree. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.

On March 14, 1962, at approximately 4:30 a. m., defendant entered the apartment of one J. A. Jackson in Oakland. The apartment was on the ground floor. Mr. and Mrs. Jackson were asleep in their bedroom when Jackson was awakened by a noise. He heard his bathroom window being raised and also heard the rustle of shower curtains which were hung over the window. The bathroom was across the hall from the bedroom. Jackson saw the bathroom door steadily opening and then saw the figure of the defendant in the doorway. Defendant had a flashlight cupped in his hand, flashed the light a couple of times, stood by the open bedroom door momentarily, and then made his way down the hall in the direction of the living room, flashing the light as he went. At this point, Jackson, who had armed himself with a hunting knife, sprang out of bed, ran after the defendant, apprehended him in the living room and made him sit in a chair. Jackson then awoke his wife who called the police.

Officer Uhrenholt arrived at the apartment and placed defendant under arrest. A second police officer arrived immediately thereafter. Defendant was then searched. He was wearing an army field jacket in the large pocket of which he had placed his shoes. These were the only objects found on his person. The police found no weapons and no money or valuables of any kind. The search therefore established that defendant had taken nothing belonging to the Jacksons. A flashlight and rag were found near him on the floor.

It was subsequently discovered that defendant had made his entry into the bathroom by climbing on a table which he had moved from a neighboring yard.

Officer Uhrenholt took the defendant in a patrol car to the defendant's car which was parked about a block away. In the glove compartment of the latter vehicle, the officer found defendant's wallet, identification papers, wristwatch and other miscellaneous papers. Defendant was sober.

Defendant was the sole witness for the defense. He admitted entering the apartment but stated that his purpose in so doing was 'to see Mrs. Jackson.' He testified on direct examination that he had no intent to commit any felony or to do anything or to molest Mrs. Jackson in any way. 'I went in to see her as a person. I went in to see her just as a person, Mrs. Jackson. That is about the only way I can answer that. * * * I had seen Mrs. Jackson before and I guess mentally I was attracted to her by sight and I guess you would have to say more or less I had a feeling to see her again under any conditions.' He further testified that he had seen her previously at a food store and on the street. On cross-examination defendant denied that on the morning of his arrest he had told either Jackson in the latter's apartment or Officer Uhrenholt in the patrol car that two men had forced him to enter the apartment to steal a P-38 revolver.

In rebuttal both Jackson and Unrenholt testified that defendant had made such a statement to them. Oakland Police Inspector Bias, also called in rebuttal, testified that he had driven past the Jackson apartment with the defendant after the latter's arrest and that when he asked the defendant whether there was 'any special reason for picking this place,' defendant replied 'no, it just looked better.' The inspector thereupon asked defendant why he had given 'a phony story about two men forcing you into the apartment to get a P-38' to which defendant's reply was 'I had to say something.'

The sole question before us is whether the trial court committed prejudicial error in sustaining the People's objection to a question asked defendant by defense counsel (not his counsel on this appeal) as to whether he had ever undergone any psychiatric treatment. Defendant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict.

Direct examination of defendant was relatively brief, covering only four pages in the transcript. After narrating his entry and apprehension, defendant testified that when he entered the building he had no intent to commit any felony and that he entered to see Mrs. Jackson, explaining this in testimony set forth by us above. Immediately after the first part of his explanation, the following took place: 'Q. Let me ask you this, Mr. Taylor. Have you ever undergone any psychiatric treatment? MR. BALDWIN: Object, Your Honor. That is separate proceedings. THE COURT: That is separate proceedings. There is no plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. MR. HOFFMAN: Your Honor, on this matter the claim here is not one of not guilty by reason of insanity but attempt to show the background and motive and intent of this man. THE COURT: That is all right but whether he is psychotic is something different.' Defendant then proceeded with a further explanation as to why he wanted to see Mrs. Jackson. The direct examination then concluded with a statement by defendant that he had been charged with a violation of a Penal Code section involving 'Peeping Tom.' ¹

Defendant was charged in the information with entering the building 'with the intent to commit theft.' This specific intent was an essential element of the crime (People v. Morlock (1956), 46 Cal.2d 141, 146, 292 P.2d 897) and therefore a material issue in the case. It was incumbent upon the People to prove that the entry was made with the requisite specific intent (People v. Wilson (1958), 158 Cal.App.2d 553, 555, 322 P.2d 966; People v. Garcia (1958), 166 Cal.App.2d 141, 143, 333 P.2d 69) although this could be proved circumstantially, such intent being rarely susceptible of direct proof (People v. Nichols (1961), 196 Cal.App.2d 223, 227, 16 Cal.Rptr. 328; People v. Garcia, supra).

Defendant contends that the evidence offered was relevant on the issue of his specific intent and therefore admissible. 'The general test of relevancy of indirect evidence is whether it tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove a material issue.' (People v. Jones (1954), 42 Cal.2d 219, 222, 266 P.2d 38, 41, citing inter alia People v. Peete (1946), 28 Cal.2d 306, 315, 169 P.2d 924.) In the case of a crime involving specific intent, the jury is called upon to determine the existence of such nonobjective fact, i. e., the specific intent or state of mind and must therefore be as completely informed as possible of all the circumstances connected with the offense which manifest such intention. (People v. Wells (1949...