State v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 01 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 65761-1
• Citation: 963 P.2d 843,136 Wn.2d 498
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Joey C. ELLIS, Petitioner.

Page 498

136 Wn.2d 498

963 P.2d 843

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v.Joey C. ELLIS, Petitioner.

No. 65761-1.

Supreme Court of Washington En Banc.

Argued March 24, 1998.

Decided Oct. 1, 1998.

Rita Griffith, Seattle, for Petitioner.

John Ladenburg, Pierce County Prosecutor, Gerald T. Costello and Barbara Corey-Boulet, Deputy Pierce County Prosecutors, Tacoma, for Respondent.

SMITH, Justice.

PetitionerJoey C. Ellis seeks discretionary review of an order of the Pierce County Superior Court dated July 29, 1997 granting Respondent State of Washington's motion in limine to exclude expert testimony on diminished capacity and denying Petitioner's motion to allow the testimony in a pending trial in which Petitioner is charged with two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree and in which the State seeks the death penalty.We granted review on September 4, 1997 staying Petitioner's trial which had been scheduled for September 15, 1997.We reverse the Superior Court.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The question presented in this case is whether the trial court erred in excluding proffered defense expert testimony on diminished capacity, thus denying Petitioner an opportunity to establish a diminished capacity defense.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 16, 1996, the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney filed a corrected information in the Pierce County Superior Court charging PetitionerJoey C. Ellis with two counts of aggravated first degree murder ¹ for the deaths of his mother, Lindy Lou Ellis, and his two-year-old half-sister, Jaime Jane Ellis.² The information states that on or about January 8, 1996Petitioner, with premeditated intent, ³ bludgeoned his mother and half-sister to death with a breadboard.⁴ The information claimed as an aggravating circumstance that "the murders were part of a common scheme or plan, or the result of a single act of the defendant or '...' was [sic] committed in the course of, in furtherance of, or in immediate flight from Robbery in the First or Second Degree...."⁵

On September 19, 1996, the State filed a discovery motion for disclosure of any mental defense Petitioner intended to present at trial.The State acknowledged receipt from Petitioner, as part of a mitigation package, of a report by Dr. Lloyd I. Cripe, Ph.D., a clinical neuropsychologist.The State observed that "Dr. Cripe discusses in detail his analysis of the [Petitioner's] state of mind when he killed the victims.However, Dr. Cripe does not address, one way or the other, the question of diminished capacity.Based upon past experience and the nature of this case--legally and factually--the [State] anticipates that diminished capacity (or even insanity) will be raised at trial."⁶

On September 23, 1996, the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, stating that "either no mitigating circumstances have been brought to the attention of this office, or such mitigating circumstances as have been submitted have been received and considered and are not sufficient to merit leniency."⁷ By letter dated January 3, 1997, Petitioner's assigned counsel informed the State of his diminished capacity defense, naming three psychologists as expert witnesses, "Mark Whitehill, Ph.D., Lloyd Cripe, Ph.D., and Jon Conte, Ph.D."⁸

In his mitigation report dated August 7, 1996, Dr. Cripe stated that he reviewed police reports and records, interviewed a close family friend, interviewed Petitioner's probation officer, and conducted a neuropsychological evaluation of Petitioner.He determined that Petitioner"suffered extreme psychological pain and a damaged self-esteem" as a result of growing up in a very dysfunctional and abusive environment.⁹

In an addendum to his report dated January 2, 1997, Dr. Cripe determined that Petitioner suffered from a "mental illness related to a long history of child and adolescent abuse which combined with drug abuse and the circumstances the night of the homicides resulted in a diminished capacity to normally control his mind and behavior."Dr. Cripe recommended that Petitioner"be defended with an understanding [sic] a diminished capacity at the time of his extreme actions."¹⁰

In a summary of findings dated January 3, 1997, Dr. Mark B. Whitehill, Ph.D., clinical and forensic psychologist, stated that he reviewed taped statements Petitioner made to the police following his arrest, examined the results of Petitioner's polygraph examination, interviewed a long-time family friend, and conducted a battery of psychological tests of Petitioner.He concluded that Petitioner satisfied the "statutory criteria ... in State v. Edmon, 28 Wash.App. 98, 621 P.2d 1310(1981) for diminished capacity defense".¹¹

On June 4, 1997, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude or limit expert testimony.¹² On June 7, 1997Petitioner filed a motion to admit expert testimony on diminished capacity.¹³ Both parties cited a 1981Court of Appeals decision, State v. Edmon, ¹⁴ which stated nine foundational requirements for admitting expert testimony on diminished capacity.At a hearing before the Honorable Vicki L. Hogan on June 16, 1997, defense counsel elected not to call witnesses, but relied upon their written motions.The State called as "hostile witnesses" defense experts Dr. Conte, Dr. Cripe and Dr. Whitehill and appropriately asked leading questions.Over defense objections, the court allowed testimony by Dr. Greg J. Gagliardi, Ph.D., of Western State Hospital, who gave his opinion concerning the appropriate methodology for diagnosing diminished capacity and application of "Edmon factors" in psychological diagnosis.¹⁵ In an oral ruling on June 17, 1997, Judge Hogan granted the State's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of defense expert witnesses Dr. Conte, Dr. Cripe and Dr. Whitehill. ¹⁶Petitioner moved for reconsideration, requesting the court to allow an offer of proof through further testimony and declarations.¹⁷The court granted the motion.After hearing the testimony of Dr. Cripe on July 28, 1997, Judge Hogan affirmed her prior ruling.¹⁸The court did not allow further testimony from Dr. Whitehill, determining there was "nothing new in Dr. Whitehill's July 23rd declaration that indicates anything new than as testified."¹⁹

On July 29, 1997, ²⁰ Judge Hogan signed an order granting the State's motion in limine to exclude or limit expert testimony and denying Petitioner's motion to admit expert evidence on diminished capacity.²¹ On August 8, 1997Petitioner sought discretionary review by this Court.²²Review was granted on September 4, 1997.²³

DISCUSSION

The usual rule is that admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's decision²⁴ will not be reversed absent abuse of that discretion.²⁵"An abuse of discretion occurs only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court."²⁶

Petitioner asserts that diminished capacity is a mental condition, not amounting to insanity, that causes an inability to form the requisite intent for the crime charged.²⁷Citing State v. Eakins, Petitioner acknowledges that for a defendant to maintain a diminished capacity defense, the defendant must present expert testimony establishing a mental disorder that impaired the ability to form the specific intent ²⁸ to commit the offense charged.²⁹Petitioner argues that determination of the credibility of expert witnesses is for the jury.³⁰

Asserting that State v. Edmon establishes the foundational criteria for admitting the opinion of an expert regarding a defendant's ability to form a specific intent, Petitioner argues that he has satisfied all nine "Edmon factors"³¹ and therefore the trial court erred in excluding his expert testimony.

Petitioner argues that "Edmon factor" one has been satisfied because, in the expert opinion of Dr. Cripe, Petitioner could not have formed a specific intent at the time of the killings.³²Petitioner contends that "Edmon factor" two has been satisfied because the experts' qualifications were not challenged and the court, either expressly or implicitly, acknowledged that the experts were qualified to testify.³³Petitioner argues that "Edmon factor" three has been satisfied through the testimony of Dr. Whitehill on June 16, 1997 and Dr. Cripe on July 28, 1997, when they stated that they examined and diagnosed Petitioner and were able to state an opinion with reasonable medical certainty.³⁴

According to Petitioner, the expert testimony is based upon substantial supporting evidence in the record and therefore "Edmon factor" four has been satisfied.Dr. Whitehill testified he relied on his discussions with Petitioner and additional information, including a previous mental health examination.³⁵Dr. Cripe testified he relied upon examination of Petitioner and "records surrounding the case and the police and legal aspects of the case."He stated he received "some input from Dr. Whitehill," and interviewed a woman with whom Petitioner and his mother had lived and interviewed Petitioner's grandfather.³⁶

Petitioner contends he has satisfied "Edmon factor" five because expert testimony concluded his mental disorder, and not ordinary emotions, prevented him from forming a specific intent.Dr. Whitehill testified he would characterize Petitioner's personality disorder on multiple levels, a behavioral component, a cognitive component, an interpersonal relations component, and an emotional component.³⁷

During his testimony, Dr. Cripe explained that Petitioner was not experiencing mere transient emotion, but the emotion was a component of an underlying mental disorder.³⁸

Arguing that "Edmon factor" six has been satisfied, Petitioner contends defense experts explained that his mental disorders caused his inability to form intent.Dr. Whitehill testified that Petitioner experienced an aberrant reaction, "We are talking about extreme pathology here, and breakdowns of mental observations that are not...