State v. Castaneda

• Citation: 150 Ariz. 382,724 P.2d 1
• Decision Date: 10 June 1986
• Docket Number: No. 6443,6443
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William Abad CASTANEDA, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

Page 1

724 P.2d 1

150 Ariz. 382

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. William Abad CASTANEDA, Appellant.

No. 6443.

Supreme Court of Arizona In Banc.

June 10, 1986.

Reconsideration Denied Sept. 9, 1986.

Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by William J. Schafer III and Galen Wilkes, Asst. Attys. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee.

O'Dowd, Burke & Lundquist by Bruce Burke, Tucson, for appellant.

CAMERON, Justice.

Defendant, William Abad Castaneda, was convicted of six counts of sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen, A.R.S. § 13-1405, two counts of kidnapping, A.R.S. § 13-1304, and one count of first degree murder, A.R.S. § 13-1105. Defendant was sentenced to death for first degree murder. He also received 28 years on each of four counts, the sentences run concurrently to each other but consecutively to a previous sentence reimposed upon revocation of probation. On the four remaining counts, defendant was sentenced to 28 years on each count. These sentences are concurrent to each other but consecutive to the first four counts. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 5(3) and A.R.S. §§ 13-4031, -4035.

Defendant presents several issues for review:

A. Pretrial

1. Was it error for the trial court to fail to suppress defendant's out-of-court statements?

2. Was it error for the trial court to fail to suppress the out-of-court and in-court identifications of defendant?

3. Was it error for the trial court to fail to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search of defendant's business?

B. Trial

1. Did the trial court err in allowing the prosecutor to present evidence of a prior bad act?

2. Did the trial court err in admitting allegedly gruesome photographs?

C. Post-trial

1. Did the trial court properly allow defendant's admission of his prior convictions?

2. Was the death sentence properly imposed?

3. Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective?

The facts follow. On 6 May 1984, Joel and Michael, both age twelve, went to a chess tournament in downtown Tucson. Between matches, they decided to take a walk. While resting near a store, they encountered defendant, who drove up next to them in a pickup truck. Defendant talked to the two boys about making some money doing yardwork. Defendant then forced the boys into his truck. He told the boys to get under the dashboard and to be quiet.

He drove the boys to his business, an automobile repair shop. He placed Joel in the bathroom and put Michael on a bed in an adjacent room. While in the bathroom, Joel heard slapping sounds and Michael crying. Later, defendant removed Joel from the bathroom. Michael did not have on any clothes, and defendant forced Joel to remove his clothes also. Defendant then performed various sexual acts on both boys and forced them to perform fellatio on him. While this was happening, visitors arrived at defendant's business. Defendant forced both boys to hide under some boxes, telling them that the visitors were maniacs and would kill them. Defendant then went into an outer office and talked to the visitors. The visitors were defendant's father and his father's neighbor; they had come to borrow a ladder. After the visitors left, defendant returned to the boys, told them to dress, put them into his truck, and began driving.

Defendant took the boys to a desert area north of Tucson. Defendant told the boys Police set up a command post in the area described by Joel and began to search for Michael. During the search, the police encountered defendant on foot and arrested him. By this time it was past midnight. With defendant's assistance, the police located Michael. He was found dead, lying naked under a tree. The condition of the body indicated Michael had been sexually abused and repeatedly stabbed. Defendant was tried, convicted, and sentenced. He now appeals.

                [150 Ariz. 386] they would become "blood brothers to the Indians."   He forced Michael to get out of the truck and locked Joel inside.  Defendant forced Michael to remove all his clothes and to walk about a hundred yards across the desert.  Joel heard Michael screaming that he did not want to die and that he loved his parents.  Joel crawled out of a partially opened window and started running.  He had run only a short distance when he heard Michael's screaming stop suddenly.  Joel kept running and after wandering in the desert for several hours he met two boys riding three-wheelers.  They took Joel to a police station where he told detectives of the incident.
                

ADMISSIBILITY OF DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS

Immediately after his arrest, defendant was given his Miranda warnings, and he responded "I have nothing to say." An officer put defendant into the back of a police vehicle. Then, defendant asked to speak with his sister, who was at the scene. The officers allowed her to get into the car to talk privately with defendant. The officers did not solicit defendant's sister to talk with him. After they had finished talking, defendant's sister got out of the car and told the officers, "He will take you to the vehicle." Defendant said, however, that he would not take them until his sister left the scene. An officer told defendant's sister that she was free to go and she left. Officers had informed defendant that they were looking for a small boy, and as they drove to the truck, defendant told the officers that when they found the truck, they would find the body of the boy. With defendant's assistance, police located the truck, and began to search around the truck for the body. Because it was still dark, the officers were unable to find Michael's body, even with the help of a police helicopter. An officer again asked defendant to tell him where the body was located. The officer indicated that if defendant didn't tell them where the body could be found, the officer would ask defendant's sister to return. Defendant then told the officer specifically where the body of the victim was located.

Defendant complains that during this sequence of events his Miranda rights were violated. First, he argues that the police did not scrupulously honor his right to cut off questioning. Second, defendant maintains that he should have been re-advised of his Miranda rights after his sister told police he would take them to the truck. Finally, defendant argues that his statements indicating the location of the victim's body were a product of coercion.

1. Honoring Defendant's Right to Cut Off Questioning

The U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley held that statements obtained from a person in custody after he has exercised his right to remain silent are not per se proscribed by Miranda. 423 U.S. 96, 103, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Instead, it held that the critical factor to admissibility is whether the police "scrupulously honored" the person's right to cut off questioning. Id.

The facts show that the police gave defendant his Miranda warnings, and defendant invoked his right to remain silent by saying "I have nothing to say." The police did not question him any further and put defendant into the back of a police car. We believe the police scrupulously honored defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent.

2. Readvising of Miranda Rights

After talking to his sister, defendant waived his right to remain silent by

[150 Ariz. 387] volunteering to tell the officers where they could find the truck. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); State v. James, 141 Ariz. 141, 685 P.2d 1293 (1984). Defendant contends that irrespective of any waiver, police should have repeated the Miranda warnings when he told them he would help them find his truck. We do not agree. When a defendant is given Miranda warnings upon arrest "[f]urther warnings are not required in the absence of circumstances between the arrest and interrogation which would alert the officers that the accused may not be fully aware of [his] rights." State v. Noriega, 142 Ariz. 474, 480, 690 P.2d 775, 781 (1984). In the instant case, defendant volunteered to take the police to the truck only minutes after he had received his Miranda warnings. We believe that defendant was still fully aware of his rights. As we find there was no change of circumstances so as to require additional warnings, the warnings did not need to be repeated. We find no error.

3. Coercion

After taking officers to the truck, the appellant was held in custody while the officers undertook an unsuccessful search for Michael's body. At this time it was still dark and even though the body was only 100 yards from the truck, the police were unable to locate the victim. A police officer advised appellant that "if you don't tell us where the boy is, Sergeant Hardyman is going to call your sister back out." At this point, the defendant told them where to find the body.

Defendant contends the threat to bring his sister back amounted to coercion and that his resulting statement should have been suppressed. First, we note that the victim's body would have been found as soon as it became light; therefore, the body would have been admissible under the "inevitable discovery doctrine" of Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). Second, while we might agree that the conduct of the police amounted to coercion, any error in failing to suppress the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Ashelman, 137 Ariz. 460, 671 P.2d 901 (1983). In the instant case, the evidence against defendant was overwhelming, even without his statement. Joel clearly identified the defendant. Additionally, there was physical evidence that linked defendant to the murder. Thus, even if it was error to admit the statement, we nevertheless believe reversal is not required because the jury would have reached the same verdict without the statement. Chapman, supra; Ashelman, supra.

ID...