State v. Caudill

• Decision Date: 23 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75-1151,75-1151
• Citation: 48 Ohio St.2d 342,358 N.E.2d 601
• Parties: , 2 O.O.3d 467 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. CAUDILL, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 342

48 Ohio St.2d 342

358 N.E.2d 601, 2 O.O.3d 467

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. CAUDILL, Appellee.

No. 75-1151.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 23, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In accepting a written plea of no contest to a felony charge, the trial court must adhere scrupulously to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2).

2. Adherence to the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) requires an oral dialogue between the trial court and the defendant which enables the court to determine fully the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his plea of guilty or no contest.

3. The requirements of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) are not satisfied by a written statement by the defendant or by representations of his counsel.

Patrolman William Brown of the Lima Police Department was fatally shot on January 5, 1974, while investigating the inprogress robbery of a gasoline service station. Defendant, Ross D. Caudill, was arrested on January 9, 1974, and, five days later, an indictment was returned against defendant charging that he 'did purposely cause the death of another, to-wit: William Brown, while committing aggravated robbery,' with a specification that 'the Grand Jurors further find and specify that William Brown, the victim of the offense, was a law enforcement officer whom the said Ross Daniel Caudill knew to be such law enforcement officer, and the said William Brown was engaged in his duties as such law enforcement officer, at the time of the offense as aforesaid.'

Defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the indictment, waived trial by jury, and later elected to be tried by a three-judge court. At the beginning of trial, defendant's attorneys informed the trial court that they had fully advised defendant of his constitutional rights, of the possibilities and probabilities of the case, and of the penalties involved, and that he desired to withdraw his former pleas and to enter a plea of no contest. In conjunction therewith, defendant's atorneys read to the trial court a written statement by defendant withdrawing his former pleas and entering a no contest plea, which statement encompassed the matters set forth under Crim.R. 11(C)(2). While the trial court inquired of defendant if he had read everything contained in the statement, it did not personally inform defendant and determine his understanding that he was waiving his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he could not be compelled to testify against himself.

After hearing the state's evidence, the court found defendant guilty of the charge and of the specification. Thereafter, at a sentencing hearing, the court, being unable to find unanimously that none of the mitigating circumstances listed in R.C. 2929.04(B) was established, sentenced defendant to life imprisonment in the Ohio Penitentiary.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court to permit the defendant to plead anew.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of the state's motion for leave to appeal.

Lawrence S. Huffman, Pros. Atty., and James C. King, Lima, for appellant.

Siferd & Eaton and Richard E. Siferd, Lima, for appellee.

STILLMAN, Justice.

The state of Ohio has appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, assigning three errors listed as propositions of law. The first of these propositions recites:

'Where a defendant enters a written plea of no contest to a felony and, in writing, expressly acknowledges understanding all of his rights as enumerated in Criminal Rule 11(C), and expressly states his desire to waive said rights, and the trial court thereafter personally addresses the defendant concerning said written plea and waiver, and independently determines defendant understands the consequences thereof, there has been a literal compliance with Criminal Rule 11(C) and defendant's plea of no contest need not be set aside.'

Crim. R. 11(C) reads, with respect to the important subject matter of this appeal, as follows:

'(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept such plea without first addressing the defendant personally and:

'(a) Determining that he is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that he is not eligible for probation.

'(b) Informing him of and determining that he understands the effect of his plea of guilty or no contest, and that the court upon acceptance of the plea may proceed with judgment and sentence.

'(c) Informing him and determining that he understands that by his plea he is waiving his rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself.

'(3) With respect to aggravated murder committed on and after January 1, 1974, the defendant shall plead separately to the charge and to each specification, if any. A plea of guilty or no contest to the charge waives the defendant's right to a jury trial, and before accepting such plea the court shall so advise the defendant and determine that he understands the consequences of such plea.

'If the indictment contains no specification, and a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge is accepted, the court shall impose the sentence provided by law.

'If the indictment contains one or more specifications, and a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge is accepted, the court may dismiss the specifications and impose sentence accordingly, in the interests of justice.

'If the indictment contains one or more specifications which are not dismissed upon acceptance of a plea of guilty or no contest to the charge, or if pleas of guilty or no contest to both the charge and one or more specifications are accepted, a court composed of three judges shall: (a) determine whether the offense was aggravated murder or a lesser offense; and (b) if the offense is determined to have been a lesser offense, impose sentence accordingly; or (c) if the offense is determined to have been aggravated murder, proceed as provided by law to determine the presence or absence of the specified aggravating circumstances and of mitigating circumstances, and impose sentence accordingly.

'(4) With respect to all other cases the court need not take testimony upon a plea of guilty or no contest.'

It is clear from the provisions of this rule that a no contest plea requires the court to address the defendant personally and to inform him specifically that he is giving up his right to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. It is also required of the trial court that a determination be made that the defendant understands the significance of his waiver. Crim. R. 11(C) (2)(c).

Clearly this provision of the rules contemplates a dialogue requiring more than a perfunctory response from the defendant. There is an additional provision of Rule 11(C)(2)(b) requiring the court to inform the defendant of the effect of his plea of no contest and to make the same determination that the defendant understands the significance of a no contest plea.

With respect to an aggravated murder committed on or after ...