State v. Caves

• Decision Date: 08 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 04–15–00367–CR,04–15–00367–CR
• Citation: 496 S.W.3d 153
• Parties: The State of Texas, Appellant v. Charles Caves, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

496 S.W.3d 153

The State of Texas, Appellant

v.Charles Caves, Appellee

No. 04–15–00367–CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.

Delivered and Filed: June 8, 2016

Adam Crawshaw, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.

Jennifer Rossmeier, Bexar County Assistant District Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Appellee.

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice, Karen Angelini, Justice, Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

OPINION

Opinion by: Karen Angelini

, Justice

Pursuant to section 550.024 of the Texas Transportation Code

,¹ Charles Caves was charged with failure to stop and give notice to an unattended vehicle after striking the vehicle. After the trial court found the complaint deficient and signed an order quashing the information and complaint, the State appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Charles Caves was charged by information as follows:

on or about the 8th Day of April 2014, CHARLES CAVES, hereinafter referred to as defendant, while operating a vehicle that collided with and damaged an unattended vehicle, did intentionally and knowingly fail to immediately stop and locate the operator or owner of the unattended vehicle ... and give the complainant the defendant's name and address and the name of the owner of the vehicle which defendant was operating, and did fail to leave in a conspicuous place in or securely attach in a plainly visible way to the unattended vehicle a written notice giving the defendant's name and the name of the owner of the vehicle which defendant was operating and a statement of the circumstances of the collision, and the damage to all vehicles involved was $200 or more....

The information was supported by a complaint in which the affiant swore that the “affiant has good reason to believe and does believe that in the County of Bexar and the State of Texas, and before the making and filing of this complaint on or about April 8, 2014, CHARLES CAVES committed the offense of FAIL GIVE NOTICE UNATTENDED VEHICLE.”

Caves filed a motion to quash the complaint and information, arguing that the complaint was deficient because it cannot be discerned what crime, if any, is charged in the complaint. Caves further argued that because a defective complaint cannot support an information, the trial court should quash the complaint and information. In response, the State argued that the complaint was not defective and, even if it was, the probable cause affidavit was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of a complaint. After hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court found that the complaint failed to charge Caves with an offense; the court thus granted the motion to quash. The State then appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the trial court's order granting a motion to quash an information and complaint de novo. Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex.Crim.App.2010)

.

DISCUSSION

The resolution of this appeal involves the application of four articles of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

First, article 21.20, entitled “Information,” defines an information as “a written statement filed and presented in behalf of the State by the district or county attorney, charging the defendant with an offense which may by law be so prosecuted.” TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.20 (West 2009)

.

Second, article 21.22, entitled “Information based upon complaint,” provides the following:

No information shall be presented until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense. The affidavit shall be filed with the information. It may be sworn to before the district or county attorney who, for that purpose, shall have power to administer the oath, or it may be made before any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.

Id. art. 21.22.

Third, article 15.04, entitled “Complaint,” provides that “[t]he affidavit made before the magistrate or district or county attorney is called a ‘complaint’ if it charges the commission of an offense.” Id. art. 15.04 (West 2015).

Fourth, article 15.05, entitled “Requisites of complaint,” provides the following:

The complaint shall be sufficient, without regard to form, if it have these substantial requisites:

1. It must state the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, must give some reasonably definite description of him.

2. It must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the State, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the accused has committed such offense.

3. It must state the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as can be done by the affiant.

4. It must be signed by the affiant by writing his name or affixing his mark.

Id. art. 15.05.

Thus, an information that charges a defendant with an offense must be accompanied by a sworn complaint that also charges the commission of an offense. Further, the complaint must contain certain information identifying (1) the accused, (2) the time and place the offense was committed, (3) a statement that the affiant believes the accused has committed an offense, and (4) the affiant's signature.

On appeal, the State argues that the complaint in this case was sufficient to support the information. The State points out that only one requisite contained in article 15.05 is at issue: the requirement that the complaint contain a statement that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of the State or that the affiant has good reason to believe and does believe the accused has committed such offense. According to the State, the complaint meets this requirement because it states that the affiant had reason to believe the accused committed the offense of failure to stop and give notice of an unattended vehicle. The State emphasizes that the abbreviation of the offense to “FAIL GIVE NOTICE UNATTENDED VEHICLE” in the complaint does not render it defective.

Caves, on the other hand, argues that the abbreviated offense of “FAIL GIVE NOTICE UNATTENDED VEHICLE” cannot support the information because one cannot discern what crime, if any, is charged in the complaint.

“A valid complaint is a prerequisite to a valid information in a misdemeanor case.” Holland v. State, 623 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.1981)

. It has long been the law, however, that “particularity as a requisite in an information is not necessary in the complaint on which it is founded, nor are discrepancies between them of any consequence, provided there is accordance in substance.” Id. Further, the complaint used to support an information does not have to measure up to standards for complaints upon which search warrants are issued. Chapa v. State, 420 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex.Crim.App.1967) (citing Cisco v. State, 411 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1967) ). A complaint in support of an information serves only as the basis for a criminal prosecution. Id.

A complaint, however, must be sufficient to apprise the accused of the facts surrounding the offense with which he is charged in order to prepare a defense. See id.

; State. v.

Zorrilla, 404 S.W.3d 734, 735 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2013, no pet.). An information must be supported by an affidavit made by a credible person charging the defendant with an offense. Wells v. State, 516 S.W.2d 663, 664 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). A supporting affidavit is required before institution of a prosecution by information to prevent one person from being both the accuser and the prosecutor in misdemeanor cases. Id.

In Pitts v. State, 149 Tex.Crim. 608, 609, 197 S.W.2d 1012, 1012 (1946)

, the Court of Criminal Appeals was presented with an issue similar to one herein—whether the allegation in the complaint charged an offense. The defendant was charged with and convicted of aggravated assault. Id. The complaint, however, alleged only that the defendant “did, with premeditated design, and by the use of means calculated to inflict great bodily injury, to-wit, hands & feet, and did then and there by the use of said means and with premeditated design, injure the [victim].” Id. The court recognized that when an injury is inflicted by violence, the intent to injure may be presumed; however, the court emphasized that the act must be unlawful. Id. The court found the complaint to be insufficient because it did not allege the acts were unlawful or that the defendant committed an assault or battery upon the victim. Id. at 1013. Thus, the complaint failed to charge the offense of aggravated assault. Id.

Likewise, in Williams v. State, 133 Tex.Crim. 39, 40, 107 S.W.2d 996, 997 (1937)

, the defendant claimed the complaint was inadequate because it alleged no offense and failed to support the information. In that case, the defendant was charged by complaint and information with violating certain statutes regulating the sale of motor fuel. Id. Because the complaint failed to allege that the defendant acted knowingly, the court found the complaint insufficient to support the information. Id.

The State relies on a number of cases to support its argument. First, the State cites to Kindley v. State, 879 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no pet.)

. In that case, the defendant was charged with displaying an expired license plate, and the complaint alleged that the defendant “did then and there unlawfully while operating a motor vehicle without having attached thereto and displayed on the rear thereof, a license number plate, which has been validated by the attachment of a symbol for the current registration period, contrary to law and against the peace and dignity of the State.” Id. at 263. The defendant argued the complaint was defective because if failed to notify him of the charges against him. Id. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that “the complaint is clear, concise, and would notify anyone of reasonable intelligence of the nature of the charge.” Id.

Second, the State relies on Cisco v. State, 411 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Crim.App.1967)

. In that case, the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated. Id. at 548. The complaint...