State v. Cawyer

• Decision Date: 29 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 44271–0–II.,44271–0–II.
• Citation: 330 P.3d 219
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Kristina Marie CAWYER, Appellant.

330 P.3d 219

STATE of Washington, Respondent,

v.Kristina Marie CAWYER, Appellant.

No. 44271–0–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington,

Division 2.

July 29, 2014.

David L. Donnan, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, Elaine L. Winters, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Lewis M. Schrawyer, Attorney at Law, Port Angeles, WA, for Respondent.

WORSWICK, J.

¶ 1 Kristina Cawyer appeals the sentencing court's restitution order, entered following her Alford¹ plea to two counts of first degree custodial interference. Cawyer argues that the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority by ordering her to pay restitution for the State's extradition expenses, which were incurred to extradite her from Ohio to Washington. Cawyer also argues that RCW 10.01.160 did not give the sentencing court the authority to order her to pay the State's extradition expenses as a court cost. We hold that the sentencing court exceeded its authority under the restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753, by imposing restitution for the State's extradition expenses, but that RCW 10.01.160 gives the sentencing court authority to require the defendant to pay the State's extradition expenses as a court cost. We affirm the amount ordered for the State's extradition expenses, and remand for the sentencing court to modify its restitution order consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

¶ 2 Kristina Cawyer and her former husband Samuel ² lived in Washington State, where they shared custody of two minor children pursuant to a parenting plan. Cawyer then moved with the children from Washington to South Carolina. Cawyer failed to comply with two separate court orders requiring her to return the children to Samuel in Washington. The State charged Cawyer with two counts of first degree custodial interference.³

¶ 3 Cawyer moved with the children to Ohio, where she was arrested and jailed pursuant to a warrant. The Clallam County Prosecutor's Office incurred expenses to extradite Cawyer from Ohio to Washington to face the custodial interference charges.

¶ 4 Cawyer entered an Alford plea to both counts of first degree custodial interference. The sentencing court sentenced Cawyer to 30 days on each count, running concurrently, and gave her credit for time served. The sentencing court did not impose a suspended sentence or probation, but ordered Cawyer to pay $2,707.56 in restitution to the Clallam County Prosecutor's Office for expenses it incurred to extradite her to Washington.⁴ Cawyer objected below to the order requiring her to pay restitution for the State's extradition expenses. The sentencing court justified the restitution order as follows:

Again, it would appear to me that an extradition is different than what the statute contemplates. It is an expense which is not ordinarily incurred. It's occasionally incurred. And I would note that the felony judgment and sentence form has actually [sic] a box for extradition costs built into it, which indicates at least somebody at the State level contemplated that those costs might be incurred and would be compensable.

....

I'm going to impose the restitution costs, under the circumstances as I read the statute it allows the State to have those extraordinary sort of costs that are not incumbent necessarily for the administration of justice or for having a jury trial or those sorts of things.

Specifically in a case such as this, where there was [sic] a third party provided services to get her here, I think it's reasonable to require her to pay those as part of the consequences of her actions.

Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 48–51. Cawyer appeals the restitution order.

ANALYSIS

¶ 5 Cawyer argues that the sentencing court did not have authority to order her to pay the State's extradition expenses as restitution under RCW 9.94A.753, or as a court cost under RCW 10.01.160. We hold that the sentencing court exceeded its authority under the restitution statute, RCW 9.94A.753, by imposing restitution for the State's extradition expenses. But we hold that the sentencing court had authority to order Cawyer to pay $2,707.56 for the State's extradition expenses as a court cost under RCW 10.01.160.

I. The State's Extradition Expenses As Restitution Under RCW 9.94A.753

¶ 6 Cawyer argues that because the State was not a victim of Cawyer's custodial interference, the sentencing court exceeded its statutory authority under the restitution statute by imposing restitution for the State's extradition expenses.

¶ 7 We reverse a sentencing court's restitution determination only for a clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of law. State v. Corona, 164 Wash.App. 76, 78, 261 P.3d 680 (2011). “A [sentencing] court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds; this standard is also violated when a [sentencing] court makes a reasonable decision but applies the wrong legal standard or bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law.” Corona, 164 Wash.App. at 78–79, 261 P.3d 680. When, as here, we review whether the sentencing court applied the wrong legal standard or based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, we review de novo the choice of law and its application to the facts of the case. Corona, 164 Wash.App. at 79, 261 P.3d 680.

¶ 8 The sentencing court's authority to order restitution is derived entirely from statute. State v. Smith, 119 Wash.2d 385, 389, 831 P.2d 1082 (1992). RCW 9.94A.753 authorizes the sentencing court to impose restitution against a criminal defendant. RCW 9.94A.753(3) places limits on this authority, stating in part:

[R]estitution ordered by a court pursuant to a criminal conviction shall be based on easily ascertainable damages for injury to or loss of property, actual expenses incurred for treatment for injury to persons, and lost wages resulting from injury.... The amount of restitution shall not exceed double the amount of the offender's gain or the victim's loss from the commission of the crime.

¶ 9 Restitution is appropriate only if a causal connection exists between the defendant's offense and the victim's injuries for which restitution is sought. State v. Vinyard, 50 Wash.App. 888, 893, 751 P.2d 339 (1988). A causal connection exists if “but for” the offense, the loss or damages to a victim's property would not have occurred. State v. Tobin, 161 Wash.2d 517, 519, 524–25, 166 P.3d 1167 (2007). The State must prove this causal connection between the expenses and the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Kinneman, 122 Wash.App. 850, 860, 95 P.3d 1277 (2004)aff'd,155 Wash.2d 272, 119 P.3d 350 (2005).

¶ 10 The sentencing court may award restitution only to victims. Kinneman, 122 Wash.App. at 866, 95 P.3d 1277. A victim is “any person who has sustained emotional, psychological, physical, or financial injury to person or property as a direct result of the crime charged.” RCW 9.94A.030(53). While restitution is limited to victims, the definition of “victim” is not limited to the offense's immediate victim. Tobin, 161 Wash.2d at 524, 166 P.3d 1167; Kinneman, 122 Wash.App. at 866, 95 P.3d 1277. Rather, an individual or entity is a “victim” of an offense if the offense directly victimized that individual or entity, or if the offense caused that individual or entity to incur expenses to assist others who were directly victimized by the offense. See State v. Davison, 116 Wash.2d 917, 920–21, 809 P.2d 1374 (1991); Kinneman, 122 Wash.App. at 866–67, 95 P.3d 1277; State v. Ewing, 102 Wash.App. 349, 350, 7 P.3d 835 (2000).

¶ 11 In Tobin, our Supreme Court upheld the sentencing court's order imposing restitution for the State's expenses where the defendant's offenses directly victimized the State. 161 Wash.2d at 519–20, 528, 166 P.3d 1167. In Tobin, the defendant pleaded guilty to offenses arising out of an illegal crab and geoduck harvesting scheme. 161 Wash.2d at 520–21, 166 P.3d 1167. The sentencing court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for expenses that the State incurred to investigate the defendant's case and to resurvey the crab-and-geoduck-inhabited lands. 161 Wash.2d at 522, 166 P.3d 1167. Our Supreme Court upheld the order imposing restitution for the State's expenses because the offenses directly victimized the State, and thereby caused the State to incur extraordinary and unusual expenses. See 161 Wash.2d at 527–28, 166 P.3d 1167.

¶ 12 Tobin is distinguishable from this case. In Tobin, the defendant engaged in illegal crab and geoduck harvesting. Tobin's offenses directly victimized the State by depleting the State's crab and geoduck population and by damaging the State's environment. 161 Wash.2d at 519, 529–30, 166 P.3d 1167. Because the offenses directly victimized the State, the sentencing court in Tobin had authority to impose restitution for the State's expenses.

¶ 13 Here, in contrast, Cawyer was convicted of custodial interference—an offense that directly victimized Samuel and the children. But Cawyer's offense neither directly victimized the State, nor caused the State to incur extradition expenses to assist those who were directly victimized by Cawyer's offense. Rather, Cawyer's offense caused the State to incur extradition expenses to assist its prosecution of Cawyer. Thus, we hold that the State does not qualify as a victim of Cawyer's custodial interference because Cawyer's offense neither directly victimized the State nor caused the State to incur expenses to assist those who were directly victimized by Cawyer's offense. Therefore, the sentencing court erred by requiring Cawyer to pay the State's extradition expenses as restitution.⁵

II. The State's Extradition Expenses as a Court Cost Under RCW 10.01.160

¶ 14 The State argues that the sentencing court had authority to award the extradition expenses as a court cost under RCW 10.01.160. Cawyer responds that RCW 10.01.160 did not give the sentencing court authority to order her to pay the State's extradition expenses as a court...