State v. Cederaski

• Decision Date: 05 March 1908
• Citation: 80 Conn. 478,69 A. 19
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CEDERASKI.

69 A. 19

80 Conn. 478

STATE

v. CEDERASKI.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 5, 1908.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; George W. Wheeler, Judge.

Prosecution by the state of Morris Cederaski for a violation of an ordinance of the city of New Britain. From a conviction, defendant appeals. No error.

George W. Klett and Benjamin W. Alling, for appellant. John H. Buck, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.

HAMERSLEY, J. It is well settled that the Legislature may lawfully establish a municipality authorized to exercise within its territorial limits certain governmental powers of the state. The power thus authorized may include the powers necessary to the maintenance of a local government charged with the duty of preserving order within its limits, and of protecting the property, health, and morals of its inhabitants, and may include powers in the executive and legislative branches of the municipal government appropriate to the accomplishment of these ends. When the local legislature, in strict pursuance of the authority given by statute, enacts ordinances, those ordinances are operative as laws by force of the statute, and the exercise of the authority thus given is subject to all the limitations placed upon the exercise of legislative power. State v. Carpenter, 60 Conn. 97, 103, 22 Atl. 497. Such ordinances must be reasonable, that is, they should tend in some degree to accomplish the object for which alone such legislative power is given. They should not violate any provision of the fundamental law for protecting the rights of person and property, and their provisions should not be so vague as to render them void for uncertainty. See Cooley on Constitutional Limitations (3d Ed.) p. 200.

The phrase "by-laws must be reasonable" was first used in early English cases dealing with corporations aggregate erected by the King in the exercise of his prerogative. Such corporations included those which were purely private as well as those of a quasi public nature, such as chartered boroughs, and in the matter of by-laws there was no distinction between the two. The courts held that the mere erection of a corporation aggregate involved the power to pass by-laws and impose penalties for their violation, and that by-laws passed in pursuance of such implied authority must be reasonable, that is, related to the purposes of the corporation, and not contrary to the laws of the land, including the common law. 1 Black. Comm. c. 18. The phrase is still used when speaking of the validity of by-laws passed by any corporation aggregate, but it is manifest that its meaning may be open to some misconception when used in reference to the validity of a law passed by a local government in pursuance of authority expressly given in the act of Parliament by which such government is established, and especially when used in reference to the validity of laws passed by a municipality established for the purpose of local self-government by an act of a state Legislature under the provisions of its Constitution. In the latter case the validity of a city ordinance depends, first, upon the construction of the act establishing the city government. Is the ordinance in question expressly, or by necessary implication, authorized by that act? If not, the ordinance is unauthorized, and therefore void; but if the ordinance is clearly authorized by the public act, then it is an exercise of the legislative power of the state, and it is valid, and "reasonable," within the meaning of the ancient phrase, if its provisions do not violate any controlling general statute on the same subject, and are within the limitations imposed by the fundamental law upon the exercise of legislative power.

The Legislature has established the electors of the state residing within the territorial limits of the city of New Britain as a municipality for the purpose of local self-government, with the governmental powers conferred by its charter. 14 Sp. Laws 1905, p. 915. These powers include the power of taxation to defray the burdens and expenses imposed upon the city, both directly through a tax said by the city upon its grand list in the mode prescribed by its ordinances, and indirectly through special assessments for public improvements and care of its streets and through burdens imposed upon owners of property and others incident to the enforcement of regulations necessary for the protection of its inhabitants, and the power to make such ordinances as it shall see fit concerning nuisances of all kind and their summary abatement; concerning the preservation of the city from fires and the erection of buildings that may become unsafe; concerning the regulation of markets and commerce, the inspection of produce brought into the city for sale and the sale of unwholesome food of any kind; concerning the streets and public grounds, and keeping the same free from snow, ice, rubbish, or obstructions of...