State v. Chantiloupe, 4D18–162
| Decision Date | 06 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D18–162,4D18–162 |
| Citation | 248 So.3d 1191 |
| Parties | STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Tashane M. CHANTILOUPE, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Leslie T. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Gary Lee Caldwell, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
The State petitions for a writ of prohibition or a writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's order refusing to allow it to file an untimely notice of intent to seek the death penalty. We agree with the State that the circuit court incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to enlarge the forty-five-day deadline to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. But, based on the specific facts of this case, we cannot conclude the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it declined to exercise its discretion and grant the State's request for extension. Thus, we deny the petition.
The Palm Beach State Attorney's Office indicted the Defendant on charges of first-degree murder with a firearm and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The date of his arraignment was August 18, 2017, which is critical to the resolution of this petition because both section 982.04(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2017), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.181, allow the State forty-five days from the date of arraignment to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty.
Fifty–six days after arraignment, the Defendant moved to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty. The State responded three days later by moving for leave to file a notice to seek the death penalty. In its four-paragraph motion, the State listed two aggravating factors, which included a prior conviction and evidence that the Defendant planned his acts in advance. The State also asserted that In other words, the State provided no basis for the extension, nor any cause for failing to seek the extension until after the deadline had passed.
The court held a hearing on the competing motions. It pointed out that the State knew of the two aggravating factors upon which it sought leave at the time of indictment. The State asked for additional time to file a supplemental memorandum because, they stated, "it's an important issue, and the language is really odd in the statute." After a colloquy, the court responded, stating Nevertheless, the court ultimately allowed the State additional time to file a supplemental memorandum.
The supplemental memorandum was filed as the State's motion to deny defendant's motion to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty. While acknowledging it was untimely, the State argued there would be no prejudice to the Defendant:
The defendant asks this Court to impose the harshest punishment available, i.e., prohibit the State from seeking the appropriate sentence of death in this case simply because the state filed its Notice To Seek The Death Penalty fourteen days late. The State acknowledges that pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 782.04(1)(b) and Fla. R. of Crim. Pro. 3.181, the Notice is untimely, however, the two-week delay has not in any way prejudiced the defendant, nor has it violated any of his constitutional rights.
This five-page memorandum, like the original four-paragraph motion, failed to provide a reason to extend the deadline and focused on the legality of extending the forty-five-day deadline.
The court held a continued hearing after the State filed its supplemental memorandum, at which time the State raised excusable neglect for the first time:
On excusable neglect, the court orally found that it appeared "the prosecutor forgot the time line or forgot" and that "even with the good faith exception, I would find against you, in this, under the facts of this case." In other words, even if the court believed it had the authority to extend the deadline it would not have done so because it did not think that the State had shown good cause or excusable neglect.
The court took the issue under advisement to allow it time to review the State's supplemental memorandum. The court then issued a detailed order granting the Defendant's motion to preclude the State from seeking the death penalty and denying the State's motion for enlargement. The State filed this petition for writ of prohibition or certiorari asking that we quash the court's order.
The State seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition or, alternatively, a writ of certiorari. We begin our analysis with the standard of review applicable to each. Second, we consider the evolution and the language of the governing statute and rule. Third, we apply the statute and rules and hold the court incorrectly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to extend the deadline. Fourth, we consider whether the court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it declined to exercise its discretion to extend the deadline and conclude the court did not.
"The state attorney has complete discretion in making the decision to charge and prosecute." Cleveland v. State , 417 So.2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982). A writ of prohibition is appropriate if a trial court interferes with the prosecutor's discretion by refusing to allow a first-degree murder prosecution to proceed as a capital case. State v. Bloom , 497 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986) (); see also State v. Lopez , 219 So.3d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
A writ of certiorari may also be appropriate to review certain "non-final orders of lower tribunals other than as prescribed by rule 9.130." Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2)(A). The "extraordinary writ is reserved for those situations where there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250, 254 (Fla. 1988). A petition for writ of certiorari requires the State to establish the court departed from the essential requirements of the law in a way that results in material injury to the remainder of the case and that cannot be remedied on post-judgment appeal. See, e.g., State v. Pettis , 520 So.2d 250, 253 (Fla. 1988) ; Lake v. State , 193 So.3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
In 1995, the Florida Supreme Court enacted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.202(a), which stated:
(a) Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty. The provisions of this rule apply only in those capital cases in which the state gives written notice of its intent to seek the death penalty within 45 days from the date of arraignment. Failure to give timely written notice under this subdivision does not preclude the state from seeking the death penalty.
Amendments to Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220 Discovery , 674 So.2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1995). This rule remained in place until 2016 when the Supreme Court of the United States found Florida's "sentencing scheme" unconstitutional. Hurst v. Florida , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 624, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016).
As a result of Hurst , the legislature amended Florida's capital-punishment statute. The legislature codified a requirement that the State file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty:
(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment. If the prosecutor intends to seek the death penalty, the prosecutor must give notice to the defendant and file the notice with the court within 45 days after arraignment. The notice must contain a list of the aggravating factors the state intends to prove and has reason to believe it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The court may allow the prosecutor to amend the notice upon a showing of good cause.
Ch. 2016–13, § 2, Laws of Fla. (enacting § 782.04(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016) ). The statute provides that a notice of intent to seek the death penalty must be filed within forty-five days after arraignment. In other words, the legislative enactment incorporated Rule 3.202(a) into the Florida Statutes.
After the legislature enacted section 782.04(1)(b), the Florida Supreme Court amended the rules. It amended Rule 3.202 and added new Rule 3.181. In In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure , 200 So.3d 758, 759 (Fla. 2016), the court stated that the amendments "implement chapter 2016–13, section 2, Laws of Florida." The court's opinion also noted that the changes included the "removal [of] language from existing rule 3.202(a) in order to avoid possible conflict with the statute and new rule." Id. The Appendix to the court's...
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State v. Demons
...interferes with the prosecutor's discretion by refusing to allow a first-degree murder prosecution to proceed as a capital case." Chantiloupe, 248 So.3d at 1195. We also review novo the trial court's interpretation of statutes. D.A. v. State, 11 So.3d 423, 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). We start ......