State v. Christman
| Decision Date | 17 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 28609–6–III.,28609–6–III. |
| Citation | 160 Wash.App. 741,249 P.3d 680 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent,v.Corey (NMI) CHRISTMAN, Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Susan Marie Gasch, Gasch Law Office, Spokane, WA, for Appellant.Carole Louise Highland, Attorney at Law, D. Angus Lee, Grant County Prosecuting Attorney, Ephrata, WA, for Respondent.SIDDOWAY, J.
[160 Wash.App. 744] ¶ 1 Delivering a controlled substance that is used by the person to whom it was delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is punishable as controlled substances homicide. Corey Christman appeals his conviction for the crime, contending (1) that in order to prove the “results in death” element, the State was required to prove that the user's death was proximately caused by the drug he delivered and, given evidence that other substances contributed to the death in this case, the evidence was insufficient and (2) alternatively, that the statute establishing the crime is unconstitutionally vague in failing to clearly identify how a defendant's delivery of drugs must relate to the cause of death. We hold that proximate cause is a required element of controlled substances homicide, that the statute establishing the crime is not unconstitutionally vague in that respect, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
¶ 2 On an evening in September 2008, a group of young people gathered at the sand dunes near Moses Lake, Washington, to party. They built a bonfire, ate, and drank beer and wine coolers. Some smoked marijuana and took ecstasy (methylenedioxymethamphetamine). Among those in attendance were Corey Christman and Ryan Mulder.
¶ 3 Mr. Christman brought nine and one-half methadone pills to the party, intending to sell them. Instead, he gave two of the pills to Mr. Mulder. Mr. Mulder later told Mr. Christman that he was not feeling any effect from the pills and asked for more, and Mr. Christman gave him another three. Still later, Mr. Mulder asked for more and was directed by Mr. Christman to the pocket of his shirt, which was by the fire. The next morning, Mr. Christman discovered that the remaining four and one-half pills that were in his shirt pocket were gone.
¶ 4 The partiers left the sand dunes after about an hour and one-half. Several, including Mr. Mulder, drove to the home of Justin Sibley. Those who moved on to the Sibley home characterized Mr. Mulder as appearing extremely intoxicated. After lingering for a while at the Sibley home, several people walked Mr. Mulder to a nearby house where he planned to spend the night in the garage, something he had done before. Mr. Mulder said he was thirsty and would like something to eat, and before leaving Mr. Mulder to sleep, the residents of the home provided him with water and food.
¶ 5 The next morning, residents who went to wake Mr. Mulder found him barely breathing. After unsuccessfully trying to revive him, someone called 911. Mr. Mulder was taken to Samaritan Hospital and was then flown to Deaconess Medical Center in Spokane, where he died two days later. The only items of evidentiary value later located in the garage were items of clothing; no evidence of drugs or alcohol was discovered. By all accounts, Mr. Mulder did not consume any drugs or alcohol after leaving the sand dunes.
¶ 6 County medical examiners determined that Mr. Mulder had not died of natural causes and had toxic levels of methadone in his body. Mr. Christman was thereafter charged with controlled substances homicide.
¶ 7 At trial, Dr. John Howard, a forensic pathologist and one of the two medical examiners for Spokane County, testified that the cause of Mr. Mulder's death was hypoxic encephalopathy due to the use of methadone, methamphetamine, and alcohol and that aspiration pneumonitis contributed to his death. He relied on clinical evidence and laboratory test results from the hospital medical records, as well as a postmortem analysis of the earliest available hospital blood sample, which he requested be prepared by the state toxicology laboratory. Some of the screening tests performed at the hospitals over the several days of Mr. Mulder's care indicated the presence of methadone metabolites, alcohol, and methamphetamine but without quantifying the amounts present; one lab screen also indicated the presence of cannabinoids, or THC (tetrahydrocannabinol). The postmortem analysis prepared by the state toxicology lab measured the amount of methadone in Mr. Mulder's body as .23 milligrams per liter but did not reveal measureable evidence of alcohol or amphetamines, even though the toxicologist testified at the time of trial that he had run assays for those substances and the testing performed at the toxicology lab is more sensitive than a typical hospital assay.
¶ 8 On direct examination, Dr. Howard testified that ingesting nine and one-half pills of methadone was consistent with a blood methadone level of .23 milligrams per liter. He testified that the alcohol and methamphetamine present could have contributed to the toxic effects on the brain but that he could not say “percentagewise” what role, because their quantity was not measured. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 269.
¶ 9 When Dr. Howard was asked for his opinion as to methadone's contribution to the medical cause of death, defense counsel objected on foundation grounds, arguing that the doctor had no basis on which to form an opinion without knowing the amount of alcohol and methamphetamine in Mr. Mulder's system, which defense counsel suggested had metabolized prior to the postmortem testing. RP at 270. The objection was overruled, and Dr. Howard testified that .23 milligrams of methadone per liter had been shown to be lethal in other cases. RP at 284. When asked whether methadone caused the death of Mr. Mulder within reasonable medical certainty, Dr. Howard responded “Yes.” RP at 273.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Dr. Howard testified that both methamphetamine and alcohol were also causes of death. RP at 281–82. On redirect, the State questioned him further about methadone being an additional cause, and Dr. Howard testified:
My opinion is that all three combined to cause death, and that each one, each of the two drugs and the alcohol played a role. So each of the—the fact that each of them were detected describe it as each of them hastened his death. So the alcohol hastened his death, the methamphetamine hastened his death, and the Methadone hastened his death. So each of them is a cause of death.
¶ 11 The medical testimony only partially bore out defense counsel's suggestion that alcohol and methamphetamine could not be measured by the state toxicology lab because they had metabolized by the time of the postmortem analysis. Dr. Howard agreed that, while alive, Mr. Mulder would have more rapidly metabolized alcohol and methamphetamine than methadone, which could be one factor explaining why alcohol and methamphetamine were detected in some blood samples taken at the hospitals but did not exist in measureable amounts in the sample tested by the state toxicology lab.1 But the state toxicologist testified that because the blood sample tested at the state toxicology lab was treated with an enzyme poison and anticoagulant at the time it was drawn, it would not have been compromised in the time elapsing before its postmortem analysis. RP at 302–03.
¶ 12 The instructions provided to the jury stated that among the elements the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict were:
(1) That on or about September 7, 2008, the defendant unlawfully delivered methadone, a controlled substance, to Ryan Mulder;
....
(3) That the defendant knew that the substance delivered was a controlled substance;
....
(5) That use of the controlled substance delivered by the defendant resulted in the death of Ryan Mulder.
Clerk's Papers at 32 (Instruction 12). The term “resulted in” was not defined for the jury, nor was a proximate cause definition instruction requested or given.
¶ 13 The jury found Mr. Christman guilty of controlled substances homicide and the superior court imposed a standard range sentence of 61 months. Mr. Christman appeals, contending first, that in light of the medical examiner's inability to isolate methadone as the cause of death, insufficient evidence supports his conviction; and second, that the controlled substances homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
¶ 14 Mr. Christman's appeal proceeds from the premises (1) that the controlled substances homicide statute, RCW 69.50.415, requires that the State prove that a victim's death was proximately caused by a controlled substance delivered by the defendant and (2) that the State did not prove proximate cause in this case. If we do not reverse on the basis that the statute requires proof of proximate cause, he asks that we reverse by applying the rule of lenity or by finding the statute unconstitutional as applied.
¶ 15 RCW 69.50.415(1) provides:
A person who unlawfully delivers a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(2)(a), (b), or (c) which controlled substance is subsequently used by the person to whom it was delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is guilty of controlled substances homicide.
Mr. Christman points out that no less an authority than the authors of the Washington Pattern Jury Instructions view the “results from” language in the statute as unclear as to the quality of causation required. Br. of Appellant at 6–7. The comment to pattern instruction 29.02 notes that “[i]t is not clear whether the Legislature intended that the death of the user must be proximately caused by the use of the controlled substance or that use of the controlled substance merely ‘result in the death of the user.’ ” 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 29.02, cmt. (3d ed. 2008). The comment further states that if the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bauer
...intent to distinguish “causing death” from “resulting in death” and that both require a showing of proximate cause. State v. Christman, 160 Wash.App. 741, 754, 249 P.3d 680,review denied,172 Wash.2d 1002, 257 P.3d 666 (2011). The first degree robbery statute 6 requires—as one alternative—th......
-
State v. Carpenter
...Foremost, the statute at issue in Burrage involved a sentencing-enhancement statute. See, e.g. , State v. Christman , 160 Wash.App. 741, 751-752, 249 P.3d 680 (2011) ("These cases are unhelpful to our analysis, however, because they involve the distinguishable context of sentencing enhancem......
-
People v. Nere
...qualify as a cause, even if the victim was already mortally wounded by another person's independent act. See State v. Christman, 160 Wash.App. 741, 249 P.3d 680, 683, 688 (2011) (expert opinion that methadone defendant gave victim hastened victim's death was sufficient to prove guilt under ......
-
State v. Bauer
...may be liable for the other's death from overdose even if other drugs from another source also contributed to the death. 160 Wash.App. 741, 249 P.3d 680 (2011). Once again, the initial act was not only intentional, but felonious, and capable of causing harm in and of itself. ¶ 20 Bauer's ac......
-
TABLE OF CASES
...454 Choice, United States v., 201 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 2000), 47 Christian S., In re, 872 P.2d 574 (Cal. 1994), 222 Christman, State v., 249 P.3d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011), 178 Chun, People v., 203 P.3d 425 (Cal. 2009), 494 Cicero, People v., 157 Cal. App. 3d 465 (Ct. App. 1984), 555 City of ......
-
§ 14.02 Actual Cause (or "Factual Cause")
...subsection, see Ben Gifford, State v. Brelo and the Problem of Actual Causation, 44 Am. J. Crim. L. 157 (2017). [28] State v. Christman, 249 P.3d 680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that "[t]he 'substantial factor' test is generally applied in multiple causation cases"; "[u]nder the sub......
-
§ 14.02 ACTUAL CAUSE (OR "FACTUAL CAUSE")
...provides thoughtful insights into the issue, as well as citations to many earlier writings on the subject.[30] . State v. Christman, 249 P.3d 680, 687 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that "[t]he 'substantial factor' test is generally applied in multiple causation cases"; "[u]nder the substan......