State v. Cnty. of Florence

Decision Date17 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. 27323.,27323.
Citation406 S.C. 169,749 S.E.2d 516
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE of South Carolina and the South Carolina Department of Revenue, Petitioners, v. COUNTY OF FLORENCE, Florence County Council, and the Florence County Registration and Elections Commission, Respondents. Appellate Case No. 2013–001868.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Harry T. Cooper, Jr. and Milton Gary Kimpson, both of Columbia, for South Carolina Department of Revenue; Deputy Solicitor General Robert D. Cook and Deputy Solicitor General J. Emory Smith, Jr., of the Office of Attorney General, of Columbia, for Petitioners State of South Carolina and South Carolina Department of Revenue.

D. Malloy McEachin, Jr., of McEachin & McEachin, P.A., of Florence; John Carroll Moylan III, of Wyche, PA, of Columbia; and Wade Stackhouse Kolb III, and J. Theodore Gentry, both of Wyche, PA, of Greenville, for Respondents County of Florence, Florence County Council and the Florence County Registration and Elections Commission.

Austin J. Tothacer, Jr., of Newberry, for Newberry County, South Carolina, Amicus Curiae.

Robert E. Lyon, Jr., John K. DeLoache and Jenna L. Stephens, all of Columbia, for South Carolina Association of Counties, Amicus Curiae.

Chief Justice TOAL.

This case is before the Court in its original jurisdiction. The State and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) 1 (collectively, Petitioners) request this Court declare a proposed tax referendum invalid under the Capital Project Sales Tax Act, sections 4–10–300 to –380 of the South Carolina Code (the Act),2 and enjoin the County of Florence, Florence County Council, and Florence County Registration and Elections Commission (the Commission) 3 (collectively, Respondents) from placing the proposed referendum on the ballot at the November 5 county elections. We find Respondents actions valid pursuant to the Act, and deny Petitioners' request for an injunction, thereby permitting the tax referendum to go forward on November 5.

Facts/Procedural Background

On November 7, 2006, Florence County held a countywide referendum to approve the imposition of a one percent sales and use tax to raise $148 million for six road projects. Florence County voters approved the following referendum:

Must a special one percent sales and use tax be imposed in Florence County for not more than seven (7) years to raise the amounts specified for the following purposes: $148,000,000.00 for the Florence County Road Project (‘the Project’) with the individual components of the Project to be funded in the following order of priority....

The tax is scheduled to terminate on April 30, 2014.

Although the tax has been collected since 2006, Petitioners assert that only one of the road projects has been completed. According to Petitioners, as of January 31, 2013, only $35.6 million of the $447.6 million projected tax revenue had been expended on the project, and the remaining revenue will be insufficient to complete the projects.4

Florence County Council has now enacted an ordinance approving a referendum for a one percent sales tax to be placed on the ballot on November 5, 2013. The question posed by the proposed referendum is nearly identical to the 2006 referendum, except that Respondents seek to raise $145 million dollars for entirely different projects than those listed in the 2006 referendum and have not provided for the completion of those projects in the proposed referendum.

Petitioners filed a petition in the Court's original jurisdiction, seeking a declaration that the proposed tax is invalid and to enjoin the referendum.5

This Court granted Petitioners' petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Rule 245, SCACR.

Issue

Whether the Act permits Florence County to place the proposed tax referendum on the November 5, 2013, ballot?

Analysis
I. Classification of the Tax as “New” or “Reimposed”

Petitioners contend the Act prevents Florence County from holding the referendum on November 5 because the referendum covers entirely new projects than those that were voted on in the 2006 referendum, which they claim are incomplete and have not been fully funded, and as such, the tax is “new” and not “reimposed.” On the other hand, Respondents argue that they have complied with the express terms of the statute, in that the Act provides for the reimposition of the tax to continue funding for additional county projects without interruption.

“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” State v. Scott, 351 S.C. 584, 588, 571 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2002) (citing Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State Budget & Control Bd., 313 S.C. 1, 437 S.E.2d 6 (1993)); Florence Cnty. Democratic Party v. Florence Cnty. Republican Party, 398 S.C. 124, 128, 727 S.E.2d 418, 420 (2012). “What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.” Scott, 351 S.C. at 588, 571 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed.1992)). Therefore, [i]f a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning ‘the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning.’ Id. (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)); see also State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 561, 647 S.E.2d 144, 161 (2007) ( “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the maxim that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used.”) (citing McClanahan v. Richland Cnty. Council, 350 S.C. 433, 438, 567 S.E.2d 240, 242 (2002)). The Court must construe statutory language in light of the intended purpose of the statute, and [t]his Court will not construe a statute in a way which leads to an absurd result or renders it meaningless.” Florence Cnty. Democratic Party, 398 S.C. at 128, 727 S.E.2d at 420.

Pursuant to section 4–10–310,

[T]he county governing body may impose a one percent sales and use tax by ordinance, subject to a referendum, within the county area for a specific purpose or purposes and for a limited amount of time. The revenues collected pursuant to this article may be used to defray debt service on bonds issued to pay for projects authorized in this article. However, at no time may any portion of the county area be subject to more than one percent sales tax levied pursuant to this article, pursuant to Chapter 37, Title 4, or pursuant to any local law enacted by the General Assembly.

S.C.Code Ann. § 4–10–310 (2013).

Section 4–10–330 sets forth the required content of a tax referendum ballot and describes the permitted purposes of such a tax raised under the Act. For example, subsection (A) requires that the ballot contain: (1) the contents of the enacting ordinance, which specifies the purpose of the tax and the permitted types of projects; (2) the maximum time for which the proposed tax will be imposed, not to exceed eight years from the date of imposition “or in the case of a reimposed tax, a period ending on April thirtieth of an odd-numbered year, not to exceed seven years, for which the tax may be imposed”; (3) whether the county proposes to issue bonds for the payment of any costs of the project and how the county proposes to repaythose bonds; and (4) the maximum cost of the project. S.C.Code Ann. § 4–10–330(A). Moreover, the ordinance must set forth the priority of funds to be used for multiple projects. Id. § 4–10–330(B). Under subsection (C), a county election commission is charged with conducting a “referendum for imposition or reimposition of the tax” which “must be held at the time of the general election unless the vote is to reimpose a tax in effect on or before June 1, 2009, and in existence at the time of such vote, in which case the referendum may be held on a general election day or at a time the governing body of the county and [DOR] determine necessary to permit the tax to be reinstated and continue without interruption.” Id. § 4–10–330(C). The governing body of the county may select the timing of the election. Id. “However, a referendum to reimpose an existing tax ... only may be held once whether or not the referendum is held on a general election day or at another time.” Id. In addition, section 4–10–340 provides for the tax imposition and termination as follows:

(A) If the sales and use tax is approved in the referendum, the tax is imposed on the first of May following the date of the referendum. If the reimposition of an existing sales and use tax imposed pursuant to this article is approved in the referendum, the new tax is imposed immediately following the termination of the earlier imposed tax and the reimposed tax terminates on the thirtieth of April in an odd-numbered year, not to exceed seven years from the date of reimposition. If the certification is not timely made to the Department of Revenue, the imposition is postponed for twelve months.

(B) The tax terminates the final day of the maximum time period specified for the imposition.

(C)(1) Amounts collected in excess of the required net proceeds must first be applied, if necessary, to complete a project for which the tax was imposed.

(2) If funds still remain after first using the funds as described in item (1) and the tax is reimposed, the remaining funds must be used to fund the projects approved by the voters in the referendum to reimpose the tax, in priority order as the projects appeared on the enacting ordinance.

(3) If funds still remain after first using the funds as described in item (1) and the tax is not reimposed, the remaining funds must be used for the purposes set forth in Section 4–10–330(A)(1). These remaining funds only may be expended for the purposes set forth in Section 4–10–330(A)(1) following an ordinance specifying the authorized purpose or purposes for which the funds will be used.

S.C.Code Ann. § 4–10–340 (2013).

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    ...successor. See id. We find such absurd results could not have been intended by the General Assembly. See State v. Cnty. of Florence , 406 S.C. 169, 173, 749 S.E.2d 516, 518 (2013) (“The cardinal rule of statutory construction is a court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the le......
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