State v. Coates

• Decision Date: 28 June 1900
• Citation: 22 Wash. 601,61 P. 726
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. COATES.

61 P. 726

22 Wash. 601

STATE v. COATES.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 28, 1900

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; W. H. H. Kean, Judge.

Herbert Coates was convicted of burglary, and, his motion for a new trial being overruled, he appeals. Affirmed.

Walter M. Harvey, for appellant.

Fremont Campbell, for the State.

WHITE J.

The appellant was tried in the superior court of Pierce county and convicted of the crime of burglary, and on November 7 1899, was sentenced by the court to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of five years. Before such sentence, motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled. Appellant prosecutes this appeal from the judgment and sentence of the lower court.

On the night of March 19, 1899, the safe in the office of the Tacoma Theater was broken open, and in the neighborhood of $500 taken. The prosecution relied almost entirely upon the testimony of one Roy Kauffman to secure a conviction. This witness admitted on the stand that he was an accomplice in the crime for which the appellant was on trial and that he had come from the Walla Walla state penitentiary to give his testimony in this case; having been sentenced upon the charge of burglarizing a store across the street from where the burglary in this case is alleged to have been committed. The story told by Kauffman upon the stand was substantially this: That previous to the alleged burglary he had met the appellant four times, when, so he states, it was proposed that they burglarize the Tacoma Theater. That he came downtown on the car Sunday evening, March 19, 1899 about half past 6 o'clock, and met the appellant at the corner of Ninth and C streets, near the theater building. That together they went through the C street entrance, and up three flights of stairs, gaining an entrance over the transom. From there they went down through the foyer and opened the box-office window. That appellant went through the window into the office, and then opened the door leading from the box office out into the foyer, and Kauffman remained outside the office on watch. That after turning on the light, and working a few minutes with a hammer and a punch which they had secured in the Standard House Furnishing Company's building, the appellant broke open the safe and took out its contents. Then the appellant came out and handed Kauffman a sack which contained about $125, which the appellant said was all. Kauffman stated that two days after the burglary he met the appellant and told him that he had seen a statement in the paper that more than $125 had been extracted from the safe, and that, if so, the appellant should not demand any further money from him, as he had his share. The witness Kauffman made a confession about the 30th of March, 1899, to W. W. Thompson, James Nevins, and George Ashby, policemen and detective officers, under circumstances hereinafter detailed. From the testimony of J. H. Read, chief of police of Tacoma, it would seem that the appellant was helping the detective force of Tacoma ferret out criminals; that the appellant was a 'stool pigeon,' so called, and was put to work among the thieves. As the chief of police expressed it in his testimony, they used 'people that can get in and associate themselves with thieves and hard characters, in order to find out what their business is in the city, and what they are going to do, and so forth.' It was claimed by the appellant that he had furnished the information leading to the arrest and conviction of Kauffman, and that revenge for his so doing was the motive influencing Kauffman in testifying against him. The appellant was boarding at the city jail, and he undertook to show, by the cook at the jail, that, during the hours that Kauffman testified the burglary was being committed, he was spending the evening with the cook. The cook testified strongly in support of this contention. The other material facts in the case are alluded to in the opinion.

One of the court's instructions to the jury was as follows: 'In regard to the testimony of the witness Roy Kauffman, the court instructs you that, while it is a rule of law that a person may be convicted upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, still a jury should always act upon such testimony with great care and caution, and subject it to careful examination in the light of all other evidence in the case; and the jury ought not to convict upon such testimony alone, unless, after a careful examination of such testimony, you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt of its truth, and that you can safely rely upon it.' The appellant complains of this instruction, and says: 'Nowhere is anything said to the jury about corroboration. The word is nowhere used, and the inference from the language of the court is that evidence of the accomplice, standing alone, is all right and sufficient in itself.' In effect, the court told the jury by this instruction that it could convict the appellant upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, at the same time giving the ordinary precautionary charge as to how the jury should act on such testimony. In the case of Edwards v. State, 2 Wash. St. 291, 26 P. 258, the court says: '* * * There may occur other cases where, from all the circumstances, the honest judgment will be as thoroughly satisfied from the evidence of the accomplice of the guilt of the defendant as it is possible it could be satisfied from human testimony; and in such cases justice demands that the evidence be accepted, so far as the court is concerned.' This being the case, it was not necessary to tell the jury that the evidence of the accomplice should be corroborated. In this instruction the court told the jury to act upon the testimony of the accomplice with great care and caution, and subject it to a careful examination in the light of all the evidence in the case, to be satisfied of its truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and to be so satisfied that they could rely upon it. This was most favorable to the appellant. To single out the testimony of this witness, even though he was an accomplice, and to caution the jury as to how his testimony should be received, was all the court was required to do; and under our law it may be questioned whether the court was required to go to this extent, for we have a constitutional provision which forbids the court to comment upon the facts. The jury was told to view the testimony of Kauffman in the light of all the other evidence, and we will point out further on in this opinion other evidence sufficient to corroborate his testimony.

The appellant, as a second assignment of error, complains that the court erred in refusing to permit appellant's counsel, on cross-examination of witness Kauffman, to trace the money, the proceeds of the burglary, and to lay thereby the foundation to impeach the witness as to how he disposed of the money. As a rule, 'a trial court should permit the defense, in the cross-examination of an accomplice, to go into every species of questioning that can affect or impair his credit as a witness. The extent of cross-examination under such circumstances and for such a purpose is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and, unless the evidence shows that discretion to have been grossly abused, the appellate court will not reverse.' 3 Rice, Ev. p. 517, § 325. However, an examination of the statement of facts shows that, after the ruling of the court complained of under this assignment, the appellant was allowed to go fully into the question as to the disposition of the money, thereby obviating the objection; and, from an examination of the statement in this respect, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.

The appellant, as a third assignment of error, complains that he was not allowed, upon cross-examination of Kauffman, to show the large number of burglaries which he (Kauffman) had committed. What we have said under the second assignment of errors as to the latitude to be allowed in the cross-examination of an accomplice applies to this assignment. It is true that, on the cross-examination of Kauffman, he was asked how long he had been engaged in the business of burglarizing houses, and if he had not admitted to the detectives, Nevins and Ashby, that he had committed a number of burglaries in the city of Tacoma, to which he answered, 'No,' and the answer was allowed to stand. Objections to these questions were made by the prosecuting attorney, and the objections were sustained, and exceptions were duly noted. These questions were relevant for the purpose of discrediting the witness and for laying the foundation on which to impeach him, and, if the matter had been allowed to rest without further testimony, it might have been prejudicial to the appellant. But the detectives, Nevins and Ashby, were called by the defense, and, over the objection of the prosecuting attorney, were allowed to testify that Kauffman made a confession to them shortly after he was arrested, in March, 1899, and that he confessed to burglarizing the traction company's safe on Railroad street, in Tacoma, twice, and confessed to the burglary for which appellant was on trial, and to a burglary of the Yellowstone Saloon, in Tacoma, and the Standard Furniture Company, in Tacoma, eight or nine times, in all which he acted alone. Notwithstanding the rulings of the court, the impeachment of the witness as to his confession was allowed, and his character as a professional burglar was pretty well shown. Under these circumstances, no harm was done the appellant by the court's ruling. This court has held that it will not reverse a case for harmless errors, where it is apparent that no injury has been done the party complaining of them.

The fourth error...