State v. Coleman
| Decision Date | 10 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 76851-4-I,76851-4-I |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Gail Yvette COLEMAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
David Bruce Koch, Jennifer J. Sweigert, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, Attorney at Law, 1908 E Madison St., Seattle, WA, 98122-2842, for Appellant.
Alison Moore Bogar, King County Prosecutor's Office, 500 4th Ave., Seattle, WA, 98104-2337, Donna Lynn Wise, King County Prosecutor's Office, Prosecuting Attorney King County, King County Pros./App. Unit Supervisor, 516 3rd Ave. Ste. W554 King County Courthouse, Seattle, WA, 98104-2362, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 An individual found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity who is committed for treatment or supervision or who has been conditionally released from supervision may petition for final release1 from custody.2 We conclude an order granting or denying a petition for final release pursuant to RCW 10.77.200 is appealable as a matter of right under RAP 2.2(a)(13). Gail Coleman has the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her petition for final release.
¶ 2 If only immaterial portions of the findings of fact lack support, it is of no legal consequence. Because sufficient evidence supports the critical findings of fact, and those findings in turn support the key conclusions of law, the trial court correctly denied Coleman’s petition for final release.
¶ 3 Therefore, we affirm.
¶ 4 In 2004, Coleman shot a grocery store manager in the face. The State charged her with second degree attempted murder. The court found her not guilty by reason of insanity in December 2005. After several years in treatment for paranoid schizophrenia at Western State Hospital, Coleman was conditionally released to the community in October 2009. Since then, she has lived in her own apartment and complied with the conditions of her release, all while under the supervision of Western State Hospital. She takes her medications regularly. Her paranoid schizophrenia is in remission when treated with medication. Coleman filed a petition for final release pursuant to RCW 10.77.200 in June 2016. Following a five-day evidentiary hearing in April 2017, the court denied her petition.
¶ 5 Coleman appeals.
¶ 6 The threshold issue is whether the denial of Coleman’s petition is appealable as a matter of right.
¶ 7 RAP 2.2(a) lists superior court decisions appealable as a matter of right.3 RAP 2.2(a)(13), on which Coleman relies, allows an appeal of "[a]ny final order made after judgment that affects a substantial right."4 Appeal under this rule requires "a showing of (1) effect on a substantial right and (2) finality."5 The parties do not dispute the first requirement, so the issue is finality.
A final judgment or order "leaves ‘nothing else to be done to arrive at the ultimate disposition of the petition.’ "6
¶ 8 Final release, which used to be called "final discharge,"7 is the "legal termination of the court-ordered commitment under the provisions of this chapter."8 A patient may not be released "except by order of a court ... made after a hearing and judgment of release."9
¶ 9 RCW 10.77.200 governs final release procedures. A person "may petition the court at any time for [their final] release."10 No section of RCW 10.77 mandates that either the Department of Social and Health Services or the person petition for final release. If a petitioner shows by a preponderance of the evidence that she "is no longer dangerous as a result of mental disease or that [s]he is no longer insane—then the [petitioner] must be unconditionally released."11
¶ 10 The State points to other sections in chapter 10.77 RCW that govern conditional release to argue against the finality of the court’s decision. But final release and conditional release are drastically different.12 A petition for final release carries the possibility of finality, whereas a petition for conditional release does not.13 A person petitioning for conditional release remains under the court’s jurisdiction regardless of the petition’s disposition. A person on conditional release is subject to regular court monitoring, modification of her release conditions, and limitations on her liberties.14 But a successful petition for final release necessarily results in termination of any court jurisdiction over the person, leaving nothing else for the court to do.15
¶ 11 The State relies heavily on In re Detention of Petersen to argue against Coleman’s right to appeal, but Petersen is inapposite because it addresses interlocutory circumstances akin to a petition for conditional release.16 In Petersen, our Supreme Court considered whether denial of a probable cause hearing, a statutorily-required hearing prior to an unconditional release hearing, was appealable as a matter of right.17 The court concluded the decision was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(13) because the finding of no probable cause "is not a final order after judgment in light of the court’s continuing jurisdiction over the [patient] until their unconditional release."18 Only discretionary review was available "[i]n light of the nature of the show cause hearing required by RCW 71.09.090(2)."19 But the court strongly suggested that a decision on the merits of unconditional release is appealable as a matter of right:
[A]lthough we do not now so decide, review of decisions made after a full hearing on the merits under RCW 71.09.090(2) would be reviewable as of right. Such hearings appear to be equivalent to whole new trials with the same procedural protections as the initial commitment trial.[20 ]
¶ 12 Consistent with the Petersen court’s suggestion, RCW 10.77.120(2) presumes the State’s ability to appeal adverse rulings on petitions for final release:
If the [S]tate appeals an order of [final] release, such appeal shall operate as a stay, and the person shall remain in custody and be returned to the institution or facility designated by the secretary until a final decision has been rendered in the cause.[21 ]
An order granting final release ends the court’s jurisdiction over the patient, consistent with legislative contemplation of a release order as a final ruling.
¶ 13 The State also compares this case to In re Dependency of Chubb 22 and State v. Howland,23 but neither is compelling. In Chubb, a parent appealed dependency review orders, not the dependency order or parental rights termination, and our Supreme Court concluded they were not appealable pursuant to RAP 2.2.24 The dependency review orders were interlocutory because the review hearings occurred automatically as part of an ongoing process.25 Similarly, in Howland, a trial court’s denial of a patient’s petition for conditional release was not appealable under RAP 2.2(a)(13) because it was not a final order.26 Even if the trial court had granted the patient’s conditional release petition, it would have retained jurisdiction and disposed only of the petition itself.27
¶ 14 Here, Coleman appeals a decision based on a five-day evidentiary hearing on the merits of her petition. Coleman would not be under any court’s jurisdiction if her petition were granted. And RCW 10.77.200 does not provide for routine monitoring of Coleman’s readiness for release nor does it require a preliminary hearing before a full evidentiary hearing.28 Moreover, the statute contemplates grant of a release petition as a final, appealable decision.29
¶ 15 Similarly, in State v. Gossage, this court concluded a trial court order denying a sex offender’s petition for a certificate of discharge was appealable as a matter of right.30 The court rejected as inapt the State’s analogy to Petersen and Chubb.31 The court upheld the offender’s right to appeal because no court would have had continuing jurisdiction over the offender if his petition were granted and because no statute required routine monitoring to determine whether termination of ongoing court jurisdiction was warranted.32 The same analysis applies to a petition for final release of a person found not guilty by reason of insanity.
¶ 16 The State contended at oral argument that it may appeal the grant of a final release as a matter of right, implicitly conceding that a decision on a final release petition is a final judgment, but suggested that an unsuccessful petitioner could not appeal as a matter of right the denial of a final release. The State provides no authority for this one-sided approach. An order granting or denying the petition for final release leaves " ‘nothing else to be done to arrive at the ultimate disposition of the petition.’ "33 Coleman is appealing a final order.
¶ 17 Accordingly, we follow the reasoning in Gossage and conclude that the trial court’s order dismissing a petition for final release is appealable as a matter of right pursuant to RAP 2.2(a)(13).34
¶ 18 The main, narrow issue presented by Coleman on the merits is whether we should reverse the court’s denial of her petition and remand for reconsideration if, as she contends, 7 of its 58 factual findings are unsupported by the record.35
¶ 19 Our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the challenged findings of fact and, in turn, if the supported findings and unchallenged findings support the court’s conclusions of law.36 "Evidence is substantial if it is sufficient to convince a reasonable person of the truth of the finding."37 "So long as this substantial evidence standard is met, ‘a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court even though it might have resolved a factual dispute differently.’ "38 Even if a trial court relies on erroneous or unsupported findings of fact, immaterial findings that do not affect its conclusions of law are not prejudicial and do not warrant reversal.39 Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal.40
¶ 20...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Pillon
...findings support the court’s conclusions of law. State v. Klein, 156 Wash.2d 102, 115, 124 P.3d 644 (2005) ; State v. Coleman, 6 Wash. App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018), review denied, 193 Wash.2d 1005, 438 P.3d 122 (2019). Unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. Coleman, 6 Wash. ......
-
State v. Koeller
...Wash.2d 1011, 460 P.3d 176 (2020).21 State v. Jieta, 12 Wash. App. 2d 227, 229 n.1, 457 P.3d 1209 (2020) (citing State v. Coleman, 6 Wash. App. 2d 507, 516, 431 P.3d 514 (2018) ), review denied, 195 Wash.2d 1026, 466 P.3d 776 (2020).22 RP (Apr. 2, 2019) at 166.23 Hatt, 11 Wash. App. 2d at 1......
-
City of Seattle v. Seattle Police Officers’ Guild
...in those sections because it is unclear whether the DRB adopted that testimony as its factual findings. See State v. Coleman, 6 Wash. App. 2d 507, 516 n.40, 431 P.3d 514 (2018) ("A finding that a particular witness testified, ‘The stop light was red’ is not the same as a finding of fact tha......
-
State v. Allyn Lee
...an assignment of error where there is no argument in the brief in support thereof. State v. Coleman, 6 Wn.App. 2d 507, 516 n.34, 431 P.3d 514 (2018). Because fails to provide any argument for these assignments of error, we do not address the issues. RAP 10.3(a)(6); Coleman, 6 Wn.App. 2d at ......