State v. Conroy, 98-1354.
| Decision Date | 20 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1354.,98-1354. |
| Citation | 604 N.W.2d 636 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Duane Russell CONROY, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Linda J. Hines, Assistant Attorney General, and Nicola J. Martino, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, TERNUS, and CADY, JJ. SNELL, Justice.
Defendant, Duane Russell Conroy, appeals his conviction for reckless use of a firearm in violation of Iowa Code section 724.30 (1995). Defendant claims the State failed to establish an essential element of the offense, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
On July 1, 1994, Duane Russell Conroy and two friends whiled away the evening at a Fort Dodge tavern. By all accounts the men drank heavily and continued to do so well after the bar closed. At around 3:00 a.m. defendant suggested a drive in the country. Ostensibly, the purpose of the expedition was to ascertain the whereabouts of Richard Dagit. Dagit had previously been involved in a relationship with Conroy's girlfriend. Conroy was apparently upset with Dagit and "wanted to find out where he lived." Upon arriving at the Dagit abode, Conroy produced a firearm. He then fired a shot through the window of Dagit's truck, which had been parked at the end of a lane overlooking a field.
Conroy was later charged with reckless use of a firearm in violation of Iowa Code section 724.30, and criminal mischief in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.6. Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of both offenses. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years for reckless use of a firearm, and one year for criminal mischief. The sentences are to be served concurrently.
On appeal, Conroy admits to firing a weapon for the purpose of causing damage to Dagit's truck. However, defendant claims the State failed to prove the firearm was discharged in a reckless manner, as is required by Iowa Code section 724.30, which provides:
Conroy asserts the phrase "reckless manner" means conduct done consciously with wilful disregard for the consequences. It is not intentional conduct in the sense that one is motivated to effectuate harm. He attributes injuries caused by reckless behavior to negligent, rather than deliberately malicious, acts. As such, defendant posits that section 724.30 applies to persons who intentionally discharge firearms in a wilful or wanton manner, without regard for the safety of persons or property, accidentally occasioning harm to others.
Since the damage to Dagit's truck was induced by design, defendant submits his conduct, while amounting to criminal mischief, was not reckless. Defendant avers the State failed to proffer sufficient evidence to support a conviction for recklessness, and that his attorney should have moved for a judgment of acquittal. Failure to do so, he alleges, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
The State argues that the word "reckless" modifies the manner in which the intentional discharge of a firearm occurs, rather than a person's frame of mind with regard to causing injury. As such, the State maintains the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that the use of a dangerous weapon, in anger, in the dark, by someone who had consumed large quantities of alcohol, was reckless. Defense counsel was therefore not ineffective for failing to raise the issue.
Although the defendant presents his appeal as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we are essentially being asked to consider the following: (1) Did the district court err in its interpretation of the word "reckless" as it relates to Iowa Code section 724.30; (2) Is there sufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction; and (3) Was the defendant prejudiced by his attorney's failure to move for a judgment for acquittal? Owing to our resolution of the first two issues, we need not address the last.
A district court's interpretation of a statute is a legal question, so our review is at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Barron v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 423, 424 (Iowa 1995); State v. Blakley, 534 N.W.2d 645, 647 (Iowa 1995).
Iowa Code section 702.16 defines reckless as the willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. This is the definition typically employed by our courts in reckless driving and manslaughter proceedings. In those instances, we do not condition guilt on an intent to cause harm. We simply look to whether the actor embarked on an activity which is known, or should be known, to pose a substantial risk to others. State v. Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1978).
In Kernes, we remarked that a review of words characterizing criminal conduct should reflect as much uniformity and precision as possible. Id. at 604-05. However, we also acknowledged that the meanings of such words often depend upon the context in which they are used. Id.
Iowa Code section 724.30 proscribes the intentional discharge of a firearm in a reckless manner. "Reckless," as it pertains to section 724.30, modifies the manner in which the intentional discharge of a firearm occurs, not the person's mental state in regard to causing injury. State v. Haskins, 573 N.W.2d 39, 48 (Iowa App. 1997). Thus, the statute requires that the discharge of a firearm occasion unreasonable risk to others; intent to injure is irrelevant.
The district court instructed the jury as to the traditional definition of recklessness. We hold that the instruction correctly interpreted section 724.30 as to the law.
Defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction rests primarily on his mistaken belief that intentional conduct cannot be reckless, and that the prosecution...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Smith, 04-3461.
...to whether the actor embarked on an activity which is known, or should be known, to pose a substantial risk to others." State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000). Smith argues on appeal that the Iowa offense of reckless use of a firearm does not involve conduct that presents a seriou......
-
State v. Rankins, No. 7-585/06-0999 (Iowa App. 9/19/2007)
...782, 787 (Iowa 1992)). Finally, we must consider all of the evidence, not just that which supports the jury's verdict. State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa Iowa Code section 703.1 provides: [a]ll persons concerned in the commis......
-
State v. Rodriguez
...to whether the actor embarked on an activity which is known, or should be known, to pose a substantial risk to others.” State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000). “[R]eckless driving is not an intentional wrong in the sense that resulting harm is intended.” State v. Baker, 203 N.W.2d......
-
State v. Howard, No. 8-211/06-1975 (Iowa App. 4/30/2008)
...787 (Iowa 1992)). In addition, we must consider all of the evidence, not just that which supports the jury's verdict. State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000). Finally, "[a] jury is free to believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and to give as much weight to the evidence ......