State v. Rankins, No. 7-585/06-0999 (Iowa App. 9/19/2007)
| Decision Date | 19 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 7-585/06-0999,7-585/06-0999 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY WAYNE RANKINS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.
Danny Rankins appeals from his conviction for robbery in the first degree.
CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and James P. Ward, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Baker, JJ.
Danny Rankins appeals from his conviction for robbery in the first degree in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1, 711.2, 902.3, 902.9, and 902.12 (2005). We conditionally affirm Rankins's conviction and remand to the trial court for a ruling on the new trial motions.
Rankins was charged with robbery based on allegations he aided and abetted another person in the robbery of a Des Moines Arby's restaurant on January 18, 2006. According to the State's theory of the crime, Rankin was the driver of a car used to initially survey the restaurant and later used as the getaway car.1 Rankins denied any involvement in the robbery and entered a not-guilty plea to the offenses charged in the trial information.2
The trial record includes evidence of the following: On January 18, 2006, Anne Michelle Harvey-Crouch, an assistant manager at the Arby's on Northeast 14th Street in Des Moines, observed a suspicious car at the restaurant. The car, a gold Cadillac, drove in the drive-through and stopped for a moment without placing an order. The car then briefly parked in the Arby's parking lot before leaving the area.
At approximately 11:00 p.m., Crouch and Shannon Campbell, a shift manager, closed the restaurant. After they left the restaurant, they were confronted by a masked man with a gun, who demanded the night deposit and repeatedly threatened to kill them. Crouch unlocked the door to the restaurant and attempted to disable the alarm. Crouch accidently typed in the wrong code, triggering a silent alarm. In the resulting confusion, Crouch and Campbell escaped and called police. Their assailant fled on foot south on Northeast 14th Street.
Richard Knutson, who was walking on Northeast 14th Street near Arby's at approximately 11:30 p.m., saw a man running south "faster than a track star almost" from Arby's to a bowling alley parking lot. The man stopped running when he came to the bowling alley parking lot and got into a "yellowish, goldish, cream" car. The car hurriedly left the parking lot without its headlights on and headed south on Northeast 14th Street.
Derek Pettijohn, a security officer at AMB Bowling near Arby's, saw a cream or beige Cadillac, Seville, or Lincoln pull into the parking lot and park in its west end with the engine idling. After some time, the car drove to the east end of the lot, parked, and then drove toward the west end of the lot. As Pettijohn approached the car, he saw a man come from the west end of the lot and get into the car. Pettijohn also saw the car drive south on Northeast 14th Street.
Shortly thereafter, a police officer stopped a car driven by Rankins because it matched the description of the car seen in the Arby's and bowling alley parking lots. An unidentified passenger got out of the car and fled on foot. Police were unable to apprehend the passenger. Rankins was arrested. During a search of the trunk, police discovered a loaded revolver, which Crouch and Campbell later identified as the gun used in the robbery. Crouch identified the car as that seen in the Arby's parking lot earlier that day. Knutson and Pettijohn identified the car as the car seen leaving the bowling alley's parking lot. They also identified Rankins as the driver of the car.
As noted earlier, Rankins denied any involvement in the robbery. According to Rankins's version, he was parked at a Kum & Go, which is between the Arby's and the Shop `N Save (where the stop was made), when an unknown man approached him and asked him for a ride. Rankins agreed to drive the man as far as the Shop `N Save.
At the close of the State's evidence, Rankins moved for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied Rankins's motion. In addition, Rankins objected to the court's aiding and abetting instruction "(1) because a person cannot aid and abet him or herself and (2) because the State has not named a specific principal that he allegedly aided and abetted." Rankins also renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal. The trial court overruled Rankins's objection to the proposed instruction and denied his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal.
A jury found Rankins guilty of robbery in the first degree. Rankins filed a pro se motion in arrest of judgment, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. Rankins's attorney also filed a combined motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment, arguing that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The trial court's resulting ruling stated:
[T]he Court would state that I was present throughout the trial. I reviewed all of the evidence; I listened to all the witnesses. I ruled that there was sufficient evidence for this case to go to the jury. And I now overrule the motions in arrest of judgment because I have determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict and sentenced Rankins to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years.
On appeal, Rankins claims: (1) The trial court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial; (2) the trial court erred in overruling his objections to the aiding and abetting instruction; (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct on mistake of fact; and (4) if error has not been preserved, counsel was ineffective. We will address each argument in turn.
We review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997) (citing State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996)). A jury's verdict is binding on appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence. State v. LeGear, 346 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 1984) (citing State v. Schrier, 300 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Iowa 1981)). Substantial evidence is "such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gay, 526 N.W.2d 294, 295 (Iowa 1995) (citing State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993)). Evidence, however, that only raises "`suspicion, speculation, or conjecture'" does not constitute substantial evidence. Randle, 555 N.W.2d at 671 (quoting State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1972)).
When reviewing challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that fairly and reasonably may be deduced from the evidence in the record." State v. Hoeck, 547 N.W.2d 852, 859 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (citing State v. Bass, 349 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Iowa 1984); State v. Hall, 371 N.W.2d 187 188 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985)). "Although direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, the inferences to be drawn from the proof in a criminal case must `raise a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime.'" State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992)). Finally, we must consider all of the evidence, not just that which supports the jury's verdict. State v. Conroy, 604 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Iowa 2000) (citing State v. Kostman, 585 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1998)).
Iowa Code section 703.1 provides:
[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as principals. The guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part the person had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's guilt.
To "aid or abet" means to knowingly approve and agree to the commission of a crime "either by active participation in it or in some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission." State v. Miles, 346 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Iowa 1984). Mere knowledge of the crime or proximity to the scene of the crime is insufficient in itself to show aiding and abetting. State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 1976). Furthermore, aiding and abetting need not be shown by direct evidence and "may be inferred from circumstantial evidence including presence, companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed." Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 406 (Iowa 1982) (citing State v. Myers, 158 N.W.2d 717, 721 (Iowa 1968)). "A person cannot aid and abet the commission of a crime unless another commits the offense; one cannot aid and abet himself in the commission of an offense." State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 864 (Iowa 1973) (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 119, at 197). The State, however, is not required to name or prove the identity of the principal. State v. Kern, 307 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 1981). The State's burden is to show that someone other than the defendant committed the offense and that defendant aided and abetted that person. See State v. Murray, 512 N.W.2d 547, 551 (Iowa 1994) ().
We find the earlier-described evidence sufficient to support Rankins's robbery conviction under the State's aiding and abetting theory. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could find another person...
To continue reading
Request your trial