State v. Cotton

• Decision Date: 03 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 5399,5399
• Citation: 516 P.2d 709,55 Haw. 138
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 709

516 P.2d 709

55 Haw. 138

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James E. COTTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5399.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Dec. 3, 1973.

Syllabus by the Court

1. While a motorcycle helmet statute has as its primary objective the protection of the wearer from head injuries, there are significant secondary harms to society as a whole which it is the purpose of the statute to remedy and which bottom the statute in policies which are constitutionally acceptable; these harms include public expenditures for emergency and hospital care for injured motorcyclists, welfare costs resulting from injured motorcyclists' possible post-accident inability to care for themselves and their dependents, and the threat to the fabric of society as a whole posed by widespread motorcycle injuries.

2. In view of the underlying differences between cars and motorcycles with respect to the protection against head injuries afforded their respective users a legislative distinction between them in terms of the mandatory wearing of helmets is reasonable and does not violate the equal protection rights of motorcyclists.

James E. Cotton, pro se.

Stephen Y. Lau, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Barry Chung, Pros. Atty., City and County of Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and MARUMOTO, ABE, LEVINSON and KOBAYASHI, JJ.

LEVINSON, Justice.

On November 17, 1972, the defendant was arrested in Honolulu for operating his motorcycle without wearing a helmet, as required by HRS § 286-81(1)(A). Against the defendant's vigorous constitutional objections, a district judge found him guilty of this offense and fined him in the amount of five dollars. We affirm.

The thrust of the defendant's main argument is that HRS § 286-81(1)(A) constitutes a burdensome imposition by the State on his personal freedom without any corresponding benefit to society as a whole which would make that imposition constitutionally permissible. Cf. State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 339 493 P.2d 306, 313 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 287, 34 L.Ed.2d 218 (1972) (Levinson, J., dissenting). To accept this argument of course, we would have to overrule our previous opinion upholding the State motorcycle helmet requirement, State v. Lee, 51 Haw. 516, 465 P.2d 573 (1970).

At the outset we note that the Federal Constitution does not require us to strike down HRS § 286-81(1)(A). Simon v. Sargent, 346 F.Supp. 277 (D.Mass.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1020, 93 S.Ct. 463, 34 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972) (rejecting constitutional arguments attacking the Massachusetts motorcycle helmet law which were virtually identical to those made by the defendant in this case). Instead, the defendant would have us read the Hawaii Constitution ¹ to afford him greater protection than that of the Federal Constitution against legislative infringement of his right to be let alone, and specifically, of his freedom to choose whether to assume the risks of helmetless motorcycle riding. Cf. State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971).

We accept now, as we did in State v. Lee, supra, the fundamental tenet that the relationship between the individual and the state leaves no room for regulations which have as their purpose and effect solely the protection of the individual from his own folly. But to say that a motorcycle helmet law has as its primary objective the protection of the wearer from head injuries is not to say that ipso factor it is unconstitutional. There may be significant secondary harms to society as a whole which it is the purpose of the statute to remedy and which, if realistic, bottom the statute in policies which are constitutionally acceptable.

A wide range of possible justifications for mandatory helmet laws have been articulated by courts and commentators. They include: (1) the 'flying missible' theory, i. e., helmets shield cyclists from foreign objects which might cause loss of control and consequent accidents with others, see State v. Fetterly, 254 Or. 47, 49-50, 456 P.2d 996-997 (1969); (2) the 'public ward' theory, i. e., helmet laws, by limiting the extent of motorcycle injuries, curtail public expenditures for emergency and hospital care for the cyclist and also minimize welfare costs resulting from the cyclist's post-accident inability to care for himself and his dependents, see Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 Ohio State L.J. 355, 370-72 (1969); (3) the 'modelling' theory, i. e., the helmetless rider may cause others, and particularly children, to imitate his behavior without first making a conscious choice rejecting the arguably safer use of a helmet, see Kaplan, The Role of Law in Drug Control, 1971 Duke L.J. 1065, 1067; and (4) the 'broad social impact' theory, i. e., motorcycle injuries resulting in serious injury or death are 'so alarming, so widespread and of such grave dimension that (they threatened) the very fabric of society,' State v. Lee, supra 51 Haw. at 519, 465 P.2d at 576, and hence that the State may adopt measures such as mandatory helmet laws, reasonably aimed at protecting the social order. While the 'flying missile' and 'modelling' theories are arguable justifications for mandatory helmet laws, they are inherently implausible and hence highly disingenuous. We prefer to rest our analysis on the 'public ward' and 'broad social impact' theories, the elements of which present the only realistic justifications for the law in question.

Both theories maintain that though helmet laws are directed on a primary level toward protecting the individual from head injuries, on a secondary level they protect much broader social interests. Viewed without limit, of course, 'secondary harm' arguments could justify an impermissibly wide range of governmental interference with private liberties. See, e. g., State v. Lee, supra at 524, 527, 465 P.2d at 578, 579-580 (Abe, J., dissenting). We agree with Professor Kaplan, however, that

(m)erely because protecting the public from secondary harms could logically justify a vast range of governmental interferences with individual liberty, and because we could define secondary harms as including anything lessening the full development of an individual's perfection, this does not mean that such interference is always improper.

Kaplan, supra at 1070.

As in so many areas of the law, the problem of deciding when secondary harms are sufficiently great in magnitude to justify remedial legislation aimed at primary behavior is one of enlightened judicial line-drawing. We start the process in this case with the observation that statistical evidence at the legislature's command indicates that the rate of increase of highway accidents and fatalities, as compared with other kinds of accidents, is alarmingly high. See, e. g., Note, supra at 357. Moreover there is evidence that the extent of motorcycle accidents, and particularly head injuries resulting therefrom, is at least as alarming as the general trend. See e. g., Simon v. Sargent, supra, 346 F.Supp. at 279. Finally, the appropriateness of mandatory helment laws as a remedy for this situation is likewise statistically demonstrable. See, e. g., State v. Lee, supra 51 Haw. at 519-520, 465 P.2d at 576.

With the great danger of primary harm to helmetless cyclists as well as the rationality of helmet wearing as a safeguard thus statistically supported, ² the magnitude of secondary harms of the nature indicated above is sufficiently great to justify the law at issue in this case. In answer to the reductio ad absurdum argument of the dissent in this case with respect to the extent of governmental intrusions justifiable by secondary harm analysis, we refer to the statement in Lee that 'this holding is limited to this case.' 51 Haw. at 521, 465 P.2d at 577. Particularly, we note that a tool which has aided us significantly in drawing the line between the police power and individual freedom in this case is the well-established doctrine that in regulating the use of public highways, the state has always been afforded exceptionallybroad discretion. ³ Certainly it is not beyond the permissible scope of legislation to mitigate by mandatory safety laws the tremendous economic and social costs occasioned by the extent of presentday highway carnage.

The foregoing analysis adequately answers the defendant's argument that HRS § 286-81(1)(A) exceeds the police power of the State under Article I, sections 2 and 4 of the Hawaii Constitution. In response to his equal protection argument, we quote and adopt the reasoning of the three-judge federal district court in Simon v. Sargent, supra 346 F.Supp. at 279:

Finally, we see no merit in plaintiff's claim that the statute denies him the equal protection of the laws. It is not difficult to discern a rational basis for the legislature's distinction between motorcyclists and, for example, automobile drivers, whose vehicle affords them substantially more protection than does a motrocycle.

See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).

We therefore decline to overrule State v. Lee, supra, and affirm the defendant's conviction.

ABE, Justice dissenting, with whom KOBAYASHI, Justice, Joins.

The majority of this court has upheld the constitutionality of the helment requirement provisions of HRS § 286-81(1)(A) ¹ and I respectfully dissent.

The defendant attacks the constitutionality of the portion of HRS § 286-81, requiring a motorcyclist to wear a helmet on the ground that the wearing of a protective helment is only for an individual's own personal safety and, therefore, is not a reasonable exercise of the State's police power protect public safety, health, or welfare.

The State, on the other hand, contends that the State has a vital interest in protecting 'members of the community from injuring themselves' and that the headgear requirement is a valid exercise of its police power. The State also urges...