State v. Crane

• Decision Date: 17 November 1915
• Docket Number: 12819.
• Citation: 88 Wash. 210,152 P. 989
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. CRANE.

152 P. 989

88 Wash. 210

STATE v. CRANE.

No. 12819.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 17, 1915

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. I. Ronald Judge.

Felix Crane was convicted of accepting the earnings of a prostitute, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Vanderveer & Cummings, of Seattle, for appellant.

Alfred H. Lundin and Joseph A. Barto, both of Seattle, for the State.

MORRIS C.J.

The defendant has appealed from a conviction on the charge of accepting the earnings of a prostitute. The charging part of the information, to which he unsuccessfully demurred, is as follows:

'He, said Felix Crane, in the county of King, state of Washington, on the 28th day of December, 1914, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously accept the earnings of one Gladys Bates, she, said Gladys Bates, then and there being a common prostitute.'

This information is practically the same as the information in State v. Columbus, 74 Wash. 290, 133 P. 455, which we held sufficient, saying:

'It is manifest also that the facts charged, if proven constitute a crime under the express terms of the statute.'

The appellant, however, urges that the sufficiency of the demurrer received scant consideration in the Columbus Case and that the force of that decision has been modified by our decisions in State v. Muller, 80 Wash. 368, 141 P 910, and State v. Dodd, 84 Wash. 436, 147 P. 9, both of which refer to the principle enunciated by Judge Dunbar in State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729, that the charge must be so specific that the defendant will be able to avail himself of his acquittal or conviction for protection against a further prosecution for the same offense. There can be no doubt of the correctness of that rule, but we do not believe that the charge here does violence thereto. In State v. Carey, supra, the statute made unlawful the practice of medicine without a license, and defined two different acts as constituting practice, the use of a degree, and the giving of a prescription. The complaint charged the defendant with the practice of medicine on a given date, but did not designate whether by the use of the letters 'M. D.' or 'M. B.,' or by giving a prescription, and it could not be known which charge was preferred against him or, if the latter, what particular act of giving a prescription he must be prepared to defend against. Likewise in State v. Dodd, supra, the information charged a crime which might have been committed by any one of several distinct acts, without specifying any one act which the defendant would have to meet. The information here charges but one crime, which may not be committed by acts of different character. Whatever may be the views entertained of our decision in the Columbus Case, we are satisfied that that holding is correct, and that this information is sufficient.

The term 'earnings of a prostitute' clearly means only earnings gained by the practice of prostitution, and the charge here clearly imports that, to be unlawful, the earnings must be given by the prostitute, either by herself or by some one in her behalf, that the earnings so given must be unlawful earnings, accepted for an unlawful purpose, and that the appellant is charged with such an acceptance. The argument that, inasmuch as prostitutes may have earnings gained in lawful occupations, the acceptance of which is not in violation of law, and as the acceptance of unlawful earnings for lawful purposes is not illegal, the information must specify that the earnings were from the practice of prostitution, and received for an unlawful purpose, is technical rather than substantial. The information charges in the words of the statute an act which is by the statute made unlawful. The charge is not of a crime which may be committed by acts differing in character, as in the Carey and the Dodd Cases.

It is contended also that the term 'earnings' is a generic term, and that as earnings might be of money, or articles of personal adornment, or other things than money, the information must state specifically what was received. State v. Muller, 80 Wash. 368, 141 P. 910 is cited to sustain the contention. In that case we found that it was the intent of the statute that the particular unit into which it was charged the intoxicating liquor had been shipped...