State v. Crenshaw

Decision Date29 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 7241-2-I,7241-2-I
Citation27 Wn.App. 326,617 P.2d 1041
PartiesSTATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Rodney K. CRENSHAW, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

Rusing & Platte, Richard C. Platte, Bellingham, for appellant.

David S. McEachran, Whatcom County Pros. Atty., Bellingham, for respondent.

DURHAM-DIVELBISS, Judge.

The defendant, Rodney Crenshaw, was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife, Karen Crenshaw, to whom he had been married only a few weeks. He appeals, having pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity to the charge below.

The defendant, who was 28 years old at the time of the offense, has a history of mental problems. He was hospitalized in his home state of Texas 15 times between 1970 and 1978, where he was diagnosed as a schizophrenic, paranoid type.

The couple married on August 10, 1978 in Texas and went to Canada. While there, the defendant became involved in a fighting incident and was deported to the United States, leaving his wife behind temporarily. He went to Blaine, Washington, registering at a motel on August 25, 1978. The victim arrived 2 days later. In his taped confession, the defendant said that when he met the victim he sensed that "it wasn't the same Karen" and that "she had been with someone else." The defendant did not ask the victim any questions about the infidelity he suspected. Instead, the couple went immediately to the motel where the defendant beat the victim until she was unconscious. He then went to a nearby natural food store to obtain a knife, returned, and stabbed the victim 24 times. The defendant left again, drove to a nearby farm where he had been employed to clear brush, and obtained an ax by telling the farm hand that the owner had told him to get the ax so he could do some more work. The defendant returned to the room and decapitated the victim, leaving ax marks that went 1/4-inch deep into the concrete floor underneath the 1-inch carpeting.

At about 6:30 p. m. that same day, the defendant went to a nearby gas station and borrowed a bucket and sponge, saying that he had a mess to clean up. When the motel manager went to defendant's room between 7:30 and 8 p. m. that night to inquire about his telephone bill, he observed the carpet was "squashy" and he smelled ammonia, but he did not ask the defendant any questions. Police later testified that the room had been washed down so thoroughly that they could not obtain fingerprints.

Later the defendant hid the victim's body under some brush in a drainage ditch about 25 miles from Blaine, and then drove to the Hoquiam area, about 200 miles from the scene of the crime. On the afternoon of August 29, 1978, he picked up two hitchhikers to whom he related that he had just decapitated his wife because she had been unfaithful, and that he wanted to get rid of the car he was driving because it was his wife's car. One of the hitchhikers assisted the defendant in pushing the car off of the Hoquiam bridge. While leaving the bridge, they spotted a police car and defendant ran away. Police apprehended him in the Hoquiam area the next day, at which time he identified himself as "Tristan Shantee." He voluntarily confessed to the crime on September 2, 1978.

The defendant was sent to Western State Hospital on September 5 to obtain psychiatric evaluations as to his competency to stand trial. On October 27, 1978, the trial court ruled him competent to stand trial. On December 7, 1978, the trial court denied his motion for acquittal on grounds of insanity.

At trial, the defendant testified that he was of the Moscovite religious faith, and that it would be improper for a Moscovite to not kill his wife if she committed adultery. He said that it would be a "little better" to use an ax for that purpose, so that the victim's head would not communicate anymore. He testified that he did not believe in divorce under any circumstances, and that divorce is "harder than death on people." In his taped confession, which was admitted into evidence and played before the jury, the defendant said that he had told the victim before they married that if he ever caught her being unfaithful to him he would shoot her, and that she should likewise shoot him if she ever caught him being unfaithful to her.

The jury found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree. The court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, and sentenced defendant to life imprisonment.

The defendant makes nine assignments of error, which we have grouped into four categories: (1) competency to stand trial; (2) evidentiary rulings; (3) the insanity defense; and (4) sufficiency of the evidence.

Competency to Stand Trial

First, the defendant assigns error to the trial court's determination that he was competent to stand trial.

RCW 10.77.010(6) defines incompetency as follows:

"Incompetency" means a person lacks the capacity to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense as a result of mental disease or defect.

The determination that an accused is competent to stand trial is within the trial court's discretion, and will not be reversed on appeal absent manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Hanson, 20 Wash.App. 579, 581 P.2d 589 (1978). We normally defer to the trial court's competency determination because the trial court can personally observe the individual's behavior and demeanor. Id. at 582, 581 P.2d at 590.

At the competency hearing, all three physicians appointed by the court to examine the defendant testified that the defendant understood the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own defense. When defendant himself took the stand, he was asked why he was in court that day, and he replied, "(w)e're in court to see whether I'm mentally capable of going to a trial." Based upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the trial court acted completely within its discretion in finding defendant competent to stand trial.

The fact that defense counsel expressed reservations about defendant's competency to stand trial at the original arraignment, and at the hearing to determine if further psychiatric evaluations were necessary, does not alter our opinion. Defense counsel did not express any such reservations at the competency hearing itself, and at the other hearing mentioned above, defense counsel said that he "(could not) honestly say that I've spent the time with him that would really perhaps be an adequate basis for a strong opinion on his competency, ..." A lawyer's opinion as to his client's competency and ability to assist in his own defense is a factor which should be considered and to which the court must give considerable weight. State v. Israel, 19 Wash.App. 773, 577 P.2d 631 (1978). Nevertheless, the primary test to be applied is whether the court engaged in a manifest abuse of discretion, State v. Hanson, supra, and no such abuse appears here.

In addition, the trial record bears out the court's pretrial competency determination. Although defendant often interrupted or distracted courtroom proceedings (e. g., by repeating "(y)our mother, your mother, your mother"), there is a distinction between explosive behavior and incompetency to stand trial. The defendant, by many of his own actions at trial, demonstrated he understood the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own defense.

Evidentiary Rulings

The defendant next assigns error to the trial court's exclusion of three items of testimony proffered by the defense. The first was a telephone conversation between the defendant and his mother in which he kept saying, "quit shooting me, mother," and the second was a portion of Dr. James A. Hunter's deposition in which he testified that in his opinion, defendant was a latent homosexual. The trial court excluded both of these items on its own motion when the defendant became disruptive and interrupted the proceedings with his personal objections to the proffered testimony. The trial court did not err by rejecting evidence even though no objection had been made by the prosecuting attorney. State v. Frost, 134 Wash. 48, 234 P. 1021 (1925). This evidence was merely cumulative, and the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding it. State v. Freeman, 17 Wash.App. 377, 563 P.2d 1283 (1977).

The third item of testimony was a telephone conversation between the defendant's mother and the victim shortly before her death in which the victim said that the defendant was upset by her menstrual periods and had told her to stop them. The State's objection to the admission of such testimony on hearsay grounds was sustained. The defendant's argument that the excluded testimony is admissible under the present sense impression and excited utterance hearsay exceptions cannot be considered because it is made for the first time on appeal. State v. Malone, 20 Wash.App. 712, 582 P.2d 883 (1978).

The defendant next contends that it was error to allow Letha Guthrie's lay opinion as to his sanity at the time he obtained the ax from her on August 27 because the State did not lay a proper foundation. We do not agree. Prior to eliciting her opinion that the defendant "seemed very normal" when he borrowed the ax, the State elicited the facts to form a sufficient basis for her opinion, including her working relationship with the defendant and the details of her encounter with the defendant on August 27.

Defendant also argues that it was error to admit Blaine Police Chief Hinchey's lay opinion as to defendant's sanity at the time of the offense because Hinchey lacked testimonial knowledge. It is well-established in Washington that a lay witness may testify concerning the sanity or mental responsibility of others, so long as the witness' opinion is based upon facts he personally observed, and the witness has testified to such facts. 5 R. Meisenholder, Wash.Prac. § 342, at 319 ...

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  • State v. Ellis
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • October 1, 1998
    ...212, 43 P. 30 (1895).3 "Alienist" is an old term for psychiatrist.4 I can find only one case to the contrary. In State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash.App. 326, 333, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980), aff'd, 98 Wash.2d 789, 659 P.2d 488 (1983), the Court of Appeals said: "Psychiatric opinion evidence regarding a d......
  • State v. Lewis
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    • August 28, 2007
    ...On appeal, we do not reverse a trial court's competency determination absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash.App. 326, 330, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980). B. ¶ 30 Defense counsel initially raised questions about Lewis's competency, triggering the trial court's decision to ......
  • State v. Davis
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • September 20, 2012
    ...the witness' opinion is based upon facts he personally observed, and the witness has testified to such facts." State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wn. App. 326, 332-33, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980)19 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting lay person testimony that the defendant "'seemed very norm......
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    ...the witness' opinion is based upon facts he personally observed, and the witness has testified to such facts.” State v. Crenshaw, 27 Wash.App. 326, 332–33, 617 P.2d 1041 (1980)19 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting lay person testimony that the defendant “ ‘seemed very no......
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