State v. Cunningham.

Decision Date31 January 1875
Citation72 N.C. 469
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. G. W. CUNNINGHAM.
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Where, upon the trial of an indictment for murder, a juror related to the prisoner was passed by the State, the Solicitor being ignorant of such relationship, and upon being tendered, made known the relationship himself, before being sworn: Held, that it was not error for the Court to stand such juror aside until the panel was completed.

Where a prisoner relies upon the plea of insanity, but there is no evidence whatever that he had ever exhibited any sign of insanity, evidence tending to show that some of his uncles and aunts were insane, is inadmissible.

Section 115 of chapter 31, Rev. Code, relating to the removal of causes, not being digested nor brought forward, is not repealed by section 2, chap. 121, Bat. Revisal; and the Superior Courts have the same authority to remove criminal causes to adjacent counties, as they had before the compilation of that Revisal.

The sentence of the Court must be carried into execution by the sheriff of the county in which the prisoner is tried.

( Adair's case, 66 N. C. Rep. 298; State v. Christmas, 6 Jones, 376; Twigg's case, 1 Winst?? 142; State v. Woodside, 142, cited and approved.)

INDICTMENT for MURDER, tried before Watts, J., at Fall Term, 1874, MADISON Superior Court.

The defendant was charged with the murder of one Daniel Sternbergh, in the county of Buncombe, and the case was removed to Madison county upon the affidavit of the defendant.

Upon the trial one G. W. Rhodes, one of the venire came upon the stand, was passed by the State, and tendered, whereupon he remarked he did not wish to be a juror in the case, as he was a cousin to the prisoner. The counsel for the State stated that he was not aware of the jurors relationship at the time he passed him. The juror was ordered to stand aside, whereupon the prisoner excepted.

The facts as disclosed by the evidence are as follows: The deceased, a citizen of Kansas, some two weeks before his death, arrived at Old Fort, in the county of McDowell, and was engaged in examining the mineral regions in the neighborhood. As he was about leaving Old Fort on a stage in company with one Gaston, with the intention of going to Macon, and other Western counties, the prisoner drove up with a wagon. The deceased asked him how near he would go to Asheville on his return. The prisoner replied that he would pass within two miles of Asheville. The prisoner was driving a wagon for one Dr. Fletcher. The deceased and prisoner made a contract, by which the prisoner agreed to carry the baggage of the deceased to Swannanoa bridge, two miles from Asheville, for fifty cents. Thereupon the deceased placed his baggage, a valise and overcoat in the wagon and started up the mountain, a short distance ahead of the prisoner. He was next seen at the toll gate near the top of the mountain, still ahead of the wagon. The prisoner arrived at the toll gate with the wagon, a short while after the deceased left. The deceased next stopped at Kerley's, two miles below the gate, remained some time, and enquired for a good place to stay all night. Was recommended to stop at Mr. Alexander's four miles below that point. The prisoner drove up about that time and said he could drive that far that evening. It was then about three or four o'clock on the 6th of June. The deceased and prisoner then left, deceased walking by the wagon. Before they passed out of sight, the deceased was seen to get into the wagon. About dark the wagon was seen and recognized at camp on the North fork of the Swannanoa, and two men sitting by the fire. About nine or ten o'clock Mrs. Stepp, residing some four hundred yards from the camp, heard a pistol or gun shot, and cries as if in pain following immediataly. The wagon was heard to drive away from the camp just before day light next morning, was seen and recognized at Alexander's a mile below, driving rapidly down the river. At eleven o'clock the prisoner stopped, four miles from Asheville on the Henderson road, and about fifteen miles from the camp, and asked for dinner, saying that he had eat no breakfast that morning, as he was sick. This was on Sunday. On the following Friday Maj. Porter discovered the body of the deceased, in a mutilated condition. This was two hundred yards below the camping place, in the river. The body was badly mutilated. In the face below the eye was a hole, apparently made by a bullet. An inquest was held and upon examination of the camp ground a pencil and pair of spectacles were found and identified as the property of the deceased. A large firebrand was also found upon which was hair and blood. Near the edge of the water were found blood and brains covered with leaves, and the leaves covered with stones. The body was identified as that of Daniel Sternbergh. The Coroner issued a warrant for the arrest of the prisoner. At the time of his arrest a pin cushion, a pocket knife, two pocket books, a watch and chain, a dirk knife and a pair of gloves were found in the possession of the prisoner, and identified as the property of the deceased. While under arrest and on his way to Asheville, the prisoner without any promise, threat or inducement expressed or implied, stated to one of the guard, the others not being present, that he had killed the deceased, that they were both drunk and playing cards and got into a dispute in the course of which deceased gave the prisoner the lie, whereupon the prisoner seized an axe and deceased a stick, prisoner got the first lick, struck deceased on the head and face and killed him. While in jail prisoner sent for one J. J. Ledford, a deputy sheriff who had charge of him, and voluntarily told him where the valise and overcoat might be found. In pursuance of this information the sheriff went to the place designated and found them. The prisoner subsequently told Ledford that he, the prisoner, killed the the deceased for his money, that he had prepared the plan before he reached the camp, that he had feigned himself sick and purposely delayed the wagon so that the deceased could not get to Alexander's, and had arranged the camp fire and camp chest with a view to the murder. That while at supper he pretended to be sick, got up, went to the fire and cut off a stick of wood, and while the deceased was looking in another direction, he struck him in the head with the axe. He then dragged him to the water when the deceased making some struggles and noises, he struck several more blows, robbed him and threw him into the river.

The prisoner objected to the admission of these declarations The objections were overruled and the prisoner excepted.

The prisoner relied on the plea of insanity, and introduced evidence to show that two aunts on his mother's side were demented, and two aunts on his father's side were weak minded and “crochety;” that a great uncle had committed suicide, under a temporary fit of insanity, and that a distant relation had recently been committed to an insane asylum.

There was no evidence that the prisoner had exhibited any signs whatever of insanity.

The prisoner asked his Honor, among other things, to charge the jury: “Though the evidence may leave the question of insanity in doubt, if upon the whole evidence in the case the jury entertained a reasonable doubt as to the perfect sanity of the prisoner, at the time of the commission of the alleged act, (if committed at all,) then they were bound to acquit him.”

The prisoner further asked the Court to charge the jury that “the jury have the right, from their own knowledge of human nature and the tendencies of the human mind, in addition to and in confirmation of the evidence of experts and others, touching the question of insanity, to say how far the circumstances, at and after the time of the alleged act, which were relied upon to show insanity when the alleged act was committed, are evidence of such insanity at that time, and if such evidence and circumstances leave their minds in doubt as to his insanity, then they are bound to acquit him.”

The prisoner further asked the Court to charge the jury, “that to constitute a crime, the accused must be acted on by a motive and governed by a will.”

His Honor was also asked to charge “that the diseased condition of mind of the prisoner's blood relation, from his paternal grand mother and her blood relations, down to his generation in all its branches as well as the conduct of the prisoner before, at the time of, and after the alleged commission of the act, are evidence for the jury to consider, in making up their verdict in this case, and if from all these things they believe that the prisoner was insane, either morally or intellectually, at the time of said act, or have a reasonable doubt as to whether he was sane or insane, or laboring under a diseased state of mind so as to be deprived of reason for the time, then it will be their duty to acquit him.”

The prisoner further asked his Honor to charge: “That to make the...

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20 cases
  • State v. Atkinson, 22
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 14, 1969
    ...where, as here, the adverse party did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. See: State v. Vann, 162 N.C. 534, 77 S.E. 295; State v. Cunningham, 72 N.C. 469, 474. The defendant is not entitled to a jury of his selection or choice but only to a jury selected pursuant to law and without uncon......
  • State v. Hayward
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1895
    ... ... used to corroborate other evidence that the party himself is ... insane, and is irrelevant where there is no such other ... evidence. This is the rule even where the insanity is a ... direct, not a collateral, issue. State v ... Cunningham, 72 N.C. 469; State v. Spencer, supra ... Lawson, Insan. Def. Crime, 864, § 83. "They were ... all offers collateral or secondary to the proof of insanity, ... and were not admissible until direct evidence of the ... prisoner's insanity had been given. A court is not bound ... to hear ... ...
  • Kemp's Will, In re
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    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 6, 1953
    ...had no logical tendency to show that the testamentary capacity of the decedent had been impaired by hereditary insanity. State v. Cunningham, 72 N.C. 469; State v. Christmas, 51 N.C. 471; In re Myer's Will, 184 N.Y. 54, 76 N.E. 920; Reichenbach v. Ruddach, 127 Pa. 564, 18 A. 432; Stansbury ......
  • James v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 17, 1915
    ...is never admissible, except in connection with other evidence directly tending to show that the defendant is himself insane. State v. Cunningham, 72 N.C. 469; Laros v. Com., 84 Pa. 200, 209; State v. Tassel, 103 Iowa, 11, 72 N.W. 497; Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30, 57 A. 542; People v. Smith, 3......
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