State v. Hayward

• Decision Date: 20 November 1895
• Docket Number: 9592--(99)
• Citation: 65 N.W. 63,62 Minn. 474
• Parties: STATE OF MINNESOTA v. HARRY T. HAYWARD
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

65 N.W. 63

62 Minn. 474

STATE OF MINNESOTA v. HARRY T. HAYWARD

Nos. 9592--(99)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

November 20, 1895

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Hennepin county, Smith, J., denying a motion for a new trial, after conviction of murder in the first degree. Affirmed.

This disposes of all the questions in the case, and the order appealed from should be affirmed. It is so ordered.

W. W Erwin and Walter A. Shumaker, for appellant.

Proof of the commission of an independent crime by defendant cannot be introduced to connect him with the crime charged. Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 181, (262); Shaffner v Com., 72 Pa. 60; State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245; People v. Corbin, 56 N.Y. 363; Coleman v People, 55 N.Y. 81; Snyder v. Com., 85 Pa. 519; Barton v. State, 18 Oh. 221; Coble v State, 31 Oh. St. 100; Garrison v. People, 87 Ill. 96; People v. Barnes, 48 Cal. 551; People v. Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319. While evidence, if relevant to the issue, is not to be excluded simply because it tends to prove the commission of another crime (State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425, 59 N.W. 490), the fact of the commission of other crimes by defendant in the East in no way tended to prove the charge in the indictment. Shaffner v Com., supra. The recognized exception to the rule excluding proof of independent crime may be stated as follows: (1) Where the crime charged is one of a series or system of interdependent crimes, the entire system may be disclosed by the evidence. Cole v. Com., 5 Gratt. 696; State v. Miller, 47 Wis. 530, 3 N.W. 31; Com. v. Call, 21 Pick. 515; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush. 243. (2) When criminal intent or guilty knowledge in respect to the act charged is an element of the offense, evidence of other acts of the accused manifesting that intent or knowledge is competent, notwithstanding that it may establish the commission of an offense not charged. Com. v. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285; Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox, Cr. Cas. 400; Dobson v. State, 5 Lea, 271. This rule applies only when act and intent are severable, -- not to establish the act of crime, but to prove an intent not inferable from the act. Mayer v. People, 80 N.Y. 364; State v. Shuford, 69 N.C. 486, S. C. 1 Green Cr. L. Rep. 247; Snapp v. Com., 82 Ky. 173. (3) Sexual crimes form a special exception, which stands upon the reason that the fact of illicit sexual relations being once established makes an attempt at their resumption more probable. State v. Williams, 76 Me. 480; State v. Markins, 95 Ind. 464; People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305; State v. Lapage, supra. (4) When an extraneous crime forms part of the res gestae, evidence of it is not excluded by the fact that it is extraneous. Com. v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122. The evidence here falls under none of the exceptions. Propensity to commit crime cannot be proved. State v. Renton, 15 N.H. 169; 1 Phillips, Ev. 181. In Tennessee it has been directly held that evidence of admissions to an accomplice of the commission of former crimes, though part of a conversation in regard to a particular crime, is inadmissible. Kinchelow v. State, 5 Humph. 9. The evidence was prejudicial if irrelevent. Hoberg v. State, supra.

The court erred in admitting the testimony of Vallely. The only hypothesis on which it could be received is that it refers to the commission of the crime charged. People v. Sharp, supra; Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16. It does not tend to prove the crime. The court erred in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Hazleton. It was not part of the res gestae. Conlan v. Grace, 36 Minn. 276, 30 N.W. 880; Lund v. Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. 36; 20 Cent. Law J. 453, note; People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, State v. Davidson, 30 Vt. 377; Hanover R. Co. v. Coyle, 55 Pa. 396; Com. v. Hackett, 2 Allen, 136; Reg. v. Wainright, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas. 171, 14 Moak, Eng. Rep. 623; Reg. v. Pook, 13 Cox, Cr. Cas. 172m, 14 Moak, Eng. Rep. 625n. See, also, Reg. v. Bedingfield, 14 Cox, Cr. Cas. 341; State v. Dula, 1 Phil. (N. Car.) 437; State v. Ching Ling, 16 Ore. 419, 18 P. 844; Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492; People v. Carkhuff, 24 Cal. 640; People v. Williams, 3 Park. Cr. Cas. 84; Kirby v. State, 9 Yerg. 383; State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa 570; State v. McCracken, 66 Iowa 569, 24 N.W. 43; Montag v. People, 141 Ill. 75, 30 N.E. 337; Crookham v. State, 5 W.Va. 510; Wood v. State, 92 Ind. 269; Trimmer v. Trimmer, 13 Hun, 182. The testimony of defendant's witness as to the finding of the bottle should have been received. It was for the jury to determine the effect of the lapse of time on the credibility of the evidence. Ettinger v. Com., 98 Pa. 338. The testimony of Woods was improper. A witness cannot be impeached by showing that he has not told his story out of court, unless there be peculiar circumstances calling upon him to speak. Com. v. Hawkins, 3 Gray, 463; Huebner v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly, 111. It was immaterial whether Stevens had told Woods he could describe the man, and an immaterial matter having been drawn out on cross-examination the witness cannot be impeached upon it. Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 85, (119); State v. Staley, 14 Minn. 75, (105); Allen v. Coates, 29 Minn. 46, 11 N.W. 132; Paddock v. Kappahan, 41 Minn. 528, 43 N.W. 393. Even if Stevens had told Woods he could describe the man, the statement would have been immaterial and could not be contradicted. Haley v. State, 63 Ala. 83; People v. McKeller, 53 Cal. 65; McKeone v. People, 6 Colo. 346; State v. Cokely, 4 Iowa, 477; People v. Ware, 29 Hun, 473, S. C., 92 N.Y. 653; Rosenweig v. People, 63 Barb. 634; People v. Cox, 21 Hun, 47; State v. Elliott, 68 N.C. 124. The testimony of the wife of Adry Hayward that her husband had gone home and got his revolver was improper. A witness cannot be corroborated by a mere cumulation of evidence on an immaterial point to which he has testified. State v. Callahan 47 La. Ann. 444, 17 So. 50; McClintock v. Whittemore, 16 N.H. 268; Wiggin v. Plumer, 31 N.H. 251; Rapalje, Witnesses, § 221; Edgerton v. Wolf, 6 Gray, 453.

The court erred in its remark as to the apparent sanity of the witness Adry Hayward on objection being made to his competency. The competency of a witness is for the court, but, if he is competent, his credibility, and how far it is affected by his unsoundness of mind, is for the jury. Rivara v. Ghio, 3 E. D. Smith, 264. The objection to his competency was properly overruled. Cannady v. Lynch, 27 Minn. 435, 8 N.W. 164. But this did not affect the right of the jury to consider his mental capacity as bearing on the weight of his testimony. Rivara v. Ghio, supra; State v. Kelley, 57 N.H. 549; People v. New York Hospital, 3 Abb. N. C. 229, Note. All expression of opinion as to the credibility of a witness is error. McMinn v. Whelan, 27 Cal. 300; People v. Bonds, 1 Nev. 33; State v. Ah Tong, 7 Nev. 148; Crutchfield v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 76 N.C. 320. The testimony offered to show the insanity of Adry Hayward should have been received. Though a witness may be so far sane as to be competent, his mental unsoundness may be proved to detract from the weight and credit of his testimony. Wharton, Cr. Ev., §§ 370, 371 and cases; Rivara v. Ghio, supra; State v. Kelley, supra; People v. New York Hospital, supra, note; Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 Johns. 302. Proof that a person acted at the time to which his testimony refers in a manner showing insanity is not necessary to proof of his insanity at such time. Testimony of delusions entertained at other times was relevant to show a delusion at the time testified to. Where the question is whether a person was insane on a given day, prior and subsequent insanity may be shown. State v. Kelley, supra; State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67; McAllister v. State, 17 Ala. 434; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225; State v. West, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. 371; Com. v. Wilson, 1 Gray, 337; Warren v. State, 9 Tex.App. 619; State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591; State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. Law, 196; Lawson, Insan. Def. Crime, 860; State v. Hays, 22 La. Ann. 39; Vance v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 132. Evidence of delusions other than that under which the witness is alleged to testify is competent. The tendency of the decisions is to admit the testimony of persons of unsound mind except in extreme mania, leaving its weight and credibility to the jury. Wharton, Cr. Ev. §§ 370, 371, and cases; People v. New York Hospital, supra, note. Reg. v. Hill, 2 Den. C. C. 254. All reasonable latitude should be allowed to the introduction of evidence to establish insanity. Dejarnette v. Com., 75 Va. 867.

H. W. Childs, Attorney General, Frank M. Nye, County Attorney Hennepin County, and James A. Peterson, Ass't. County Attorney, for the State.

The testimony of Vallely was proper to corroborate that of Adry Hayward. Evidence of threatening language indicating an intent to take life, though not referring to a particular person, is admissible. Benedict v. State, 14 Wis 423; Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44; State v. Cowell, 12 Nev. 337; Bruton v. State, 21 Tex. 337; Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, and cases there cited. The evidence would have been proper on the question of intent, even independently. Campbell v. State, supra; State v. Green, 92 N.C. 779; State v. Morton, 107 N.C. 890, 12 S.E. 112. The conversation of Mrs. Hazleton was part of the res gestae. Wharton, Cr. Ev. § 263 and note; Hunter v. State, 40 N. J. Law, 495; State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299, and cases there cited; Thomas v. State, 67 Ga. 460; Territory v. Couk, 2 Dak. 188, 47 N.W. 395; Cluverius v. Com., 81 Va. 787; State v. Cross, 68 Iowa 180, 26 N.W. 62; Kirby v. State, 7 Yerg. 259; Edmonds v. State, supra; People v. Arnold, 15 Cal. 476; Carr v. State, 43 Ark. 99; Tilley v. Com., 89 Va. 136, 15 S.E. 526; State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 14 S.W. 969, and 15 S.W. 556; Renfro v. Com. (Ky., Ct. App., June, 1889) 11 S.W. 815; ...