State v. Curtis

• Decision Date: 12 December 1988
• Citation: 552 A.2d 530
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Dean Alton CURTIS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 530

552 A.2d 530

STATE of Maine v. Dean Alton CURTIS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Nov. 16, 1988.

Decided Dec. 12, 1988.

James E. Tierney, Atty. Gen., Garry L. Greene (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for plaintiff.

Michael E. Saucier (orally), Hunt, Thompson & Bowie, Portland, for defendant.

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and ROBERTS, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, HORNBY and COLLINS, JJ.

CLIFFORD, Justice.

Defendant, Dean Alton Curtis, appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 201(1)(A) (1983), entered after a jury trial in the Superior Court (York County; Brodrick, J.). Curtis argues that it was error for the hearing justice (Cole, J.) to deny his pretrial motion to suppress statements made in the United States to Canadian detectives. Curtis further argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the judgment.

I.

On June 9, 1987, a body washed ashore on Goose Rocks Beach in Kennebunkport. The victim had been stabbed four times in the back, including one fatal wound that severed the aorta and led to rapid blood loss. The victim's car and wallet were stolen and his credit cards were used soon after his death for an unauthorized shopping spree. The victim's telephone credit card was used to make various calls from New Jersey, Florida and Canada. A York County grand jury later returned an indictment charging Curtis with the murder.

Curtis was arrested in the State of Washington. While he was incarcerated at the Skagit County Jail in Mount Vernon, Washington, Curtis was interrogated by two Canadian detectives who were investigating a different murder in Canada. One of the detectives advised Curtis of the warnings required by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), ¹ and also advised him of the Canadian warnings akin to the Miranda warnings. During the interview, Curtis made inculpatory statements regarding the murder in Maine that were later introduced at trial.

Curtis' pretrial motion to suppress those statements was denied. The Superior Court found that Curtis was advised of the warnings required by Miranda, that he understood the rights referred to in the warnings and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights. The Superior Court also determined that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements were made voluntarily.

Curtis argues that it was error for the Superior Court to deny his motion to suppress because he never expressly waived his right to remain silent. After he was advised of the Miranda warnings by one of the Canadian detectives, the detective asked him whether he wished to talk and whether he understood the rights referred to in the Miranda warnings. The detective did not pause for a response after the first question. Following the second question, Curtis replied, "Yeah." After the detective advised him of the Canadian warnings, Curtis asked the detective several questions, including whether the Canadian authorities had obtained any evidence. Curtis responded to some, but not all, of the questions asked by the Canadian detective. Curtis maintains that his implicit waiver of the right to remain silent and his right to counsel was ineffective because the State did not establish that he expressly waived those rights.

The State bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a suspect was advised of the warnings required by Miranda and knowingly and intelligently waived the rights referred to in the warnings. State v. Knights, 482 A.2d 436, 440 (Me.1984). An express written or oral waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is not required to establish waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-76, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); State v. DeLong, 505 A.2d 803, 808 (Me.1986). In the absence of words expressly signifying a waiver, a defendant's overall conduct, viewed in the context in which it occurred, may suffice to effect a waiver. State v. Hazelton, 330 A.2d 919, 925 (Me.1975). Here, Curtis was advised of the warnings required by Miranda, indicated that he understood his rights, and then asked several questions and responded to many of the questions posed by the detective. Based on the totality of circumstances, we cannot find, despite the absence of an express waiver, that the suppression justice was clearly erroneous in finding that Curtis waived his right to remain silent and to have counsel present during the interrogation. State v. Cote, 518 A.2d 454, 456 (Me.1986).

Curtis also argues that it was error for the Superior Court to deny his motion to suppress because he invoked his right to counsel. Immediately before Curtis was advised of the rights referred to in the Miranda warnings, the Canadian detective asked him if he was familiar with a "thing called Miranda." Curtis responded, "I know it by heart. I've already spoken to my attorney." Curtis contends he invoked his right to counsel when he made that statement. We disagree.

When a suspect makes an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel and thereby invokes his right to counsel, custodial interrogation must cease and the police may not resume interrogation until counsel has been made available or the suspect initiates further discussions with the police and waives the right he previously invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). A suspect does not invoke the right to counsel every time he uses the word "attorney." See United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1773, 84 L.Ed.2d 833 (1985). Curtis' statement that he was familiar with the Miranda warnings and that he had already spoken to his attorney was not a request for an attorney. Curtis was then immediately advised of his rights, but did not again refer to his attorney during the interrogation. There is ample support in the record for the suppression justice's finding that Curtis understood the rights outlined in the Miranda warnings, and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights.

Curtis further argues that his statements were involuntary because they were spontaneous and made while he was emotionally upset. In order to be admissible, a statement must be voluntary. State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me 1984). A statement is voluntary if "it results from the free choice of a rational mind, if it is not a product of coercive police conduct, and if under all of the circumstances its admission would be fundamentally fair." State v....