State v. D'Amour
| Decision Date | 10 October 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002–603.,2002–603. |
| Citation | 834 A.2d 214,150 N.H. 122 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire, v. Michael D'AMOUR. |
Peter W. Heed, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Landya McCafferty, assistant appellate defender, of Dover, on the brief and orally, for the defendant.
The defendant, Michael D'Amour, appeals his conviction on one count of possession of a controlled drug, see RSA 318–B:26 (Supp.2002), after a jury trial in the Superior Court (Abramson , J.). On appeal, he contends that the Superior Court (Coffey , J.) erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the warrantless search and seizure of his backpack. We reverse and remand.
After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the superior court found the following facts. Early on the morning of July 10, 2001, Officer MacDonald, of the Portsmouth Police Department, was dispatched to the railroad tracks behind Bill's Used Appliances to assist officers responding to a noise complaint made by the store owners. At the scene, Officer MacDonald assisted two other officers in arresting four men, including the defendant. Following the defendant's arrest for criminal trespass and resisting arrest, Officer MacDonald took him to Portsmouth Hospital for treatment of several abrasions. At the hospital, Officer MacDonald overheard the defendant tell a nurse that he had asthma
, for which he used an inhaler. After reading the defendant his Miranda rights, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Officer MacDonald took him to the Portsmouth Police Department for booking. Once there, another police officer took charge of the defendant when Officer MacDonald was directed by the shift commander to retrieve the defendant's boots from the hospital, and then return to the scene of the arrest to check for property damage and ensure that nothing had been left behind.
Approximately one hour after his initial dispatch, Officer MacDonald arrived back at the appliance store. A small trailer, owned by the store's proprietors, stood behind the store, some thirty to fifty yards from the spot where the defendant was arrested. Officer MacDonald noted that the trailer appeared to be empty, but observed that its door was open and that a backpack sat in its threshold. Observing no one and nothing else in the area, the officer looked inside the backpack for identification. Although he found none, he did detect three pills wrapped in tissue paper and two asthma
inhalers. Having remembered the defendant's earlier disclosure that he used an inhaler for an asthma condition, the officer took the backpack to the police station to determine whether it belonged to the defendant.
Once there, Officer MacDonald asked the defendant if the backpack was his and if he wanted to inspect it to make sure that nothing was missing. After acknowledging ownership, the defendant looked through the backpack and confirmed that its contents were intact. Officer MacDonald asked him if he was under a physician's care or taking any prescription medication. The defendant said he was not. Because the pills in the backpack had not been prescribed for the defendant, Officer MacDonald arrested him on the additional charge of possession of a controlled drug without a prescription. He then fully inventoried the backpack's contents.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved unsuccessfully to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the search and seizure of his backpack. After a two-day trial, the defendant was convicted. This appeal followed.
The defendant argues that the trial court, in denying his motion to suppress, erred in ruling that: (1) Officer MacDonald's initial warrantless search and seizure of his backpack was justified under the "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement; and (2) the officer's warrantless search of the backpack at the police station was justified under the "inventory" exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, he contends that the introduction at trial of evidence seized during the warrantless searches of his backpack violated his rights under Part I, Article 19 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Because we conclude that the trial court's finding that the initial search and seizure of the backpack was done solely as community caretaking was clearly erroneous, we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Our review of the superior court's order on a motion to suppress is de novo , except as to any historical facts found. See State v. Finn, 146 N.H. 59, 60, 767 A.2d 413 (2001). Such findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. McBreairty, 142 N.H. 12, 14, 697 A.2d 495 (1997).
Part I, Article 19 of our State Constitution provides that every citizen has "a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions." Warrantless seizures are considered per se unreasonable unless they fall within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception. State v. Psomiades, 139 N.H. 480, 481, 658 A.2d 1190 (1995). The State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a seizure or search falls within one of these exceptions. See State v. Westover, 140 N.H. 375, 379, 666 A.2d 1344 (1995) ; Psomiades , 139 N.H. at 481, 658 A.2d 1190.
In Psomiades , we explicitly recognized a limited "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement. Psomiades , 139 N.H. at 481–82, 658 A.2d 1190. We held that the exception applies to the seizure of property when the seizure constitutes no more than a routine and good faith attempt, in the exercise of reasonable caution, to safeguard a defendant's own property. Id. at 482, 658 A.2d 1190.
Our recognition in Psomiades of the community caretaking exception under our State Constitution noted its initial adoption by the United States Supreme Court in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). In that case, the Court observed:
Local police officers ... frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523; see Psomiades , 139 N.H. at 481, 658 A.2d 1190. We have also cited with approval People v. Ray, 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 928, 931 (1999), cert . denied , 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S.Ct. 1240, 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (2000), for a further delineation of the exception.
In the average day, police officers perform a broad range of duties, from typical law enforcement activities—investigating crimes, pursuing suspected felons, issuing traffic citations—to "community caretaking functions"—helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, assisting and protecting citizens in need....
People v. Ray, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d at 931; see State v. Denoncourt, 149 N.H. 308, 310, 821 A.2d 997 (2003) ; see also State v. Seavey, 147 N.H. 304, 311, 789 A.2d 621 (2001) (Duggan, J., dissenting).
While the "divorce" between the community caretaking function and the role of the police in the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute must be total, we conclude that the absolute separation need only relate to a sound and independent basis for each role, and not to any requirement for exclusivity in terms of time or space. We reject the contention that dicta in our case law requires that the separation of the community caretaking function from the investigation of a criminal matter be of a temporal or spatial nature. See Denoncourt , 149 N.H. at 310, 821 A.2d 997 (). But see State v. Boyle, 148 N.H. 306, 308, 807 A.2d 1234 (2002).
To hold that the police can never legitimately engage in community caretaking activities merely because they are also involved in the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence concerning the violation of a criminal statute could lead to absurd results. For example, while investigating a crime, the police could happen upon an unopened wallet, seemingly flush with cash. Under an overly narrow interpretation of the "divorce" between community caretaking and investigation, the police would not be allowed to seize the wallet for safekeeping but would be required to leave it unprotected, even if they had no inkling that the wallet was in any way connected to their criminal investigation.
The State argues that United States v. Rodriguez–Morales, 929 F.2d 780 (1st Cir.1991), cert . denied , 502 U.S. 1030, 112 S.Ct. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 774 (1992), supports the contention that the police may conduct a search of lost property even when they suspect they will find evidence of a crime. In Rodriguez–Morales , the First Circuit Court of Appeals approved, under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the removal of the defendant's automobile from the highway and its impoundment at the state police barracks as a reasonable exercise of the police's community caretaking function, once the police discovered that neither the defendant nor his passenger had a valid driver's license. Id. at 785–86. The court noted that the fact the impoundment Id. at 787.
We agree. In addition:
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