State v. Davenport
Decision Date | 25 November 1996 |
Docket Number | No. CA96-03-020,CA96-03-020 |
Citation | 686 N.E.2d 531,116 Ohio App.3d 6 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. DAVENPORT, Appellant. * |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Timothy A. Oliver, Warren County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kenneth A. Ewing, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Lebanon, for appellee.
Allen & Crossley and Mitchell W. Allen, Lebanon, for appellant.
On March 30, 1992, defendant-appellant, Jefferley A. Davenport, was indicted on four counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). Appellant subsequently accepted a plea bargain under which he agreed to enter guilty pleas to four counts of sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(4). The trial court sentenced appellant to two hundred forty days in jail and fined appellant $500. The trial court suspended the jail sentence and placed appellant on probation for a period of two years.
On December 21, 1995, appellant filed a petition to expunge the record of his convictions pursuant to R.C. 2953.32, which provides, in part, as follows:
The trial court held that R.C. 2953.36 precluded appellant from obtaining an expungement under R.C. 2953.32. R.C. 2953.36 took effect on December 9, 1994 and provides that "[s]ections 2953.31 to 2953.35 of the Revised Code do not apply to * * * convictions under section * * * 2907.06 [sexual imposition] * * *." The trial court denied appellant's petition for expungement in an order dated February 1, 1996. Appellant now appeals, setting forth the following assignments of error:
In his first assignment of error, appellant contends that R.C. 2953.36 violates his right to due process of law under the Ohio and United States Constitutions because it renders him ineligible for expungement under R.C. 2953.32. Appellant relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Santobello v. New York (1971), 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427.
The defendant in Santobello was arrested and charged with several gambling offenses. Id. at 258, 92 S.Ct. at 497, 30 L.Ed.2d at 430- 431. The defendant subsequently agreed to enter a guilty plea to a reduced charge in exchange for a promise by the prosecutor that he would make no sentencing recommendation to the trial judge. Id. The prosecutor later recommended to the trial judge that the defendant receive the maximum penalty and the defendant was sentenced accordingly. Id. at 259, 92 S.Ct. at 497, 30 L.Ed.2d at 431.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the defendant's guilty plea. Id. at 263, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 433-434. The court held that due process requires the state to honor any promise or representation it may make to induce a guilty plea by the defendant. Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499, 30 L.Ed.2d at 432-433. The court reasoned that Id.
Appellant urges us to extend the rationale of Santobello to the facts of this case. Appellant argues that he accepted the plea bargain offered by the state in 1992 with the expectation that he would be able to petition for the expungement of his convictions one year after completing his probation and that R.C. 2953.36 violates his right to due process because it renders him ineligible for expungement and thereby deprives him of the "benefit he bargained for" during the plea negotiations. We are not persuaded.
The record indicates that neither the prosecutor nor any other representative of the state ever promised appellant that he would be able to expunge his convictions at some later date if he accepted the plea bargain in this case. The mere fact that appellant chose to accept the state's plea bargain based upon some unilateral hope that he might be able to expunge his convictions in the future does not render expungement a fundamental right protected by due process or in any way restrict the General Assembly's authority to limit the offenders eligible for expungement under R.C. 2953.32. Accordingly, we find that R.C. 2953.36 does not violate appellant's right to due process of law under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that R.C. 2953.36 violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from enacting statutes which impose punishments that are either cruel and unusual by their very nature or grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. Solem v. Helm (1983), 463 U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 645. R.C. 2953.36 does not impose any sentence of imprisonment, fine, or other criminal sanction, but instead merely limits the class of offenders who may seek an expungement after having served their sentence. Therefore, we find that appellant's Eighth Amendment claim is without merit because R.C. 2953.36 does not impose any form of punishment. Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that R.C. 2953.36 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions as the statute is applied to him. Appellant argues that R.C. 2953.36 treats him more harshly than other similarly situated sex offenders because he was trained as a teacher and will be unable to earn his teaching certificate unless he first obtains an expungement.
Equal protection under the law requires that no person or class of persons be denied the protection afforded by the law to other persons or classes in like circumstances. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 261, 262, 643 N.E.2d 523, 523-524. However, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent all classifications. Toledo v. Wacenske (1994), 95 Ohio App.3d 282, 287, 642 N.E.2d 407, 410-411. It simply forbids laws which treat persons differently who are alike in all relevant respects. Id.
The first step in our equal protection analysis is to determine the appropriate standard of review. Statutes which discriminate based upon a "suspect classification" or which deprive a certain class of individuals of a fundamental right are subject to...
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