State v. Dawson
| Decision Date | 11 April 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-577.,03-577. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. David Thomas DAWSON, Defendant and Appellant. |
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¶ 1 Defendant and Appellant, David Thomas Dawson, has moved to discharge his appellate counsel, dismiss all ongoing appeals, and proceed to the execution of his sentence of death. This Court concludes that Dawson's motions are made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and must be granted.
¶ 2 In February 1987, Dawson was found guilty, by jury verdict, of three counts of deliberate homicide, four counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of robbery. Dawson's sentence was determined by the District Court, without jury findings of aggravated circumstances, pursuant to §§ 46-18-301 to 305, MCA (1985). Dawson was sentenced to death for each count of deliberate homicide. He was also sentenced to death for the aggravated kidnappings of the deliberate homicide victims. For the aggravated kidnapping of the surviving victim, Dawson was sentenced to one hundred years imprisonment. An additional ten years imprisonment was added for use of a dangerous weapon.
¶ 3 The trial court found the existence beyond a reasonable doubt of four aggravating circumstances: (1) the offenses were aggravated kidnappings that resulted in the deaths of the victims; (2) the deliberate homicides were committed as part of a scheme or operation which, if completed, would result in the death of more than one person; (3) the deliberate homicides were committed by a person lying in wait or ambush; and (4) the deliberate homicides were committed by means of torture. The trial court also found "as a matter law that each aggravating circumstance, standing by itself, is sufficient for the imposition of the death penalty."
¶ 4 On August 23, 1988, this Court unanimously affirmed Dawson's convictions and death sentences on direct appeal, and the United States Supreme Court denied Dawson's petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Dawson, 233 Mont. 345, 761 P.2d 352, cert. denied 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3200, 105 L.Ed.2d 708 (1989).
¶ 5 In July 2002, Dawson filed, through counsel, a Motion for New Trial in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. He challenged his death sentences under the ruling in Ring v. Arizona (2002), 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556. In September 2002, again through counsel, Dawson filed a Motion to Vacate a previous order in which the District Court had denied a challenge to his sentence of death under Ring. In July 2003, the District Court denied both motions. On July 24, 2003, Dawson appealed to this Court.
¶ 6 On August 24, 2004, Dawson, acting pro se, filed motions in this Court to dismiss all ongoing appeals and discharge his appellate counsel, William Hooks and Kathryn Ross (Hooks and Ross). He also moved the District Court to set a new date for his execution. Hooks and Ross resisted these pro se motions. This Court, by Order of July 26, 2005, remanded the motions to the District Court with instructions to determine whether they were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
¶ 7 Dawson had also filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his death sentences in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, Billings Division. At about the same time that Dawson filed his motions in this Court to discharge his counsel and dismiss all appeals, he filed a similar motion in the U.S. District Court to dismiss his habeas corpus petition.
¶ 8 The U.S. District Court appointed Dr. Sally C. Johnson, M.D., and Dr. James H. Hilkey, Ph.D., to conduct psychiatric evaluations of Dawson. Both Dr. Johnson and Dr. Hilkey conducted thorough evaluations of Dawson and produced written reports which concluded that he was not suffering from any mental disease, disorder, or defect that would affect his capacity to appreciate his position and to make rational decisions.
¶ 9 U.S. Magistrate Judge Richard Anderson reviewed the reports from Drs. Johnson and Hilkey and took evidence from Dawson. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Dawson's motion to dismiss his habeas petition be granted. Senior U.S. District Judge Jack D. Shanstrom accepted this recommendation, and on December 12, 2005, entered an order granting Dawson's pro se motions to withdraw his federal habeas petition and dismiss his court appointed attorneys. The U.S. District Court concluded that Dawson's decision was the product of "rational intellect and an unconstrained will and that he is well aware of the consequences of this decision." This order is now on appeal.
¶ 10 In response to this Court's remand, the Yellowstone County District Court obtained and reviewed the reports submitted to the U.S. District Court by Drs. Johnson and Hilkey. The District Court was also familiar with the entirety of Dawson's file. The District Court conducted a hearing at which Dawson appeared and was questioned on the record by the court and by counsel.
¶ 11 The District Court, by Order dated February 6, 2006, concluded that Dawson suffers from no mental disease or defect and his motions were made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The record was then returned to this Court for a decision on Dawson's motions to discharge his appellate counsel and dismiss this appeal.
¶ 12 On March 29, 2006, Hooks and Ross filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief. In this motion they argue that this Court should first resolve the question of whether Ring is retroactive under Montana law, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Schriro v. Summerlin (2004), 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442, before determining whether Dawson's motions to discharge his lawyers and to dismiss this appeal are made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The State and Dawson each filed separate responses in opposition to this motion.
The Right to Waive Counsel
¶ 13 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee an accused the right to the assistance of counsel. However, this right does not prohibit a defendant from rejecting the assistance of counsel. State v. Weaver (1996), 276 Mont. 505, 511, 917 P.2d 437, 441. A person charged with a crime has the constitutional right to proceed pro se. State v. Woods (1997), 283 Mont. 359, 372-373, 942 P.2d 88, 97. This Court has stated that before a court may grant a request for self-representation, it must first determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is unequivocal, as well as voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. State v. Langford (1994), 267 Mont. 95, 99, 882 P.2d 490, 492.
¶ 14 We do not rigidly adhere to a specific set of requirements in ascertaining whether a criminal defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. Langford, 267 Mont. at 99, 882 P.2d at 492. There is no particular questioning or inquiry required, so long as the trial court satisfies itself that the defendant is "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that ... `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 582 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 242, 87 L.Ed. 268, 275). This test focuses not on what a defendant was told, but on a determination that a defendant understands his decision and is proceeding voluntarily. State v. Insua, 2004 MT 14, ¶ 20, 319 Mont. 254, ¶ 20, 84 P.3d 11, ¶ 20.
¶ 15 As discussed above, this Court remanded Dawson's motions to the District Court to make an initial factual determination of whether he was acting voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. So long as substantial credible evidence exists to support the determination of the district court, it will not be disturbed. Langford, 267 Mont. at 100, 882 P.2d at 492.
¶ 16 As we discuss below in considering the motion to dismiss this appeal, two mental health professionals thoroughly examined Dawson and concluded that he does not suffer from any mental disease or defect and that he is acting voluntarily. The District Court also, after a thorough examination of Dawson, determined that his desire to dismiss his lawyers and proceed pro se, was made knowingly. Dawson himself clearly and cogently explained to the District Court why he wished to dismiss counsel and withdraw his appeals:
MR. DAWSON: To start with, Your Honor, the reasons why — I mean there's a multitude of reasons why. It is years — a decision that has been years in the making. It's a case that would be 20 years old here in just a few months. Right now there's no end in sight. I guess, without spending hours and hours explaining personal reasons why, it comes down to just enough's enough. It's just time.
And as to my lawyers, the fact of the matter is, they're not with me on this in any sense. They have their own agenda, and they've demonstrated very willing [sic] just to show that their agenda is not mine. I think they should be dismissed because they have their welfare in mind and not so much my welfare.
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