State v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 08 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. DA 11–0062.,DA 11–0062.
• Citation: 2011 MT 277,362 Mont. 416,264 P.3d 1146
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,v.Brent Arthur WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

362 Mont. 416

264 P.3d 1146

2011 MT 277

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Brent Arthur WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.

No. DA 11–0062.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Sept. 22, 2011.Decided Nov. 8, 2011.

For Appellant: Joseph P. Howard, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana.For Appellee: Steve Bullock, Montana Attorney General, Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Mitch Young, Lake County Attorney, Polson, Montana.Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Brent Arthur Wilson (Wilson) appeals from the Judgment and Commitment of the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, Montana, finding him guilty on four miscellaneous felony and misdemeanor counts, and sentencing him accordingly. Wilson alleges he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his right to counsel and that the District Court erred when it did not require standby counsel to assist him. Wilson also argues the District Court abused its discretion by allowing the State of Montana to introduce journals allegedly authored by Wilson into evidence, as the State did not properly authenticate or identify the journals. Finally, Wilson alleges that the District Court illegally augmented his sentence because he refused to confess his crimes, and that it also failed to adequately consider alternative sentencing.

¶ 2 We affirm.

ISSUE

¶ 3 Wilson raises three issues on appeal. A restatement of the issues is:

¶ 4 1. Did the District Court err in determining substantial credible evidence existed that Wilson knowingly, intelligently, and competently waived his right to counsel, and granting his request to represent himself?

¶ 5 2. Should this Court conduct plain error review of the State's use of journals allegedly belonging to Wilson?

¶ 6 3. Was the sentence the District Court imposed upon Wilson legal?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 7 Wilson was involved in a fraudulent contract scheme to illegally take possession of real property in Lake County, Montana. At issue was a house located at 2948 Meadow Road ¹ in Polson (Property), previously owned by an individual who had defaulted on her loans. First American Title Insurance Company acquired the Property, and on July 16, 2009, sold it to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation at an auction for $385,131.42. On or around August 7, 2009, Wilson recorded a number of fraudulent documents relative to the Property at the Lake County Clerk and Recorder's Office.

¶ 8 Around August 14, 2009, a Lake County real estate agent reported that someone had tampered with one of his property listings. At the Property, the locks had been changed, a notice stating the property was foreclosed upon on August 7, 2009, was posted on the inside of the house, and the real estate agent's For Sale signs were taken down. The cost to replace the locks and signs totaled between $500 and $700.

¶ 9 The State filed an Information listing seven counts against Wilson, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Three counts were later dropped, and an amended Information was filed.

¶ 10 On February 18, 2010, Wilson was arraigned in District Court. He was asked if he wished to have an attorney represent him. He declined, stating he wished to represent himself. The District Court informed him of his rights and the dangers and disadvantages of representing himself. After again being advised of his rights and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, Wilson pled not guilty to all counts. The District Court requested counsel be available as standby counsel if Wilson decided to accept legal advice, though Wilson confirmed he did not want representation. At the State's request, the District Court ordered a mental health evaluation of Wilson to make sure he was fit to represent himself and adequately waived his rights.

¶ 11 The mental health evaluation concluded that Wilson was generally fit to proceed with his criminal charges. Wilson was found to be bright and legally astute and to not suffer from a mental disease or defect. Though diagnosed with a mixed personality disorder with antisocial and narcissistic traits, Wilson was not seriously developmentally disabled and did not suffer from a mental disorder requiring commitment to the Montana State Hospital. While the report suggested Wilson's plan was to continue to refuse legal counsel, it concluded that such behavior was a voluntary choice on his part and was not indicative of the presence of a mental disease, disorder, or defect. Likewise, the fact that he chose not to reveal his unconventional defense strategy to the mental health examiner was not indicative of an underlying mental disease or defect. Based on these findings, the District Court determined Wilson was fit to proceed and represent himself.

¶ 12 Wilson made numerous subsequent appearances before the District Court, appearing as a self-represented litigant. At each appearance, the District Court engaged in protracted discussions with Wilson, reminding him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and imploring him to accept counsel or at least confer with standby counsel. Wilson consistently referred to himself as a “beneficiary” and Judge Christopher as his “trustee.” The District Court explained that these notions were mistaken. Wilson continued to decline the assistance of counsel. At a status conference, Wilson stated he wished to waive his right to a jury trial and waive his constitutional rights, though the District Court declined to grant his waiver as he was unwilling to withdraw his not guilty plea and plead guilty. At one point Wilson wished to “settle and close” the case, which the State understood as a motion to dismiss. The District Court denied the motion.

¶ 13 Following a jury trial during which he represented himself, Wilson was found guilty of four counts and was sentenced on December 3, 2010, as follows: Count I—Attempt (Theft), felony—six years in the Montana State Prison with three years suspended; Count II—Deceptive Practices, felony—four years in the Montana State Prison with two years suspended; Count III—Tampering with Public Records or Information, felony—ten years in the Montana State Prison with five years suspended; and Count IV—Criminal Mischief, misdemeanor—six months in the Lake County jail. All counts were to run consecutively, with 358 days of credit given for time served. The appointed standby counsel immediately moved for a new trial, which the District Court denied. The District Court indicated it was not opposed to a conditional release if Wilson “ever comes to accept responsibility, gains an appreciation for the law, recognizes society and other people's property rights and develops a willingness to participate in the country in which he has chosen to live.”

¶ 14 Wilson appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 15 We will not disturb a district court's ruling that a defendant has made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel if substantial credible evidence exists to support the decision, and if “the trial court satisfies itself that the defendant is ‘aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation....’ ” State v. Colt, 255 Mont. 399, 407, 843 P.2d 747, 752 (1992); State v. Dawson, 2006 MT 69, ¶ 14, 331 Mont. 444, 133 P.3d 236 (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). The district court is not required to adhere to a particular test or specific set of requirements in determining if the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waives the right to counsel, and the defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant to the assessment. Dawson, ¶ 14; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. We will look at “the particular facts and circumstances surrounding th[e] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused” to determine if a waiver was knowing and intelligent. State v. Plouffe, 198 Mont. 379, 385, 646 P.2d 533, 536 (1982) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)).

¶ 16 This Court will “discretionarily review ‘claimed errors that implicate a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional rights,’ even if a timely objection was not made in the trial court....” State v. West, 2008 MT 338 ¶ 23, 346 Mont. 244, 194 P.3d 683 (citing State v. Finley, 276 Mont. 126, 137, 915 P.2d 208, 215 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 21, 304 Mont. 215, 19 P.3d 817). When a claimed error implicates a defendant's fundamental rights, we may review the claimed error where failing to do so “may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79; accord State v. Parrish, 2010 MT 212, ¶ 15, 357 Mont. 477, 241 P.3d 1041. We invoke plain error review sparingly, on a case-by-case basis, according to narrow circumstances, and by considering the totality of the case's circumstances. State v. Lindberg, 2008 MT 389, ¶ 34, 347 Mont. 76, 196 P.3d 1252. “[A] mere assertion that constitutional rights are implicated or that failure to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice is insufficient to implicate the plain error doctrine.” State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, ¶ 100, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74.

¶ 17 We review a district court's evidentiary rulings to determine whether the court abused its discretion by “act[ing] arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or [by] exceed[ing] the bounds of reason.” Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 65, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561 (citing Lopez v. Josephson, 2001 MT 133, ¶ 14, 305 Mont. 446, 30 P.3d 326). If we determine the district court did abuse its discretion, we then determine whether a reversible error occurred by which...