State v. Day

• Decision Date: 19 May 2014
• Docket Number: C.A. No. P3-2013-0643A
• Parties: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. STEPHEN DAY
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. STEPHEN DAY

C.A. No. P3-2013-0643A

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

DATE DECISION FILED: May 19, 2014

DECISION

MCBURNEY, M. Stephen Day (Defendant) asks this Court to dismiss this case based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants Defendant's motion.

IFacts and Travel

On August 23, 2012, a Barrington police officer stopped Defendant after he observed Defendant's vehicle swerving and cross over the center divide. (Def.'s Ex. A, Appeals Panel decision, at 1-2.) At trial, the officer testified that he observed that Defendant had "bloodshot watery eyes," "a pale face," and "was sweating profusely." Id. at 2. He also testified that Defendant "had a strong odor of alcoholic beverage coming from his breath." Id. After asking Defendant to submit to a series of sobriety tests, the officer concluded that Defendant was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 3. He then placed Defendant under arrest and asked Defendant to submit to a chemical breath test, which Defendant refused. Id. at 3-4.

Subsequently, Defendant was charged with various roadway violations, including "Refusal to submit to chemical test," pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 31-27-2.1, and "Driving under influence of liquor or drugs" (DUI), pursuant to § 31-27-2. Id. at 1; Barrington Police Summons. Defendant contested the refusal charge, and the matter proceeded to trial. Id. The trial judge sustained the refusal charge, and Defendant filed an appeal to the Rhode Island Traffic Tribunal Appeals Panel (Appeals Panel). Id. Defendant argued before the Appeals Panel that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was read his rights, as is required by § 31-27-3, "Right of person charged with operating under influence to physical examination," and moved to dismiss the charge. Id. at 4. The Appeals Panel held that the State did not satisfy the statutory requirements of § 31-27-3 and dismissed the refusal charge. Id. at 9-10. The State then brought a DUI action against Defendant under § 31-27-2 at the Superior Court, and Defendant filed this motion to dismiss.

IIStandard of Review

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

"The defense of double jeopardy and all other defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment, information, or complaint other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall include all such defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present any such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction or the failure of the indictment, information, or complaint to charge an offense shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding." Super. R. Crim P. 12(b)(2).

This rule allows a defendant to raise the double jeopardy defense by a pretrial motion. See State v. Shelton, 990 A.2d 191, 203 (R.I. 2010); State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 330 (R.I. 1995). Ifthe motion is untimely, the defense of double jeopardy will be considered waived unless the trial justice permits an untimely, but otherwise proper, assertion of the defense. Shelton, 990 A.2d at 203; Thomas, 654 A.2d at 330; State v. LaPlante, 122 R.I. 446, 449, 409 A.2d 130, 132 (1979). "[T]he burden is on a defendant to show cause why relief should be granted notwithstanding the untimely assertion of the defense." State v. Lee, 502 A.2d 332, 334 (R.I. 1985) (citing State v. Sharbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 722, 390 A.2d 915, 920 (1978)).

IIIAnalysis

On appeal, Defendant argues that this matter is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Specifically, Defendant argues that the State is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether Defendant was informed of his rights under § 31-27-3. Defendant contends that the Appeals Panel decided that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was informed of his rights under this provision, and therefore, the State cannot relitigate this issue in the criminal matter. In response, the State argues that collateral estoppel does not apply because a DUI charge and a refusal charge have distinct elements and distinct burdens of proof.

As a general rule, the collateral estoppel doctrine bars relitigation of an issue in future lawsuits if that issue has already been determined by a valid and final judgment. State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 358 (R.I. 2005); State v. Werner, 865 A.2d 1049, 1055 (R.I. 2005). Collateral estoppel applies when there is an (1) identity of the issues; (2) the previous proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted is the same or in privity with the party in the previous proceeding. Werner, 865 A.2d at 1055. This doctrine, which applies in civil and criminal cases, "makes conclusive in a lateraction on a different claim the determination of issues that were actually litigated in a prior action." E.W. Audet & Sons, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of Newark, 635 A.2d 1181, 1186 (R.I. 1994) (citing Providence Teachers Union, Local 958 v. McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 172, 319 A.2d 358, 361 (1974)); see State v. Pineda, 712 A.2d 858, 864 (R.I. 1998) (Weisberger, J. dissenting). "The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a basic and essential part of the Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970). "[T]he raison d'etre of collateral estoppel . . . is the conservation of judicial resources by the elimination of repetitive litigation of the same issues, particularly between the same parties." R. A. Beaufort & Sons, Inc. v. Trivisonno, 121 R.I. 835, 841, 403 A.2d 664, 667 (1979) (citing Perez v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 111 R.I. 327, 336, 302 A.2d 785, 791 (1973)).

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine is capable of producing "extraordinarily harsh and unfair results," and therefore, it should not be applied mechanically. Casco Indem. Co. v. O'Connor, 755 A.2d 779, 782 (R.I. 2000). Importantly, "collateral estoppel cannot apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate that issue in the earlier case." Id. at 782-83 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980)).

Here, all three elements of collateral estoppel are met. Id. As for the first element, the identity of the issues prong, both cases involve the issue of whether the State met the requirements of § 31-27-3. Id. With respect to the second element, a "final judgment" includes "any prior adjudication of an issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect." Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13 at 132. To determine whether a decision constitutes a final judgment, courts may consider whether "the parties were fully heard, [whether] the court supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, [and whether] thedecision was subject to appeal or was in fact reviewed on appeal." Id. § 13 comment g at 136. Here, the Appeals Panel decision clearly constitutes a final judgment on the merits. See Def.'s Ex. A, Appeals Panel decision; Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13 at 132 (explaining that a final judgment is one that "is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim by the court). The parties were fully heard, the Appeals Panel wrote a thorough, reasoned decision, and the decision was subject to appeal. See § 31-41.1-9 ("Any person who is aggrieved by a determination of an appeals panel may appeal the determination [to the district court.]"); Restatement (Second) Judgments § 13 comment g at 136.

Finally, with respect to the third element, parties may be considered in privity with one another where they share common interests and "sufficiently represent" one another's interests. Duffy v. Milder, 896 A.2d 27, 36 (R.I. 2006). Although the plaintiff in the refusal case was the Town of Barrington and the Plaintiff in the instant DUI case is the State of Rhode Island, both are in privity because the Town is a political subdivision of the State. See Duffy, 896 A.2d at 36. Both sufficiently represent each other's interests. See id. Moreover, the Attorney General represented the Town of Barrington and the State of Rhode Island in both the civil and criminal proceedings. See id.; cf State v. Summers, 528 S.E.2d 17, 21 (N.C. 2000) (stating that "there can be no question that the district attorney and the Attorney General both represent the interests of the people of North Carolina" and "[i]t is the common interest in protecting the citizens of North Carolina from drunk drivers which supports a finding of privity between the Attorney General and a district attorney"); Briggs v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 732 P.2d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 1987) (holding that the Department of Public Safety and the state were in privity).

Restatement (Second) Judgments lists three exceptions to the general rule that an issue that is actually litigated and determined by a valid final judgment is precluded in a subsequent proceeding. Restatement (Second) Judgments § 28(4) at 273. These three exceptions apply when the burden of proof in the previously litigated issue changes in the following ways between the two proceedings: [1] "[t]he party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent action; [2] the burden has shifted to his adversary; or [3] the adversary has a...