State v. DeCiantis

• Decision Date: 16 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 2001-149-M.P.,2001-149-M.P.
• Citation: 813 A.2d 986
• Parties: STATE v. Anthony DeCIANTIS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

813 A.2d 986

STATE v. Anthony DeCIANTIS.

No. 2001-149-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

January 16, 2003.

Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Aaron L. Weisman, Providence, for Plaintiff.

Marie T. Roebuck, Providence, for Defendant.

OPINION

FLANDERS, Justice.

The distinction between an illegal sentence and one that was illegally imposed lies at the heart of this case. Under Rule 35(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure:

"The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. The court may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner * * * within one hundred twenty (120) days after the sentence is imposed, or within one hundred twenty (120) days after receipt by the court of a mandate of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal * * *."

Petitioning for certiorari, the state asks us to reverse a recent Superior Court order that vacated the consecutive life sentence of the respondent, convicted serial murderer Anthony DeCiantis (DeCiantis). Seventeen years after the court imposed this sentence, a Superior Court motion justice granted DeCiantis's motion to vacate it, ruling that it was void because the original sentencing justice failed in 1984 to afford DeCiantis his right of allocution before heimposed the sentence.¹ The state contends that the motion justice improperly allowed DeCiantis to invoke Rule 35 in seeking to vacate his sentence because the 120-day period for filing a motion to correct an illegally imposed sentence expired many years ago. DeCiantis, however, argues that the motion justice properly determined that his allocutionless sentence was not merely illegally imposed, but also illegal. Therefore, he contends, under Rule 35 the court could correct it at any time by vacating the illegal sentence.

Because the Superior Court sentenced DeCiantis to a permissible consecutive life sentence for having committed the crime of murder — albeit without first affording him his right of allocution — it imposed a legal sentence for this crime in an illegal manner. Such a sentence could be corrected only if DeCiantis filed a timely motion to do so within the limited 120-day period specified in Rule 35. But he failed to do so. Thus, because DeCiantis's motion to correct the sentence was untimely under Rule 35, we reverse, quash the order that vacated the sentence, and reinstate the challenged sentence and conviction.

Travel and Facts

In 1984, a jury found DeCiantis guilty of first-degree murder. State v. DeCiantis, 501 A.2d 365, 366 (R.I.1985). Thereafter, the Superior Court trial justice ordered a presentence report and held a sentencing hearing at which he sentenced DeCiantis to serve a term of life imprisonment, one that was to run consecutive to his previous life sentence for committing other murders. The court did so, however, without first affording DeCiantis his right of allocution. See Super.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1) and R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. Upon discovering his mistake, the sentencing justice immediately recalled DeCiantis to the courtroom and informed him that he had failed to give him an opportunity to address the court on his own behalf before the court imposed the sentence. Super.R.Crim.P.32(a)(1). Although DeCiantis's attorney had addressed the court on behalf of his client before the court pronounced the sentence, the sentencing justice belatedly gave DeCiantis the opportunity, in the presence of his attorney, to address the court himself. After DeCiantis briefly did so, however, the sentencing justice did not vacate the sentence or resentence him, but merely adjourned without taking further action.

DeCiantis appealed his conviction to this Court, but we affirmed. DeCiantis, 501 A.2d at 369. He also filed several post-conviction-relief applications — none of which, however, challenged the propriety of his sentencing. DeCiantis v. State, 666 A.2d 410 (R.I.1995); DeCiantis v. State, 599 A.2d 734 (R.I.1991). Ultimately, though, in 2000 — approximately fifteen years after this Court affirmed his conviction — DeCiantis moved to correct his sentence under Rule 35 and also to dismiss the indictment that led to his conviction, citing the alleged lack of a speedy trial.

DeCiantis argued to the Superior Court that his 1984 consecutive life sentence should be vacated because the sentencing justice failed to afford him his right of allocution. According to DeCiantis's interpretation of Rule 35, this omission was fatal to the legality of the sentence and required the court, per Rule 35(a), to correct such an illegal sentence "at any time." Moreover, according to DeCiantis, this sentencing error also undermined the validity of his murder indictment. In response, the state argued that the sentencing justice simply imposed the sentence in an improper manner, that it was not illegal or void, and that the Rule 35 motion to correct the sentence was untimely because DeCiantis had filed it long after the 120-day period specified in the rule had expired. After hearing these arguments, the motion justice agreed with DeCiantisand ruled that the sentence was illegal. Consequently, he vacated the consecutive-life sentence, set the matter down for resentencing, and ordered a presentence report. But the motion justice also denied DeCiantis's motion to dismiss the indictment, concluding that the state had not violated his right to a speedy trial.

The state then petitioned this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to review the order vacating the sentence. In due course, we granted the petition, issued the writ, and stayed the resentencing proceedings.

Analysis

"This Court limits its review on certiorari `to examining the record to determine if an error of law has been committed.'" City of Providence v. S & J 351, Inc., 693 A.2d 665, 667 (R.I.1997) (per curiam) (quoting Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I.1994)). "We do not weigh the evidence presented below, but rather inspect the record to determine if any legally competent evidence exists therein to support the findings made by the trial justice." Id.; see also Gregson v. Packings & Insulations Corp., 708 A.2d 533, 535 (R.I.1998)

.

In this case, the Superior Court motion justice properly found that the sentencing justice erred in 1984 when he sentenced DeCiantis to serve a consecutive life term for committing his third murder without first affording him the right of allocution. Even though he heard from the prosecution and from DeCiantis's attorney, the sentencing justice acknowledged that he failed to afford DeCiantis the personal opportunity to address the court on his own behalf before the court sentenced him. Upon realizing his mistake, the sentencing justice arranged for DeCiantis to be brought back into the courtroom, where he belatedly afforded him the opportunity to address the court. The court did so, however, without vacating the previously imposed sentence and withoutresentencing DeCiantis after he exercised his right of allocution. When the sentencing justice personally asked DeCiantis if there was anything he wished to say, DeCiantis replied: "You sentence me; you send me downstairs. You made the error. You're correcting the error. What right do I have? What right do you have to do that there, because you misled the record. * * * You sentenced me to life. * * * I'm not guilty of no crime, no murder." After DeCiantis finished speaking, the sentencing justice simply adjourned the hearing without resentencing him or taking any other action.

"The right of allocution in this state is a right of constitutional dimension." State v. Brown, 528 A.2d 1098, 1105 (R.I.1987). Article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution guarantees all persons accused of crimes in this state the liberty to speak on their own behalf before the court pronounces a sentence against them.² Thus, the law is settled in this jurisdiction that criminal defendants have the constitutional right to address the sentencing judge before he or she pronounces the sentence. See R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 10; Super.R.Crim.P. 32; Brown, 528 A.2d at 1105.³ "Rule 32(a) [of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the federal analogue to Super. R.Crim. P. 32] requires a * * * judge before imposing sentence to afford every convicted defendant an opportunity personally to speak in his [or her] own behalf." Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426, 82 S.Ct. 468, 470, 7 L.Ed.2d 417, 420 (1962); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304-05, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670, 673-74 (1961) (allowing defendant's counsel the opportunity to speak does not satisfy the right of allocution); Brown, 528 A.2d at 1105 (remanding the case for resentencing because after pronouncing the sentence the trial justice asked the defendant if he had anything to say); State v. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613, 618 (R.I. 1984) (holding that it was insufficient for the trial justice to rely upon a presentence report and then afford the defendant the opportunity to speak after sentencing him); Robalewski v. Superior Court, 97 R.I. 357, 361, 197 A.2d 751, 754 (1964) (holding that the court's denial of the defendant's request to be given a reasonable opportunity to explain incidents not of record and which were brought into issue by the assistant attorney general was an abuse of discretion).

In this case, the sentencing justice did not afford DeCiantis the personal opportunity to address the court until after he pronounced the consecutive life sentence. Although he quickly realized his mistake and belatedly recalled DeCiantis to the courtroom to afford him the opportunity to speak, the sentencing justice did not vacate the original sentence nor did he resentence DeCiantis after he exercised his right of allocution. Because the sentencing justice failed to do so, the court violated DeCiantis's right of allocution at the 1984 sentencing hearing. See Rule 32(...