State v. Delgado
| Decision Date | 31 December 2013 |
| Docket Number | 43567-5-II |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. NATHAN JOE DELGADO, Appellant. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Nathan Joe Delgado appeals his stipulated bench trial convictions for felony driving under the influence and driving with a suspended or revoked license. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence, in particular his blood alcohol test results, for lack of reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify "stopping" his vehicle and "seizing" him without a warrant.[1] Holding that the encounter was reasonable under the community caretaking exception to the constitutional warrant requirement, we affirm.
Nathan Joe Delgado was driving a pickup truck on Railroad Drive in downtown Port Angeles, along the waterfront, near the marina that provides ferry transportation across the United States border to Canada. Railroad Drive is "as close to the border as you can get without actually being in the water." Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (May 30, 2012) at 8. U.S. Border Patrol Agent Jose Romero observed binoculars on Delgado's pickup's dashboard and watched Delgado make abrupt stops in the middle of the empty roadway and then accelerate quickly and suddenly stop again. In his experience along the southern U.S. border, Romero had observed similar behavior when smugglers were scouting an area or looking to pick up humans or contraband. Romero continued to follow as Delgado continued to start and to stop abruptly in the middle of the road and then make a series of left turns. Now suspicious, Romero ran a license plate check for Delgado's pickup truck and learned that its tags were invalid. As Romero pulled closer, Delgado made a sudden, illegal left turn followed by another left turn. Unable to make the same turn safely, Romero proceeded down the street, turned around, and refueled at a gas station. At this point, Romero lost sight of Delgado.
At the same gas station, Delgado pulled up to the adjacent pump, shut off the truck's engine, and slumped in his seat. Romero approached and initially asked Delgado "if he was okay"[2]; it appeared that Delgado was impaired for some reason unknown to Romero[3], who then asked for his name, where he was from, and what he was doing in the area. According to Romero, Delgado's responses were "[s]omewhat incoherent": Romero "couldn't really make out anything [Delgado] was saying"; it appeared that Delgado "was being evasive"; and Delgado "didn't want to provide ... a name or tell. . . where he was from." VRP (May 30, 2012) at 14.
VRP (May 30, 2012) at 15. Delgado then ; after a few minutes, Delgado produced a Washington State identification card, but no driver's license. VRP (May 30, 2012) at 15. Romero believed that Delgado's "incoherence . . . stemm[ed] from either a health condition, [or] some type of either narcotic or alcohol use." VRP (May 30, 2012) at 16.
Delgado's vague responses arid initial failure to produce identification gave Romero the impression that Delgado was "trying to conceal his identity, " which caused Romero to wonder whether Delgado might be involved in "some type of criminal activity" that Romero "need[ed] to be concerned about[.]" VRP (May 30, 2012) at 16. Romero told Delgado he was- "going to call into radio dispatch" and asked for his vehicle keys, which Romero placed on Delgado's pickup truck roof. VRP (May 30, 2012) at 16. Romero took Delgado's identification card back to his patrol car, ran a check for "officer safety issues, " VRP (May 30, 2012) at 17, and learned that Delgado had "an extensive criminal history, " including "assault and various felonies, " "extraditable warrants out of Illinois and Colorado, "[4] "warrants out of Seattle, "[5] and "a prior flight from law enforcement." VRP (May 30, 2012) at 17. Romero detained him for a few minutes until Port Angeles Police Department Officer Dallas Maynard arrived to take Delgado into custody on the outstanding warrants. After handing off Delgado, Romero left.
Based on Delgado's strong odor of alcohol, Maynard arrested him on suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended or revoked license.[6] When Delgado refused to take a breathalyzer test, and after advising him of his Miranda[7] rights, Maynard drove Delgado to the hospital and requested a telephonic search warrant for two vials of his blood. The court granted the warrant, and a technician drew Delgado's blood for a blood alcohol test. A later analysis revealed that Delgado's blood alcohol content was .21 per 100 ml of blood.
The State charged Delgado with DUI and driving while his license was revoked or suspended. Because Delgado had been denied counsel at the police station, the trial court granted his motion to suppress his refusal to take a breathalyzer test.[8] Delgado also filed a separate CrR 3.6 motion to suppress all evidence obtained after his interaction with Romero, arguing that the stop had been illegal and, thus, all evidence gathered as a result was the "fruit of the poisonous tree."[9] The trial court denied this CrR 3.6 motion, ruling that, based on Delgado's actions and apparently impaired condition, (1) Romero had reason to suspect that Delgado was suffering from some sort of medical or other impairing condition and (2) Romero had acted reasonably in temporarily taking Delgado's keys and his identification to run a background check. Delgado did not object below that the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law on his suppression motions were inadequate.
Delgado waived his right to jury trial and stipulated to the facts. The trial court found him guilty of DUI and driving while his license was suspended. Delgado appeals.
Delgado assigns error to the trial court's (1) finding of fact 1 and conclusion of law 1— that Romero had a reasonable, articulable, non-pretextual basis for "stop[ping]" him (Delgado) and checking his identification; and (2) denial of his motion to suppress all evidence seized after this stop. Br. of Appellant at 1. Delgado argues that Romero lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop him and, therefore, violated federal and state constitutional prohibitions on warrantless search and seizure when he took Delgado's keys and identification. Delgado also argues that, if Romero had complied with constitutional requirements, he (Romero) would not have seized Delgado's identification and, consequently, local law enforcement would not have collected any evidence to charge him with DUI. Based on this reasoning, Delgado contends that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence of the blood alcohol test results as a "fruit of the poisonous tree" because it was procured as a result of Romero's initial allegedly unlawful seizure. Br. of Appellant at 20 (). These arguments fail.
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a suppression motion, we review the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether substantial evidence supports them and whether those findings support the trial court's conclusions of law. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242, 249, 207 P.3d 1266 (2009) (citing State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994)). Substantial evidence exists where there is a sufficient quantity of evidence in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding. Hill, 123 Wn.2d at 644 (citing State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 129, 857 P.2d 270 (1993)). We "defer to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of the evidence." State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (citing State v. Cord, 103 Wn.2d 361, 367, 693 P.2d 81 (1985)), abrogated in part on other grounds, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. Hill, 123 Wn.2d at 644 (citing In re Riley, 16 Wn.2d 32, 33, 454 P.2d 820, cert, denied, 396 U.S. 972 (1969) and Tomlinson v. Clarke, 118 Wn.2d 498, 501, 825 P.2d 706 (1992)). We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 249 ().
Both the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 7 of Washington's Constitution prohibit warrantless searches and seizures unless one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement applies.[10] Garvin, 166 Wn.2d at 249. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that a warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement. State v Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563 (1996) (citing State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 447, 909 P.2d 293 (1996)), overruled on other grounds by Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (...
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