State v. Derbyshire
| Decision Date | 06 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. COA12–1382.,COA12–1382. |
| Citation | 745 S.E.2d 886 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Adam DERBYSHIRE. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 2 June 2011 by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr., and judgment entered 1 June 2012 by Judge William R. Pittman in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 April 2013.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John W. Congleton, for the State.
Currin & Currin, Raleigh, by George B. Currin, for Defendant.
This case arises from the 8 November 2006 arrest of Adam Derbyshire (“Defendant”) on the charge of driving while impaired. The case has appeared before this Court once before, and, in a 2010 unpublished opinion, we described its procedural history as follows:
On 8 November 2006, Defendant was arrested and charged with driving while impaired. On 30 June 2008 Defendant was convicted of that offense in Wake County District Court and entered notice of appeal to Wake County Superior Court for a trial de novo. On 25 February 2009, Defendant filed a [m]otion to [s]uppress [e]vidence in Wake County Superior Court, alleging that no reasonable and articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop of his vehicle.
....
Defendant's motion to suppress was denied on 19 June 2009 by the Honorable Ronald L. Stephens. On 10 July 2009, Defendant pled guilty to the offense of driving while impaired in Wake County Superior Court. Defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Upon his guilty plea, the Honorable Abraham P. Jones sentenced Defendant to Level 5 punishment for driving while impaired[ ] and imposed a suspended sentence of sixty (60) days imprisonment and twelve (12) months unsupervised probation.
State v. Derbyshire, 207 N.C.App. 749, 701 S.E.2d 404 (2010) (unpublished disposition), available at 2010 WL 4290202 at *1. On appeal in that case, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to make written findings of fact to support its denial of his motion to suppress. Id. We agreed and remanded the case to the Wake County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Id. at *3.
A new evidentiary hearing was held on 31 May 2011. Thereafter, the trial court, the Honorable Howard E. Manning, Jr., presiding, denied Defendant's motion to suppress by written order entered 2 June 2011. In that order, the court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
.... The [c]ourt, having heard evidence and arguments of counsel, finds the facts to be as follows:
1. On Wednesday, 8 November 2006, Sergeant T.D. Turner [ (“Sgt.Turner”) ] was employed by the City of Raleigh as a police officer. She had been employed by the [City] for fifteen years prior to the date of this offense.
2. At or around 10:05[ ] that evening, Sgt. Turner first came into contact with [ ]Defendant[,] who was driving northbound on Glenwood Avenue[.]
3. Sgt. Turner's attention was ... drawn to [ ]Defendant's vehicle when she observed what she believed to be [ ]Defendant operating his vehicle with the high beam headlights activated.
4. Sgt. Turner testified that as is customary among motorists, she flashed her own high beam headlights roughly three times to inform [ ]Defendant to dim his headlights.
5. She further testified that [ ]Defendant did not appear to acknowledge this message and that[,] in addition, she observed that [ ]Defendant had a blank stare when she passed him.
6. Sgt. Turner then made a three point turn and began to follow [ ]Defendant's vehicle after which point she observed [ ]Defendant's vehicle weave in and out of his traffic lane, with the right tires crossing the dividing lane line.
7. Based on Sgt. Turner's observations of [ ]Defendant and his operation of his vehicle, she then activated her blue lights to initiate a traffic stop of [ ]Defendant's vehicle.
8. [ ]Defendant then testified and offered a conflicting account of the events that occurred that evening[.]
9. Defendant stated that he had been at dinner ... at Vin Restaurant off of Glenwood Avenue prior to the traffic stop[.] He also testified that he had a roughly two hour long dinner, [ ]during which he ... drank a martini and half a bottle of wine.
10. Defendant indicated that he did not have his high beam headlights activated and also did not see Sgt. Turner[ ] signaling for him to turn them off....
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the [c]ourt concludes as a matter of law that:
1. [ ]Defendant gave a materially conflicting version of the facts....
2. Sgt. Turner's version corroborates the fact that [ ]Defendant had been coming from Vin Restaurant when the event took place. Acknowledging the conflicts of these two versions, the [c]ourt finds Sgt. Turner's testimony to be credible.
3. The [c]ourt finds that Sgt. Turner reasonably believed [ ]Defendant's high beam headlights to have been activated, that she signaled three times for [ ]Defendant to turn them down, that she then followed Defendant's vehicle at which point she observed [ ]Defendant fail[ ] to maintain lane control.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances on this occasion, there was a sufficient basis upon which to form an articulable suspicion of impaired driving in the mind of a reasonable and cautious officer.
Defendant entered a plea of guilty on 1 June 2012, the Honorable William R. Pittman presiding. Defendant specifically reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. He gave notice of appeal in open court that same day.
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “Even if evidence is conflicting, the trial judge is in the best position to resolve the conflict.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). “Indeed, an appellate court accords great deference to the trial court in this respect because it is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any conflicts in the evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those findings, render a legal decision[.]” Cooke, 306 N.C. at 134, 291 S.E.2d at 619–20. “The trial court's conclusions of law, however, are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court's findings of fact are not adequate to support its conclusions of law; (2) the trial court's findings of fact and third conclusion of law are not supported by competent evidence; (3) Sgt. Turner did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to justify the stop of Defendant's vehicle; and (4) the trial court's conclusion that there was sufficient evidence “upon which to form an articulable suspicion of impaired driving in the mind of a reasonable and cautious officer” is legally inadequate to support the denial of his motion to suppress and does not reflect a correct application of legal principles. We agree with Defendant's third argument and reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress on those grounds. Because our determination on that issue is dispositive, we need not address Defendant's remaining arguments.
At the hearing, Sgt. Turner testified as follows to her reasons for stopping Defendant:
Q ... [O]n November 8th, 2006, approximately 10:05 p.m. did you come in contact with [ ]Defendant?
A Yes, sir, I did.
....
Q And where did you come in contact with [ ]Defendant?
A Along the Glenwood south corridor. I was heading southbound on Glenwood when I encountered [ ]Defendant coming northbound on Glenwood Avenue [in Raleigh].
....
Q And what drew your attention to [ ]Defendant?
A Initially, my attention was drawn to [ ]Defendant because of what I thought was his high beam lights were on. They were very, very bright and as we approached each other, I flashed my high beam lights at him three times and in an attempt to get him to dim his high beams and when that didn't occur, we began to meet almost as if to pass and I looked over at him and I observed a blank stare. He was very wide eyed and that's an indication of a potential for an impaired driver.
....
Q .... And now back to your encounter with [ ]Defendant, what happened after you made that three point turn?
A I fell in directly behind [ ]Defendant and began to follow him northbound on Glenwood Avenue.
Q Did you make any observations of [ ]Defendant's vehicle when you began to follow him?
A I did. As he proceeded northbound I observed him weave from left to right in his designated lane of travel. And as we crossed over ... Peace Street ..., I decided to activate my emergency equipment to investigate the potential that he might be an impaired driver.
Q And so the only—how many times did you see [ ]Defendant weave from left to right?
A I saw him weave left to right at least once. And as soon as we crossed over Peace Street I activated my blue lights.
Q And was the weaving entirely within his lane of travel or did he ever—
A I believe he went into the right-hand travel lane one time.
....
Q How far over in the right travel lane did [ ]Defendant cross?
A I don't believe I had that indicated in my notes, just that it was the right side of his tires crossed over.[ 1]
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Q Could you basically just sum up for the Court what ... made you decide to activate your blue lights.
A The training that I've received over the years has taught me that there are certain indicators and having bright lights on your vehicle or no lights at all is sometimes an indicator, coupled with other behavior like the...
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