State v. Wainwright
| Decision Date | 17 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. COA14–1036.,COA14–1036. |
| Citation | 240 N.C.App. 77,770 S.E.2d 99 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Jamie Cole WAINWRIGHT. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General J. Aldean Webster III, for the state.
The Robinson Law Firm, P.A., Greenville, by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendant.
Defendant appeals from the denial of his motions to suppress the investigatory stop of his vehicle and to quash the citation charging him with driving while impaired. We affirm.
Officer Chad Edwards was on duty in the early Sunday morning hours of 12 August 2007. Officer Edwards had four years of experience as a police officer, and had been employed by the East Carolina University Police Department for nearly a year. At approximately 2:37 a.m., Officer Edwards was standing beside his patrol car in the driveway of the Chancellor's residence on East Fifth Street. The Chancellor's residence is located directly across the street from the East Carolina University campus, three to four blocks from downtown Greenville. There are numerous bars and nightclubs located in the downtown area. The area around the Chancellor's residence is mostly comprised of student housing.
Officer Edwards was speaking with two women when he observed a grey Jeep Cherokee traveling toward downtown on East Fifth Street. The Jeep swerved to the right, crossed the white line marking the outside lane of travel, and almost hit the curb. The vehicle continued on East Fifth Street, and Officer Edwards observed nothing else unusual about the vehicle.
Officer Edwards testified he was concerned the vehicle would swerve again and strike a pedestrian. He stated pedestrian traffic in this immediate area was much heavier than normal. Students had moved back onto campus, but had not resumed their classes. The bars and nightclubs had stopped serving alcohol at 2:00 a.m., shortly before Officer Edwards observed the Jeep. Officer Edwards testified that one of the nightclubs located downtown has a capacity of 800 patrons, and it generally operated at full capacity on a Saturday night. About a dozen other establishments in the area serve alcohol. Many pedestrians were walking along the sidewalks on their way home from the bars and nightclubs in the downtown area. Officer Edwards testified some pedestrians were walking in the bicycle lane, and it was not unusual to observe some pedestrians walking in the road.
After he observed the grey Jeep swerve, Officer Edwards left the Chancellor's driveway and pulled into the roadway behind the vehicle.
He activated his blue lights and initiated a traffic stop. Officer Edwards, along with two other police officers, determined defendant, the driver, was impaired and arrested him. Defendant was transported to the Pitt County Detention Center and administered an Intoxilyzer test to determine his blood alcohol concentration. The Intoxilyzer test revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .11.
Defendant was tried before the Pitt County District Court on 12 November 2013, and was convicted of driving while impaired. He appealed the conviction to Pitt County Superior Court. Prior to trial, the Superior Court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop and to quash the citation.
The case was tried before a jury and defendant was convicted of driving while impaired. The trial court found aggravating factors of a prior driving while impaired conviction within seven years, and defendant was driving with a revoked license at the time of his arrest. He was sentenced as a Level 1 offender to a term of eighteen months of supervised probation, and was ordered to serve an active term of thirty days in prison. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues the trial court: (1) lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment on his driving while impaired conviction, because defendant did not sign the citation to acknowledge receipt and Officer Edwards did not certify delivery of the citation; (2) failed to enter a written order on the denial of his motion to suppress; and, (3) erred in denying his motion to suppress, because Officer Edwards did not form a reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant was impaired.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to quash the citation, which charged him with driving while impaired, because he did not sign the citation and Officer Edwards did not certify the delivery of the citation as mandated by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(d) (2013). He argues Officer Edwards's failure to follow the procedure set forth in the statute for service of a citation divested the court of jurisdiction to enter judgment on his conviction for driving while impaired. We disagree.
"An alleged error in statutory interpretation is an error of law, and thus our standard of review for this question is de novo. " Armstrong v. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 129 N.C.App. 153, 156, 499 S.E.2d 462, 466 (1998) (citations omitted). This Court also reviews challenges to the jurisdiction of the trial court under a de novo standard. McKoy v. McKoy, 202 N.C.App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks omitted).
"An officer may issue a citation to any person who he has probable cause to believe has committed a misdemeanor or infraction." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(b) (2013). The citation must:
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(c) (2013). The issuance of a citation requires the person to appear in court and answer a misdemeanor or infraction charge or charges, or waive his appearance. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(a) (2013).
The manner of service of a citation is governed by N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(d), which provides:
A copy of the citation shall be delivered to the person cited who may sign a receipt on the original which shall thereafter be filed with the clerk by the officer. If the cited person refuses to sign, the officer shall certify delivery of the citation by signing the original, which shall thereafter be filed with the clerk. Failure of the person cited to sign the citation shall not constitute grounds for his arrest or the requirement that he post a bond.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(d) (2013) (emphasis supplied).
The citation form includes a signature box for the defendant to sign to acknowledge receipt of a copy of the citation. The citation issued in this case is included in the record and does not bear defendant's signature. The citation form does not include an additional place for the officer to sign, in the event the defendant refuses to sign for receipt of the document. Officer Edwards signed the citation, as issuing officer, pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–301(a)(2) (2013). ("The citation must be signed and dated by the law-enforcement officer who issues it.").
The record indicates defendant was provided with a copy of the charges when he was brought before the magistrate. The Magistrate's Order, included on the citation, states defendant was arrested without a warrant, there is probable cause for the arrest, and that a copy of the order was delivered to defendant. The magistrate signed the order on 12 August 2007, the day of defendant's arrest.
Defendant argues that § 15A–302(d) requires Officer Edwards to have signed the citation a second time, because defendant did not sign to acknowledge receipt of a copy. We disagree.
"When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein." State v. Jackson, 353 N.C. 495, 501, 546 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2001) (quotation and citation omitted). The language of this statute is plain and unambiguous. The statute requires the officer to deliver a copy of the citation to the person charged. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(d) (2013). The accused may, but is not required to, sign the original citation to acknowledge receipt. Id. By the plain language of the statute, the officer is only required to sign and date the document if the defendant refuses to sign. Id. While the practice of some officers is to write "refused to sign" or some other notation, if defendant refuses or is unable to sign the citation, this notation is not required by the statute.
Here, there is no evidence defendant refused to sign the citation. Defendant's motion to quash alleges he "was not requested to sign, and did not sign acknowledging receipt" of a copy of the citation. Even if the absence of defendant's signature on the citation was a conscious refusal, defendant has failed to show Officer Edwards failed to follow the procedure set forth in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–302(d). Defendant's argument is overruled.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by failing to reduce the order, denying his motion to suppress to writing, and by failure to include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. We disagree.
In ruling on a motion to suppress, "[t]he judge must set forth in the record his findings of facts and conclusions of law." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–977(f) (2013). "This statute has been interpreted as mandating a written order unless (1) the trial court provides its rationale from the bench, and (2) there are...
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