State v. Diamante

• Decision Date: 30 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2010–50–C.A.,2010–50–C.A.
• Citation: 83 A.3d 546
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. Linda A. DIAMANTE.

83 A.3d 546

STATE

v.Linda A. DIAMANTE.

No. 2010–50–C.A.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 30, 2014.

Aaron L. Weisman, Department of Attorney General, for State.

Lara E. Montecalvo, Office of the Public Defender, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice ROBINSON, for the Court.

The defendant, Linda A. Diamante, appeals from the Superior Court's denial of a motion in which she sought the sealing of a particular judicial record.¹ This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After a close review of the record and careful consideration of the parties' arguments (both written and oral), we are satisfied that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

On October 24, 1994, defendant was charged by criminal information (P2/94–3350A) with felony assault with a dangerous weapon in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–5–2 (Count One) and willful or malicious injury to property in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–44–1 (Count Two). In July of 1995, Count One was dismissed in consideration of defendant pleading nolo contendere to Count Two.² The defendant was sentenced to one year of probation and was ordered to make restitution.

Nearly a decade later, on March 5, 2004, defendant filed, in the Superior Court for Providence County, a motion to seal with respect to both of the counts contained in P2/94–3350A.³ That motion was denied in its entirety by a justice of the Superior Court on February 16, 2005. The defendant confines herself on appeal to the hearing justice's denial, in reliance upon G.L.1956 § 12–1–12.1(a), of her motion with respect to Count One; she does not appeal the denial of her motion as it related to Count Two.

When explaining her rationale for denying defendant's motion to seal as it related to Count One, the hearing justice stated:

“The defendant * * * was seeking * * * to have the charges that were dismissed in * * * 1995 sealed, because they were dismissed pursuant to [Rule] 48(a) or [Rule] 48(b) by the Court. * * * The State objected to that, indicating under the statute, Rhode Island General Laws 12 – 1– 3.1, ⁴ the defendant is not entitled to sealing a dismissed charge unless acquitted of all counts in a criminal case. The statute does seem to say that. I don't know how we can interpret that any differently. So, I have to deny those motions.”

The defendant appealed the hearing justice's denial of her motion to seal as it related to Count One of the October 1994 criminal information.⁵

IIIssue on Appeal

On appeal, defendant contends that the hearing justice erred in denying the motion to seal the record relative to the dismissed 1994 charge of felony assault with a dangerous weapon. Specifically, defendant argues that § 12 – 1– 12(a) and § 12–1–12.1(a) are in conflict because, in her view, § 12 – 1– 12(a) mandates the sealing of all court records relating to a charge on which an individual has been exonerated, whereas § 12 – 1– 12.1(a) allows for a motion to seal court records only when an individual has been “acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a criminal case.” (Emphasis added.)

IIIStandard of Review

This Court reviews questions of statutory construction in a de novo manner. Downey v. Carcieri, 996 A.2d 1144, 1149 (R.I.2010); see alsoPlanned Environments Management Corp. v. Robert, 966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I.2009); State v. Briggs, 934 A.2d 811, 814 (R.I.2007). It is a fundamental principle that, “when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.” Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996); see alsoDeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co., 26 A.3d 585, 616 (R.I.2011); Sidell v. Sidell, 18 A.3d 499, 504 (R.I.2011). It is only when a statute is ambiguous that we “apply the rules of statutory construction and examine the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and purpose of the Legislature.” Tarzia v. State, 44 A.3d 1245, 1252 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoDowney v. Carcieri, 996 A.2d 1144, 1150 (R.I.2010).

IVAnalysis

AThe Relevant Statutes

The two statutes at issue in this appeal are § 12–1–12(a) and § 12–1–12.1(a). At the time of the trial justice's decision, § 12–1–12(a) provided as follows:

“Any fingerprint, photograph, physical measurements, or other record of identification, heretofore or hereafter taken by or under the direction of the attorney general, the superintendent of state police, the member or members of the police department of any city or town or any other officer authorized by this chapter to take them, of a person under arrest, prior to the final conviction of the person for the offense then charged, shall be destroyed by all offices or departments having the custody or possession within sixty (60) days after there has been an acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no information, or the person has been otherwise exonerated from the offense with which he or she is charged, and the clerk of court where the exoneration has taken place shall, consistent with § 12–1–12.1, place under seal all records of the person in the case including all records of the division of criminal identification established by § 12–1–4; provided that the person shall not have been previously convicted of any felony offense. Any person who shall violate any provision of this section shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).”

Similarly, at that time, § 12–1–12.1(a) provided as follows:

“Any person who is acquitted or otherwise exonerated of all counts in a criminal case, including, but not limited to, dismissal or filing of a no true bill or no information, may file for the sealing of his or her court records in the case, provided, that no person who has been convicted of a felony shall have his or her court records sealed pursuant to this section.” ⁶

A disposition amounting to exoneration is one of the preconditions for relief under both of these statutes, and the parties agree that defendant was clearly “exonerated” of Count One in the 1994 information due to the fact that the state dismissed that charge.

The defendant asserts that the hearing justice erred in denying the motion to seal because, defendant submits, §§ 12–1–12(a) and 12–1–12.1(a) are in conflict. The defendant posits that the conflict exists because § 12–1–12(a) provides for the sealing of all court records by the clerk of the court within sixty days after exoneration, provided the person has not previously been convicted of a felony and, therefore, the sealing of her court record pertaining to Count One, pursuant to § 12–1–12(a), is mandatory and not discretionary. However, § 12–1–12.1(a) provides for the sealing of all court records only when a person is exonerated of “all counts in a criminal case.” According to defendant's reading of the statutes, § 12–1–12(a) requires the sealing of court records that § 12–1–12.1(a) does not allow to be sealed. The defendant avers that, because of the alleged conflict, this Court should not rely merely on the plain language of the statute.

The state counters, contending that the plain language of § 12–1–12.1(a) clearly requires exoneration of all counts in a criminal case in order for the individual to be eligible to have his or her record sealed. Moreover, the state argues, § 12–1–12(a) deals with the destruction of physical identification records whereas § 12–1–12.1(a) deals with court records. The state also points out that the only time that court records are mentioned in § 12–1–12(a), a specific reference to the sealing requirements of § 12–1–12.1(a) is made. Consequently, the state contends: (1) that there is no conflict between the two statutory provisions; and (2) that this Court should affirm the trial justice's decision because it is based on the plain language of § 12–1–12.1(a).

Pursuant to our canons of statutory construction, we first address whether or not the statute in question has a plain meaning and is, as such, unambiguous. SeeDeMarco, 26 A.3d at 617;State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998). If we find the statute to be unambiguous, we simply apply the plain meaning and our interpretive task is done. See, e.g.,State v. Graff, 17 A.3d 1005, 1010 (R.I.2011) (“[W]e have indicated that a clear and unambiguous statute will be literally construed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Oliveira, 882 A.2d 1097, 1110 (R.I.2005) (“[W]hen we examine an unambiguous statute, there is no room for statutory construction and we must apply the statute as written”) (internal quotation marks omitted). We end the process of statutory construction upon concluding that a statute has a plain meaning because “our ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent,” and we have repeatedly observed that the plain language of a statute is the “best indicator of [legislative] intent.” Olamuyiwa v. Zebra Atlantek, Inc., 45 A.3d 527, 534 (R.I.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see alsoMartone v. Johnston School Committee, 824 A.2d 426, 431 (R.I.2003) (“[O]ur ultimate goal is to give effect to the General Assembly's intent * * * [and] [t]he best evidence of such intent can be found in the plain language used in the statute.”); Fleet National Bank v. Clark, 714 A.2d 1172, 1177 (R.I.1998) (“If the language is clear on its face, then the plain meaning of the statute must be given effect and the Court should not look elsewhere to discern the legislative intent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 237, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979) (“It is a primary canon of statutory construction that statutory...