State v. Doe

Decision Date10 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 27221.,27221.
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John DOE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Lisa D. Schultz argued.

Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. T. Paul Krueger II argued. SCHROEDER, Justice.

John Doe, age twelve, appeals his conviction for aggravated battery. Doe is accused of shooting his friend while spending the night at his house. He argues that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by police interrogation and that the magistrate court admitted hearsay evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 12, 1999, ten-year-old Nicholas H. and twelve-year-old John Doe were spending the night at Nicholas's home. The boys were playing in Nicholas's older brother's room. Nicholas decided to try to fix a pellet gun that he had been given. Doe noticed a rifle case in the corner of the room. He opened the case and found several rounds of ammunition. He loaded one round into the rifle and began playing with the gun. The gun went off and Nicholas was hit in the neck. He is now paralyzed from the neck down.

Police and emergency personnel responded to the scene. Nicholas was taken to the hospital and Doe was taken to the Boise Police Station. At 3:40 a.m. Detective Todd Dehlin questioned him. The interview was audiotaped. Doe's parents were not present during the interview but were located while the interview was taking place. He was questioned again on June 17, 1999. This interview was also audiotaped. Doe's mother was present at the police station but declined to be present during the interview. Doe ultimately terminated the interview and left with his mother.

On June 18, 1999, Detective Dehlin interviewed Nicholas in his hospital room. Nicholas discussed what he remembered from the night of the shooting and told Detective Dehlin that Doe had shot him.

That day Doe was charged with aggravated battery. A motion to suppress the statements made during the two interviews was denied by the magistrate. The magistrate conducted a court trial and found the charge of aggravated battery to be true. During trial, the magistrate allowed the videotape of Nicholas's interview at the hospital to be admitted into evidence. On January 27, 2000, Doe was committed to the Department of Juvenile Corrections for a period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The district court affirmed the magistrate court's decision and order. The district court ruled that the magistrate had abused his discretion in admitting the videotaped testimony but that the error was harmless.

Doe appeals to this Court, arguing that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statements made during the interview with Detective Dehlin and erred by admitting Nicholas's videotaped interview.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, this Court will defer to the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. However, free review is exercised over a trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found." State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469, 470, 20 P.3d 5, 6 (2001) (internal citations omitted).

A trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to allow hearsay evidence under IRE 803(24). This Court will not overturn the exercise of the trial court's discretion absent a clear showing of abuse. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, this Court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).

When reviewing a district court decision, acting in its appellate capacity, this Court is to review the record and the magistrate's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision. Walborn v. Walborn, 120 Idaho 494, 498, 817 P.2d 160, 164 (1991).

III.

THE MAGISTRATE DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that police must inform individuals of their Fifth Amendment rights prior to conducting "custodial interrogations." To determine whether an individual is in custody, "a court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, with the ultimate inquiry being `whether there [was] a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Doe, 130 Idaho 811, 816, 948 P.2d 166, 170 (Ct.App.1997) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)(quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977)). This is an objective test, and determined by whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand his or her situation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984).

To determine whether a confession is voluntary, the Court looks to the "`totality of the circumstances'" to determine "whether the defendant's will was overborne." State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187, 191, 998 P.2d 80, 84 (2000). The following factors must be considered in determining whether a confession was voluntary:

(1) Whether Miranda warnings were given;
(2) The youth of the accused;
(3) The accused's level of education or low intelligence;
(4) The length of detention;
(5) The repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and
(6) Deprivation of food or sleep.

State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993)(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 862 (1973)).

June 12, 1999 Interview

The State concedes that Doe was in custody for purposes of the June 12, 1999 interview. The State was required to apprise Doe of his Fifth Amendment rights, which Detective Dehlin did. Doe argues that although his Miranda warnings were read to him, his waiver of these rights was not voluntary.

Detective Dehlin read Doe his Miranda warnings, and Doe signed a waiver of these rights prior to being interrogated. An express written waiver of Miranda rights is strong proof of a voluntary waiver but is not conclusive proof. Any waiver of Miranda warnings must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

To determine whether a juvenile has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, a court must consider "the juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence," and "whether he had the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709, 712, 963 P.2d 392, 395 (Ct.App. 1998)(quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979)).

Doe argues that due to his age, experience, lack of sleep, and Detective Dehlin's insistence that he answer questions, that his waiver of his Miranda rights was involuntary. However, an examination of the audiotape and the transcript of the interview shows that Doe was aware of the rights he was waiving and that he understood the consequences of his actions.

At the beginning of the interview, Detective Dehlin downplays the importance of the Miranda warnings, stating that before he can speak with Doe, he needs to "read ... this little piece of paper." Responding to this, however, Doe replies, "read my rights," and states that he had his rights read to him earlier that day at Juvenile Court. He was at Juvenile Court for yelling at teachers. Detective Dehlin asks Doe: "So, you, you're familiar with these?" and Doe responds, "Yeah." Detective Dehlin then proceeds to recite the Miranda warnings to Doe. He asks Doe if he understands these warnings, and Doe replies "Yeah." Detective Dehlin asks Doe if he has any questions about these rights, and Doe asks, "Am I going to have the Judge and go court and stuff for this?" Detective Dehlin replies, "I don't know. That's why I need to talk to you."

Detective Dehlin finally asks Doe if he wants to talk about the day's events, and Doe responds, "Well, sort of. I don't like talking about it because it hurts me." Detective Dehlin then tells Doe, "You're going to have to answer some questions. Because we're going to have to ask you a few things about what happened, what was there, okay? If you want to talk to me, I just need to have you sign right there." Doe replies "okay" and signs the waiver form. The questioning regarding the shooting then begins.

Detective Dehlin then asks Doe a series of questions about what it means to lie, and tells Doe that he is experienced in being able to tell when a person is lying. He repeatedly tells Doe that he doesn't think that he's a "bad kid" or has a "dark spot" in his heart. When Detective Dehlin suspects that Doe is not being honest, he asks for the "good kid" to come out. Doe's parents finally arrive and shortly thereafter the interview ends.

It is clear that Detective Dehlin does state that the Miranda warnings are just a "little sheet of paper." He also states, "You're going to have to answer some questions." However, he carefully recites the warnings to Doe, and Doe makes it clear that he knows what the warnings are, and that they have been read to him before. Taking Doe's age and experience into account, it is clear that he had dealt with law enforcement before. While he was young, he knew what the Miranda rights were and...

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