State v. Dominguez
| Decision Date | 18 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 08-21-00036-CR |
| Parties | THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SATDIEL JEREMY DOMINGUEZ, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, Texas (TC# P-3968-112-CR)
Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Alley, JJ.
The State of Texas charged Appellee Satdiel Jeremy Dominguez with one count of possession of a controlled substance in penalty group one in an amount of 1-4 grams.[1] Dominguez moved to suppress the narcotics evidence, arguing that the drugs were seized from his vehicle following an unreasonably prolonged traffic stop that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Following a hearing on Dominguez's motion to suppress the trial court granted the motion, entering detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State now appeals the court's order granting the motion. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01(5) ().
For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.
During a suppression hearing, Sergeant Thomas Ronquillo testified that on October 11, 2018, he was assigned to a narcotics task force with the Fort Stockton Police Department. That day Ronquillo was driving a marked patrol vehicle when he observed Dominguez in the driver's seat of a Jeep Renegade parked at a Dollar General store. Another person was also present in the Jeep. Ronquillo was familiar with Dominguez from prior investigations, and upon running the registration of Dominguez's Jeep while it was parked at the store, he discovered that the vehicle's registration had expired. Dominguez drove away from the parking lot, and Ronquillo began following him "for a little bit through the town". Further testimony revealed that Ronquillo followed Dominguez for over five miles through Fort Stockton. At some point, Dominguez dropped off his passenger at a house, and after Dominguez drove away, Ronquillo conducted a traffic stop for the Jeep's expired registration.
Once stopped, Dominguez acknowledged that the vehicle's registration was expired. While they were speaking, Ronquillo noticed that Dominguez was "pretty nervous," his hands were shaking, and he had just lit a cigarette, which suggested to Ronquillo that Dominguez was attempting to calm his nerves. Ronquillo also noticed the presence of a radar detector in the vehicle. Based on his experience, Ronquillo believed that individuals involved in narcotics trafficking often use radar detectors to alert themselves to the presence of nearby law-enforcement officers. Finally, Ronquillo agreed that he wrote in his report that he detected a "faint" odor of marihuana, but that the odor was too weak to positively identify the odor as marihuana. At the inception of the stop, Ronquillo asked Dominguez for proof of insurance for the vehicle, but Dominguez only first provided proof of an expired insurance policy.
Ronquillo then had Dominguez exit the vehicle. While Ronquillo continued to get information from Dominguez and ran his information with dispatch, Sergeant Daniel Rangel, a drug-sniffing dog handler with the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS), arrived on scene. Ronquillo asked Dominguez for permission to search the Jeep. Dominguez denied the request. Ronquillo claimed that as he awaited dispatch to confirm the insurance information and as he continued with the traffic investigation, Rangel ran his drug-sniffing dog around the Jeep. The dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle, and Ronquillo conducted a pat-down search of Dominguez's person, which yielded a marihuana pipe from his pocket. Rangel searched the interior of the Jeep and found marihuana and a small cylinder containing a substance he believed to be methamphetamine. Ronquillo subsequently arrested Dominguez for possession of marihuana and methamphetamine.
On cross-examination, Ronquillo testified that he wrote in his report that he believed Dominguez to be "higher up in the narcotics business" and that he had conducted a traffic stop of Dominguez on a previous occasion. Ronquillo acknowledged that he would have been justified in conducting a traffic stop for the expired registration while the vehicle was parked at the Dollar General store, and that he did not need to follow Dominguez for such a long time before initiating the traffic stop. Ronquillo also agreed that he had called for a K-9 unit to respond before initiating the traffic stop, and that Dominguez had admitted that the registration was expired while Ronquillo awaited the K-9 unit. Ronquillo also acknowledged that he did not mention the odor of marihuana in any of the body-cam videos made at the scene of the stop.
The trial court granted Dominguez's motion to suppress by written order, concluding that Ronquillo lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the detention beyond the reasons for the initial traffic stop. The trial court also entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law that we detail below.
The State challenges the trial court's order granting Dominguez's motion to suppress in three issues, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred by concluding that Ronquillo subjected Dominguez to an illegally prolonged detention; (2) the officer would have been justified to detain Dominguez even after the traffic violation was resolved based on reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity; and (3) a free-air sniff by a canine is not a search and can be the basis of probable cause to search.
Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. See State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 2020). A trial court's findings of historical fact, and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor, are afforded almost total deference if they are reasonably supported by the record. See id., citing Sims v. State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex.Crim.App. 2019). The same deferential standard of review is applied to a trial court's determination of facts that are based on a video recording admitted at the suppression hearing. See State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). Appellate courts may review de novo "indisputable visual evidence" contained in a videotape. Id. A trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the facts is reviewed de novo. See id.
When the trial court makes findings of fact, a reviewing court determines whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the court's ruling, supports those findings. See Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). The prevailing party is afforded the "strongest legitimate view of the evidence," along with all reasonable inferences that can come from it. Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 570, quoting State v. Weaver, 349 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011).
A traffic stop and any ensuing detention must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Ramirez-Tamayo v. State, 537 S.W.3d 29, 36 (Tex.Crim.App. 2017). "Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has 'specific articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.'" Id., quoting Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex.Crim.App. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). A reasonable suspicion is more than a mere hunch; the standard requires considerably less proof of wrongdoing than a preponderance of the evidence, and less than is necessary for probable cause. Garcia v. State, No 08-19-00176-CR, 2021 WL 235658, at *4 (Tex.App.--El Paso Jan. 25, 2021, no pet.) (not designated for publication), citing Kansas v. Glover, 140 S.Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) ( that reasonable suspicion falls considerably short of 51% accuracy). When determining whether reasonable suspicion to conduct a detention exists, we disregard the subjective motives of the arresting officer and instead determine whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention. See Ramirez-Tamayo, 537 S.W.3d at 36; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation." Garcia, 2021 WL 235658, at *4, citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic citation, an officer's mission during a traffic stop includes "ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). Such inquiries typically involve determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, running a record's check on the driver's license, and inspecting the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. See id. (), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979). And because traffic stops are "especially fraught with danger to police officers," law enforcement may also order a driver to exit a vehicle lawfully detained for a traffic violation without violating the Fourth Amendment. Garcia, 2021 WL 235658, at *4, quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330-31 (2009). But "[l]acking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the officer's traffic mission." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 356.
The seizure of the driver "ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop." Garcia,...
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