State v. Eddington
| Decision Date | 17 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0377.,2 CA-CR 2008-0377. |
| Citation | 244 P.3d 76,226 Ariz. 72 |
| Parties | The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Douglas Lee EDDINGTON, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Terry Goddard, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani and David A. Sullivan, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellee.
Robert J. Hirsh, Pima County Public Defender By Rebecca A. McLean, Tucson, Attorneys for Appellant.
¶ 1 Following a jury trial, appellant Douglas Eddington was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court's refusal to strike a potential juror for cause requires reversal. He also contends his conviction should be reversed or reduced because the jury received defective instructions regarding second-degree murder and the consideration of lesser offenses. We conclude the court erred in refusing to strike the challenged juror for cause given that he was a peace officer employed by the same office that had investigated the case. Finding no prejudice, however, we affirm.
¶ 2 After an investigation by the Pima County Sheriff's Department, Eddington and two codefendants were charged with first-degree murder. During voir dire on the first day of trial, a venireman testified he was a Pima County sheriff's deputy and knew between one-third and one-half of the state's fourteen potential witnesses from the sheriff's department, including the lead detective, Christopher Hogan. The deputy further stated he currently was assigned to provide security at the Pima County Superior Court. He also stated without elaboration that he understood why there were two security officers in the courtroom, a comment which suggested he knew Eddington was being held in custody.2
¶ 3 Based on these facts, Eddington moved the trial court to strike the deputy for cause. The court denied the motion, referring to the deputy's repeated avowals that he could be a fair and impartial juror and would not treat the testimony of law enforcement officers differently from that of any other witness. "[G]iven the record ... we have in terms of the questions and the responses," the court concluded, "there's not sufficient basis to strike him for cause." Eddington subsequently removed the deputy from the panel by use of a peremptory strike. Eddington was ultimately acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced as noted above. This appeal followed.
¶ 4 Eddington contends his conviction should be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the deputy for cause. Eddington specifically urged the court to strike the deputy from the venire panel because the deputy "work[ed] for the same agency" as "all the law enforcement witnesses," 3 because he "kn[ew] a third of the witnesses," and because the deputy was aware Eddington was in custody.4
¶ 5 As a general matter, a trial court must dismiss a juror for cause when "there is [a] reasonable ground to believe that [the] juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict." Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.4(b). The party challenging the juror bears the burden of establishing that the juror could not be unbiased and fair. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 13, 951 P.2d 869, 878 (1997). "In assessing a potential juror's fairness and impartiality, the trial court has the best opportunity to observe prospective jurors and thereby judge the credibility of each." State v. Hoskins, 199 Ariz. 127, ¶ 37, 14 P.3d 997, 1009 (2000). We therefore review a trialcourt's assessment of that question only for a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
¶ 6 Under the above standards, a peace officer is not automatically barred from serving as a juror. See State v. Hill, 174 Ariz. 313, 319, 321, 848 P.2d 1375, 1381, 1383 (1993) (); see also A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(5) (). Although "the impartiality of a potential juror who is personally acquainted with individuals involved in the prosecution is necessarily suspect," such acquaintances alone are not grounds for automatic disqualification. Hill, 174 Ariz. at 319, 848 P.2d at 1381.
¶ 7 However, any individual is disqualified by law from sitting on a jury if he or she is "interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation." A.R.S. § 21-211(2). We review the applicability of a statutory provision de novo and are not bound by the trial court's conclusions of law. See Reeder v. Johnson, 225 Ariz. 312, ¶ 6, 238 P.3d 123, 125 (App.2010) (); State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, ¶ 2, 162 P.3d 650, 651 (App.2007) (); see also Lopez v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., 177 Ariz. 371, 373-75, 868 P.2d 954, 956-58 (1993) ().
¶ 8 We hold that when a peace officer 5 is currently employed by the same agency, office, or department that conducted the investigation in a criminal case, that officer has, at minimum, an indirect interest in the case and must therefore be stricken for cause from a venire panel under § 21-211(2).6 In any criminal prosecution, law enforcement officers and prosecutors work together as agents of the state. See State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 243-44, 211 P.2d 821, 826 (1949) (); State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 232, 239, 836 P.2d 445, 452 (App.1992) (). Indeed, as our rules of procedure reflect, police investigators often literally serve beside prosecutors in the courtroom in attempting to prove the state's case. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 9.3(d) (); e.g., State v. Jones, 185 Ariz. 471, 483, 917 P.2d 200, 212 (1996) (); State v. Williams, 183 Ariz. 368, 379, 904 P.2d 437, 448 (1995) ().
¶ 9 Although prosecutors and peace officers alike have a broad interest in attaining justice in every case, see State v. Hughes, 193 Ariz. 72, ¶ 33, 969 P.2d 1184, 1192 (1998), peace officers, like prosecutors, also have a particular interest in seeing that the criminal cases their offices have investigated and developed are successfully prosecuted. Our jurisprudence recognizes that law enforcement can often become a " 'competitive enterprise,' " just like any other human endeavor. State v. Watling, 104 Ariz. 354, 358, 453 P.2d 500, 504 (1969), quoting Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S.Ct. 1245, 2 L.Ed.2d 1503 (1958). If nothing else, a prosecution that results in a conviction closes a case and thereby conserves a police department's limited resources. Officers therefore have some interest in any investigation in which their own department has an institutional interest. And, in such event, they should be removed from a jury for cause, just as a deputy county attorney who works inthe same office as the prosecutor should be removed from a jury panel. See People v. Terry, 30 Cal.App.4th 97, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 729, 732 (1994).
¶ 10 Peace officers also have some interest in matters investigated by their own departments arising from their role as an employee of the organization that has a stake in the outcome of the case. The same considerations noted in Terry regarding prosecutors serving as jurors apply equally to peace officers called to judge their colleagues' work and credibility: When a case has been investigated and referred for prosecution by one's own employer, a peace officer serving as a juror might feel reluctant to join an adverse verdict because the case has been "brought by a fellow [investigator] from his own office" and presumptively "supervised by his own superior." 35 Cal.Rptr.2d at 731; see also Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P.2d 665, 670-71 (1952) (). 7
¶ 11 By the above standards, the deputy's interests in these proceedings were especially pronounced. He had a professional relationship with more of the state's witnesses than he could precisely count—including the lead homicide detective, who both testified as a state's witness and sat at the prosecutor's table during portions of the trial. If seated as a juror, the deputy would necessarily be forced to judge the credibility and conduct of his coworkers, a role with potential consequences for his future working relationships. Disqualifying people with such professional entanglements and presumed allegiances was one of the clear purposes behind § 21-211(2). See § 21-211(3) (); see also Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 245 Pa.Super. 88, 369 A.2d 307, 308-09 (1976) (); cf. State v. Davis, 137 Ariz. 551, 555, 559-60, 672 P.2d 480, 484, 488-89 (App.1983) ().
¶ 12 By broadly excluding people "interested directly or indirectly in the matter under investigation," §...
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