State v. Enriquez
| Decision Date | 21 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2 CA-CR 2013-0518,2 CA-CR 2013-0518 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. MARIO HIPOLITO ENRIQUEZ, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Arizona |
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the superior Court in pima County
The Honorable Jane L. Eikleberry, Judge
AFFIRMED
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel, Phoenix
By Jonathan Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee
Stanton Bloom, P.C., Tucson
By Stanton Bloom
Counsel for Appellant
Judge Howard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Vásquez concurred.
¶1 Following a jury trial, Mario Enriquez was convicted of second-degree murder. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in various evidentiary rulings, by allowing the victim's family to decline interviews by the defense, by requiring Enriquez to wear leg braces while testifying, by restricting his cross-examination of a witness, and by denying three motions for a mistrial. He also contends the court provided improper jury instructions and illegally sentenced him to the presumptive term. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. State v. Waller, 235 Ariz. 479, ¶ 2, 333 P.3d 806, 809 (App. 2014). In November 2011, Enriquez, along with two others, entered the house of the victim, W.H. Enriquez then shot W.H. several times with an AK-47 and the men left. W.H. called 9-1-1, but died from the gunshot wounds before police arrived.
¶3 Enriquez was charged with first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. A jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to the presumptive sixteen-year prison term. We have jurisdiction over his appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 13-4033(A)(1).
¶4 Enriquez argues the trial court erred in denying two of his motions to suppress. "We review the denial of a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion." State v. Perez, 233 Ariz. 38, ¶ 25, 308 P.3d 1189, 1195 (App. 2013). In our review, "we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing and view it in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's factual findings." State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, ¶ 8, 179 P.3d 954, 956 (App. 2008).
¶5 Enriquez first argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during a police interview because his statements were involuntary, thereby violating his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. A statement is involuntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the will of the defendant was overborne. State v. Hall, 120 Ariz. 454, 456, 586 P.2d 1266, 1268 (1978). "[S]tatements or confessions by an accused are prima facie involuntary and the state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of such statements." State v. Emery, 131 Ariz. 493, 498, 642 P.2d 838, 843 (1982). "A prima facie case for admission of a [statement] is made when the officer testifies that the [statement] was obtained without threat, coercion or promises of immunity or a lesser penalty." State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420, 424, 590 P.2d 1366, 1370 (1979).
¶6 After Enriquez was taken into custody pursuant to an arrest warrant, detectives provided him with a Miranda1 warning. One of the detectives then added, "You can basically answer whatever questions you want[,] and once you understand what the whole thing's about[,] it's up to you." Enriquez unambiguously invoked his right to counsel and the interrogation stopped. As the detectives were leaving the interrogation room, one of detectives stated,
¶7 At that point, Enriquez began asking the detectives questions, indicated he was willing to answer some of their questions, and waived his right to remain silent. One of his questions was "But even if I answer the questions in the end I still go to jail, right?" A detective responded,
¶8 Enriquez argues that his statements were involuntary because the Miranda warning was inadequate and the officer improperly induced him into making a statement. We address the alleged Miranda violation first, which Enriquez contends occurred based on the officer's addition of "[y]ou can basically answer whatever questions you want[,] and once you understand what the whole thing's about[,] it's up to you."
¶9 Generally, "[v]oluntariness and Miranda are two separate inquiries." State v. Montes, 136 Ariz. 491, 494, 667 P.2d 191, 194 (1983). But a Miranda violation "gives 'added weight' to other circumstances that make a confession involuntary." State v. Pettit, 194 Ariz. 192, ¶ 19, 979 P.2d 5, 9 (App. 1998), quoting Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966); see also A.R.S. § 13-3988(B)(3), (4).
¶10 A proper Miranda warning must convey certain "essential information" to a suspect, which includes: "'[1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.'" State v. Carlson, 228 Ariz. 343, ¶ 8, 266 P.3d 369, 372 (App. 2011), quoting Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 59-60 (2010). "If the sum total of statements in a Miranda advisory reasonably conveys the essential information, the warning will be deemed constitutionally adequate." Id. ¶ 9.
¶11 Here, the officers informed Enriquez of the "essential information" necessary for a Miranda advisory. See id. ¶ 8. Enriquezhas not provided any authority for his claim that the additional statement violated Miranda. Nor has he explained how the officer's additional statement undermined or contradicted that warning in any way. Moreover, despite the officer's addition to the traditional Miranda warning, Enriquez unambiguously invoked his right to remain silent. And Enriquez does not dispute that he re-initiated contact with the detectives after invoking his right to remain silent. Consequently, because the warning "reasonably convey[ed] the essential information," it was "constitutionally adequate" and no Miranda violation occurred. Id. ¶ 9.
¶12 Enriquez next claims he was improperly induced into making a statement. Enriquez contends the detective "gave [him] the hope and promise that if he made the right statement, he would or could be released." He argues this was an improper "inducement" because the detective knew Enriquez would be sent to jail "until further order or released by the court," in compliance with the arrest warrant.
¶13 But at the motion to suppress hearing, the detective testified that, had Enriquez provided an adequate explanation, there was an "outside chance" the county attorney would choose to release him. Based on this testimony, the detective did not lie to Enriquez in order to induce a statement, and the crux of his argument fails.
¶14 Moreover, even if the detective's statement was false, "courts will tolerate some form of police gamesmanship so long as the games do not overcome a suspect's will and induce a confession not truly voluntary." State v. Tapia, 159 Ariz. 284, 290, 767 P.2d 5, 11 (1988). "So long as the promise is 'couched in terms of a mere possibility or an opinion,' the promise is generally not sufficient to render a confession involuntary." State v. Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 579, 911 P.2d 577, 585 (App. 1995), quoting State v. McVay, 127 Ariz. 18, 20, 617 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1980). In State v. Patterson, 105 Ariz. 16, 17, 458 P.2d 950, 951 (1969), police told the defendant that whether he remained in custody depended on what he told them. Our supreme court concluded the defendant's ensuing statement was not involuntary because the defendant "could not have been unaware that if his version was unsatisfactory he would be prosecuted." Id.
The court found the police conduct was acceptable so long as the defendant previously had been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and have an attorney present. Id.
¶15 Enriquez relies on State v. McFall, 103 Ariz. 234, 439 P.2d 805 (1968), to support his argument. In McFall, the defendant was a drug addict who had been arrested for forging prescriptions for narcotics. Id. at 235-36, 439 P.2d at 806-07. When he asked officers to give him some of his drugs, their answer implied they might give him some if he completed the interrogation. Id. Our supreme court noted the "possible compulsive circumstances" created by officers "insinuati[ng]" they might give an addict drugs and concluded the defendant's subsequent statement was involuntary. Id. at 236-37, 439 P.2d at 807-08.
¶16 Here, unlike the situation in McFall, no "compulsive circumstances" existed; Enriquez was not a drug addict being promised drugs as a reward for his cooperation. Instead, the detective's statement—that whether Enriquez would be released that night depended on what he said—was merely a possibility, like the statements made by police in Patterson. See 105 Ariz. at 17, 458 P.2d at 951. Enriquez had been read his Miranda rights and "could not have been unaware that if his version was unsatisfactory he would be prosecuted." Id. Enriquez's awareness of this fact is further supported by his question at the end of the interview, "So I'm being charged, right?" Although the existence of the arrest warrant in this case differentiates these facts from Patterson, see id., even if the statement that Enrique might be released was...
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