State v. Encinas-Pablo
| Docket Number | 2 CA-CR 2019-0188 |
| Decision Date | 11 August 2022 |
| Parties | The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daren Dominic Encinas-Pablo, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. CR20174932001 The Honorable Michael J. Butler, Judge
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General Linley Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Jacob R. Lines, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Megan Page, Pima County Public Defender By David J. Euchner Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Presiding Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Vice Chief Judge Staring and Judge Espinosa concurred.
¶1 Daren Encinas-Pablo appeals his convictions and sentences for one count of first-degree murder and two counts each of armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. He argues the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that he was "not constitutionally entitled to be competent" for the purpose of rejecting a plea agreement. He also argues that a mandatory life sentence with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years was unconstitutionally disproportionate as applied to him, a juvenile at the time of the offense. For the following reasons, we affirm Encinas-Pablo's convictions and sentences.
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdicts and resolve all reasonable inferences against Encinas-Pablo. See State v. Gill, 248 Ariz 274, ¶ 2 (App. 2020). In October 2017, Encinas-Pablo and an accomplice, Joseph S., approached N.E. and his fiancé, M.B., and asked to buy methamphetamine. When N.E. agreed to sell them $10 worth of drugs, Encinas-Pablo produced a gun, and he and Joseph S. robbed the couple. They handed over jewelry, a bag of drugs, and five dollars. M.B. then got on her bike to leave, turned around to see if N.E. was following her, but instead saw the flash of gunfire. N.E. was shot four times and died later that night from his injuries.
¶3 Shortly after the shooting, Encinas-Pablo was found nearby with a gunshot wound to his abdomen and taken to the hospital. Law enforcement found N.E.'s jewelry in Encinas-Pablo's clothes, which had been cut off and left behind by paramedics. Detectives interviewed Encinas-Pablo at the hospital, where he eventually admitted to participating in a robbery.
¶4 After a five-day jury trial in which the state argued Encinas-Pablo was guilty of first-degree murder on the theory of felony murder, he was convicted as described above. He was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after twenty-five years for first-degree murder, to be served concurrently to the sentences for the other six counts.[1] This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, § 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).[2]
¶5 Encinas-Pablo first contends the trial court erred by stating he was not entitled to be found competent before rejecting a plea offer. He also argues the standard for competency should be applied differently for purposes of considering a plea offer, and alternatively, that Arizona should adopt a heightened competency standard for pleading defendants. These are questions of law that we review de novo. See State v Duffy, 251 Ariz. 140, ¶ 10 (2021).
¶6 Before trial, the state offered Encinas-Pablo a plea to one count of second-degree murder, with a sentencing range of ten to twenty-five years. Encinas-Pablo rejected the offer during a Donald hearing, and the trial court inquired if it could "presume he's competent," and whether there was "an issue about his ability to reject the plea," observing "this is the most important decision he's ever going to make in this whole process."[3] Defense counsel stated that Encinas-Pablo was "neurologically incapable of thinking beyond the moment because of a neurocognitive disorder," but that "doesn't mean he's incompetent." Given counsel's comment, the court indicated there should be an evaluation of Encinas- Pablo's competency before he accepted or rejected the plea, and declined to accept Encinas-Pablo's rejection of the offer at that time. The court ordered a Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P., preliminary evaluation.
¶7 At the Rule 11 competency hearing, Encinas-Pablo presented expert testimony that he did "not have the capacity to competently accept or reject a plea due to deficits in abstract reasoning," without addressing his competency to stand trial. The trial court also considered two court-ordered expert reports finding Encinas-Pablo competent and testimony by a court-appointed expert that Encinas-Pablo displayed a "factual and a rational understanding of the legal proceedings in general," and "of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting a plea versus going to trial." The expert opined Encinas-Pablo believed the plea bargain was "not fair" given that it could result in a sentence of twenty-four years of imprisonment, not dissimilar from what he might receive if he was found guilty at trial.
¶8 The trial court observed, Encinas-Pablo "clearly understands the difference between what he's being offered and what he could face" and "understand[s] it in the context of his own plea." It also told Encinas-Pablo that he had raised an issue "for which there is no legal support." A few days later, the court held another Donald hearing, noting that it had reviewed the cases cited and they did not include a It further explained that Encinas-Pablo would not be waiving any rights, but that he had been "adequately advised of the plea offer and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily rejected] the plea offer."
¶9 At a subsequent hearing, the trial court asked Encinas-Pablo to clarify his position as to competency to stand trial. He stipulated that he was competent to stand trial, but re-stated his position that "he was not competent to reject a plea." The court then found that Encinas-Pablo "understood] the nature of the proceedings and [was] able to assist in his own defense," and was "competent for trial."
¶10 On appeal, Encinas-Pablo argues the trial court erred in ruling he "was not constitutionally entitled to be competent . . . to accept or reject a plea bargain," and his conviction should be reversed or the matter remanded to the court for additional fact-finding as to his competency. Despite stipulating to his competence to stand trial, he contends he was not competent to reject the plea bargain offered by the state because his "particular incompetencies affected decision making involved in entering a guilty plea but not . . . in assisting counsel at trial." He suggests that although there is one competency standard, it may be applied differently to a defendant's competency to accept or reject a plea as compared to his competency to stand trial. Alternatively, he advocates Arizona should, pursuant to article II, § 4 of the Arizona Constitution, adopt a different competency standard for a defendant's decision to either accept or reject a plea, as "there is no principled reason for having an identical standard for competency to stand trial and competency to enter a plea." The state counters that the court did not err because it found Encinas-Pablo competent to stand trial and the same standard applies to competency to reject a plea agreement.
¶11 When a defendant's competency is at-issue, a trial court must conduct a two-stage inquiry before permitting him to enter a guilty plea, because pleading guilty involves the waiver of important federal constitutional rights, including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01 (1993) (two-step inquiry); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (); State v. Djerf, 191 Ariz. 583, ¶¶ 34, 35 (1998) (applying Boykin to defendant accepting a plea agreement), abrogated on other grounds by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004). Similarly, a defendant who pleads not guilty and stands trial is likely to be confronted with "choices that entail relinquishment of the same rights that are relinquished by a defendant who pleads guilty." Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99.
¶12 In applying this test, a trial court first must determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial by asking if he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." [4] Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); see Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99 (). After determining a defendant is competent, the second stage of the inquiry requires the court to ascertain whether the waiver of constitutional rights implicated by a plea of guilty is both knowing and voluntary. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400-01; see State v. Rose, 231 Ariz. 500, ¶¶ 26, 31, 36 (2013) (where competency at-issue, entry of guilty plea requires competency finding and knowing, voluntary waiver of rights). "The purpose of the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry . . . is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced." Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400-01 & n.12 (...
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